The prince

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MACHIAVELLI'S PRINCE

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^BY W. K. MARRIOTT,
F. R. Hist. S.

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THE PRINCE
By NICOLO
MACHIAVELU f^^
Translated by
WKMarriott

"FRHisLS- t:^^<S)

LONDON &.TORONTO
PUBUSHED BYJ M DENT
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First Issue of this Edition
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INTRODUCTION

NicoLO Machiavelli was bom at Florence on
May 3, 1469. He was the second son of
Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of
some repute, and of Bartolommea di Stefano
Nelli, his wife. Both parents were members of
the old Florentine nobility.

His hfe falls naturally into three periods, each
of which singularly enough constitutes a distinct
and important era in the history of Florence.
His youth was concurrent with the greatness
of Florence as an Italian power under the
guidance of Lorenzo de' Medici, II Magnifico.
The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred
in 1494, in which year Machiavelli entered
the pubUc service. During his ofl&cial career
Florence was free under the government of a
Repubhc, which lasted until 1512, when the
Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost
his office. The Medici again ruled Florence
from 1512 until 1527, when they were once more
driven out. This was the period of Machia-
veUi's literary activity and increasing influence;

vii

viii Introduction

but he died, within a few weeks of the expulsion
of the Medici, on June 22. 1527, in his fifty-
eighth year, without having regained office.

YOUTH

^T. 1-25— I469-I494

Although there is little recorded of the youth
of Machiavelli, the Florence of those days is so
well known that the early environment of this
representative citizen may be easily imagined,
Florence has been described as a city with two
opposite currents of Ufe, one directed by the
fervent and austere Savonarola, the other by
the splendour-loving Lorenzo. Savonarola's in-
fluence upon the young Machiavelli must have
been slight, for although at one time he wielded
immense power over the fortunes of Florence,
he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject for
a gibe in The Prince, where he is cited as an
example of an unarmed prophet who came to
a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the
Medicean rule during the fife of Lorenzo appears
to have impressed MachiaveUi strongly, for he
frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is
to Lorenzo's grandson that he dedicates The
Prince,

Introduction ix

MachiaveUi, in his " History of Florence,"
gives us a picture of the young men among
whom his youth was passed. He writes: —
" They were freer than their forefathers in
dress and living, and spent more in other
kinds of excesses, consuming their time and
money in idleness, gaming, and women; their
chief aim was to appear well dressed and to
speak with wit and acuteness, whilst he who
could wound others the most cleverly was
thought the wisest." In a letter to his son
Guido, MachiaveUi shows why youth should
avail itself of its opportunities for study, and
leads us to infer that his own youth had been
so occupied. He writes: — " I have received
your letter, which has given me the greatest
pleasure, especially because you tell me you
are quite restored to health, than which I could
have no better news; for if God grant life to
you, and to me, I hope to make a good man of
you if you are willing to do your share." Then,
writing of a new patron, he continues: — " Tnis
will turn out well for you, but it is necessary for
you to study ; since, then, you have no longer the
excuse of illness, take pains to study letters and
music, for you see what honour is done to me for
the httle skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you
'msh to please me, and to bring success and
honour to yourself, do right and study, because
others wUl help you if you help yourself."

X Introduction

OFFICE

^T. 25-43— 1494-15 12

The second period of Machiavelli's life was
spent in the service of the free Republic of Flor-
ence, which flourished, as stated above, from the
expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return
in 1512. After serving four years in one of the
public ofi&ces he was appointed Chancellor and
Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of
Liberty and Peace. Here we are on firm ground
when dealing with the events of Machiavelli's
life, for during this time he took a leading part
in the affairs of the Republic, and we have its
decrees, records, and despatches to guide us, as
well as his own writings. A mere recapitulation
of a few of his transactions with the statesmen
and soldiers of his time gives a fair indication
of his activities, and supphes the sources from
which he drew the experiences and characters
which illustrate The Prince.

His first mission was in 1499 to Caterina
Sforza, the Madonna di Forh of The Prince, from
whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that
it is far better to earn the confidence of the people
than to rely on fortresses. This is a very notice-
able principle in Machiavelli, and is urged by

Introduction xi

him in many ways as a matter of vital import-
ance to princes.

In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms
from Louis XII. for continuing the war against
Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct of
affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors
in statecraft summarised in The Prince, and was
consequently driven out. He, also, it was who
made the dissolution of his marriage a condition
of support to Pope Alexander VI. ; which leads
MachiaveUi to refer those who urge that such
promises should be kept to what he has written
concerning the faith of princes.

Machiavelli's public life was largely occupied
with events arising out of the ambitions of Pope
Alexander VI. and his son, Cesare Borgia, the
Duke Valentino; and these characters fiU a
large space of The Prince. MachiaveUi never
hesitates to cite the actions of the duke for the
benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states
they have seized ; he can, indeed, find no pre-
cepts to offer so good as the pattern of Cesare
Borgia's conduct, insomuch that Cesare is ac-
claimed by some critics as the " hero " of The
Prince. Yet in The Prince the duke is in point
of fact cited as a type of the man who rises on
the fortune of others, and falls with them ; who
takes every course that might be expected from
a prudent man but the course which will save
him; who is prepared for all eventuahties but

xii Introduction

the one which happens; and who, when all his
abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims that
it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and
unforeseen fatality.

On the death of Pius III., in 1503, Machia-
velH was sent to Rome to watch the election of
his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia
cheated into allowing the choice of the College
to fall on Giuhano delle Rovere (Julius II,), who
was one of the cardinals that had most reason
to fear the duke. MachiaveUi, when comment-
ing on this election, says that he who thinks new
favours will cause great personages to forget old
injuries deceives himself. JuHus did not rest
until he had ruined Cesare.

It was to Juhus II. that MachiaveUi was sent
in 1506, when that pontiff was commencing his
enterprise against Bologna ; which he brought to
a successful issue, as he did many of his other
adventures, owing chiefly to his impetuous
character. It is in reference to Pope Juhus
that MachiaveUi moralises on the resemblance
between Fortune and women, and concludes
that it is the bold rather than the cautious man
that wiU win and hold them both.

It is impossible to foUow here the varying
fortunes of the Itahan states, which in 1507
were controUed by France, Spain, and Germany,
with results that have lasted to our day ; we are
concerned with those events, and with the three

Introduction xiil

great actors in them, so far only as they im-
pinge on the personahty of Machiavelli. He
had several meetings with Louis XII. of France,
and his estimate of that monarch's character
has already been alluded to. Machiavelli has
painted Ferdinand of Arragon as the man who
accompUshed great things under the cloak of
religion, but who in reality had no mercy, faith,
humanity, or integrity ; and who, had he allowed
himself to be influenced by such motives, would
have been ruined. The Emperor Maximihan
was one of the most interesting men of the age,
and his character has been drawn by many
hands; but MachiaveUi, who was an envoy at
his court in 1507-8, reveals the secret of his
many failures when he describes him as a
secretive man, without force of character —
ignoring the human agencies necessary to carry
his schemes into effect, and never insisting on
the fulfilment of his wishes.

The remaining years of Machiavelli's oflScial
career were filled with events arising out of the
League of Cambray, made in 1508 between the
three great European powers already mentioned
and the Pope, with the object of crushing the
Venetian Republic. This result was attained
at the battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one
day all that she had won in eight hundred years,
Florence had a difficult part to play during these
events, comphcated as they were by the feud

xiv Introduction

which broke out between the Pope and the
French, because friendship with France had
dictated the entire pohcy of the Repubhc.
When, in 1511, JuHus II. finally formed the Holy
League against France, and with the assistance
of the Swiss drove the French out of Italy,
Florence lay at the mercy of the Pope, and
had to submit to his terms, one of which
was that the Medici should be restored. The
return of the Medici to Florence on September i,
1512, and the consequent fall of the Republic,
was the signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli
and his friends, and thus put an end to his public
career, for, as we have seen, he died without
regaining office.

LITERATURE AND DEATH

^T. 43-58— 1512-1527

On the return of the Medici, MachiaveHi, who
for a few weeks had vainly hoped to retain his
office under the new masters of Florence, was
dismissed by decree dated November 7, 1512.
Shortly after this he was accused of complicity
in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici,
imprisoned, and put to the question by torture.
The new Medicean Pope, Leo X., procured his

Introduction xv

release, and he retired to his small property at
San Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted
himself to literature. In a letter to Francesco
Vettori, dated December 13, 1513, he has left a
very interesting description of his life at this
period, which elucidates his methods and his
motives in writing The Prince. After describ-
ing his daily occupations with his family and
neighbours, he writes: — "The evening being
come, I return home and go to my study; at
the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes,
covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble
court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I
pass into the ancient courts of the men of old,
where, being lovingly received by them, I am fed
with that food which is mine alone; where I do
not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for
the reason of their actions, and they in their
benignity answer me; and for four hours I feel
no weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does
not dismay, death does not terrify me; I am
possessed entirely by those great men. And
because Dante says: —

' Knowledge doth come of learning well retained,
Unfruitful else,'

I have noted down what I have gained from
their conversation, and have composed a small
work on ' Principalities,' where I pour myself
out as fully as I can m meditation on the

xvi Introduction

subject, discussing what a principality is, what
kinds there are, how they can be acquired,
how they can be kept, why they are lost : and if
any of my fancies ever pleased you, this ought
not to displease you : and to a prince, especially
to a new one, it should be welcome: therefore
I dedicate it to his Magnificence Giuliano.
Fihppo Casavecchio has seen it; he will be able
to teU you what is in it, and of the discourses I
have had with him; nevertheless, I am still
enriching and polishing it."

The " little book " suffered many vicissitudes
before attaining the form in which it has reached
us. Various mental influences were at work
during its composition; its title and patron
were changed; and for some unknown reason it
was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici.
Although Machiavelli discussed with Casa-
vecchio whether it should be sent or presented
in person to the patron, there is no evidence
that Lorenzo ever received or even read it: he
certainly never gave MachiaveUi any employ-
ment. Although it was plagiarised during
Machiavelli's Ufetime, The Prince was never
published by him, and its text is still disputable.

MachiavelH concludes his letter to Vettori
thus:— "And as to this little thing [his book]
when it has been read it will be seen that during
the fifteen years I have given to the study of
statecraft I have neither slept nor idled;

Introduction xvii

and men ought ever to desire to be served by
one who has reaped experience at the expense
of others. And of my loyalty none could doubt,
because having always kept faith I could not
now learn how to break it; for he who has been
faithful and honest, as I have, cannot change
his nature; and my poverty is a witness to my
honesty."

Before Machiavelli had got The Prince off his
hands he commenced his " Discourses on the
First Decade of Titus Livius," which should be
read concurrently with The Prince. These and
several minor works occupied him until the year
1 518, when he accepted a small commission to
look after the affairs of some Florentine mer-
chants at Genoa. In 1519 the Medicean rulers
of Florence granted a few poHtical concessions
to her citizens, and MachiaveUi with others was
consulted upon a new constitution under which
the Great Council was to be restored; but on
one pretext or another it was not promulgated.

In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had
recourse to Machiavelli to settle their difficul-
ties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly
remarkable for his re-entry into Florentine
Hterary society, where he was much sought after,
and also for the production of his " Art of
War." It was in the same year that he received
a commission at the mstance of Cardinal de'
Medici to write the " Historv of Florence," a

xviii Introduction

task which occupied him until 1525. His return
to popular favour may have determined the
Medici to give him this employment, for an old
writer observes that " an able statesman out of
work, hke a huge whale, will endeavour to
overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask
to play with."

When the " History of Florence " was finished,
MachiaveUi took it to Rome for presentation to
his patron, Giuhano de' Medici, who had in the
meanwhile become pope under the title of
Clement VIL It is somewhat remarkable that,
as, in 1 5 13, MachiaveUi had written The Prince
for the instruction of the Medici after they had
just regained power in Florence, so, in 1525, he
dedicated the " History of Florence " to the head
of the family when its ruin was now at hand.
In that year the battle of Pavia destroyed the
French rule in Italy, and left Francis I. a
prisoner in the hands of his great rival, Charles
V. This was followed by the sack of Rome,
upon the news of which the popular party at
Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who
were once more banished.

MachiaveUi was absent from Florence at this
time, but hastened his return, hoping to secure
his former office of secretary to the " Ten of
Liberty and Peace." Unhappily he was taken
iU soon after he reached Florence, where he died
on June 22, 1527.

Introduction xix

THE MAN AND HIS WORKS

No one can say where the bones of Machia-
velli rest, but modem Florence has decreed him
a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of
her most famous sons; recognising that, what-
ever other nations may have found in his works,
Italy found in them the idea of her unity and
the germs of her renaissance among the nations
of Europe. Whilst it is idle to protest against
the world-wide and evil signification of his name,
it may be pointed out that the harsh construc-
tion of his doctrine which this sinister reputa-
tion implies was unknown to his own day, and
that the researches of recent times have enabled
us to interpret him more reasonably. It is due
to these inquiries that the shape of an " unholy
necromancer," which so long haunted men's
vision, has begun to fade.

MachiaveUi was undoubtedly a man of great
observation, acuteness, and industry; noting
with appreciative eye whatever passed before
him, and with his supreme literary gift turning
it to account in his enforced retirement from
affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he
depicted by his contemporaries, as a type of
that rare combination — the successful states-
man and author, for he appears to have been
only moderately prosperous in his several

XX Introduction

embassies and political employments. He was
misled by Caterina Sforza, ignored by Louis
XIL, over-awed by Cesare Borgia; several of
his embassies were quite barren of results; his
attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the
soldiery that he raised astonished everybody by
their cowardice. In the conduct of his own
affairs he was timid and time serving; he dared
not appear by the side of Soderini, to whom he
owed so much, for fear of compromising him-
self; his connection with the Medici was open
to suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have re-
cognised his real forte when he set him to write
the " History of Florence," rather than employ
him in the state. And it is on the Uterary side
of his character, and there alone, that we find no
weakness and no failure.

Although the hght of almost four centuries
has been focussed on The Prince, its problems
are still debatable and interesting, because they
are the eternal problems between the ruled and
their rulers. Such as they are, its ethics are
those of Machiavelli's contemporaries; yet
they cannot be said to be out of date so long as
the governments of Europe rely on material
rather than on moral forces. Its historical
mcidents and personages become interesting by
reason of the uses which Machiavelli makes of
them to illustrate his theories of government and
conduct.

Introduction xxi

Leaving out of consideration those maxims of
state which still furnish some European and
eastern statesmen with principles of action.
The Prince is bestrewn with truths that can be
proved at every turn. Men are still the dupes
of their simplicity and greed, as they were in
the days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion
still conceals the vices which Machiavelli laid
bare in the character of Ferdinand of Arragon.
Men will not look at things as they really are,
but as they wish them to be — and are ruined.
In politics there are no perfectly safe courses;
prudence consists in choosing the least danger-
ous ones. Then — to pass to a higher plane —
MachiaveUi reiterates that, although crimes may
win an empire, they do not win glory. Neces-
sary wars are just wars, and the arms of a nation
are hallowed when it has no other resource but
to fight.

It is the cry of a far later day than MachiavelH's
that government should be elevated into a living
moral force, capable of inspiring the people
with a just recognition of the fundamental prin-
ciples of society; to this " high argument "
The Prince contributes but Uttle. Machiavelli
always refused to write either of men or of
governments otherwise than as he found them,
and he writes with such skill and insight that
his work is of abiding value. But what invests
The Prince with more than a merely artistic or

xxii Introduction

historical interest is the incontrovertible truth
that it deals with the great principles which still
guide nations and rulers in their relationship
with each other and their neighbours.

In translating The Prince my aim has been
to achieve at all costs an exact literal rendering
of the original, rather than a fluent paraphrase
adapted to the modem notions of style and
expression. Machiavelli was no facile phrase-
monger ; the conditions under which he wrote
obliged him to weigh every word ; his themes
are lofty, his substance grave, his manner nobly
plain and serious. Quis eo fuit unquam in
partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis
pressior ? In The Prince, it may be truly said,
there is reason assignable, not only for every
word, but for the position of every word. To
an Enghshman of Shakespeare's time the trans-
lation of such a treatise was in some ways a
comparatively easy task, for in those times the
genius of the English more nearly resembled
that of the Italian language; to the English-
man of to-day it is not so simple. To take a
single example: the word intrattenere, em-
ployed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy
adopted by the Roman Senate towards the
weaker states of Greece, would by an Eliza-
bethan be correctly rendered " entertain," and
every contemporary reader would understand
what was meant by saying that " Rome enter-

Introduction xxiii

iained the iEtolians and the Acheans without
augmenting their power." But to-day such a
phrase would seem obsolete and ambiguous, if
not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that
" Rome maintained friendly relations with the
iEtoHans," etc., using four words to do the work
of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy
brevity of the Italian, so far as was consistent
with an absolute fidehty to the sense. If the
result be an occasional asperity I can only hope
that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the
author's meaning, may overlook the roughness
of the road that leads him to it.

Principal Works : Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa,
1499; Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana
ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino
nell' ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo,
etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provvisione del danaro,
1502; Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506;
Kitratti delle cose dell' Alemagna, 1508-12; Decen-
nale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di Francia,
1510; Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di T. Livio, 3 vols.,
15 1 2-1 7; II Principe, 151 3; Andria, comedy trans-
lated from Terence, 151 3 (?); Mandragola, prose
comedy in five acts, with prologue in verse, 1 5 1 3 ;
Delia Lingua (dialogue), 15 14; Clizia, comedy in
prose, 1515 {?); Belfagor arcidiacolo (novel), 1515;
Asino d'oro (poem in terza rima), 1517; Dell' Arte
della guerra, 15 19-20; Discorso sopra il riformare lo
stato di Firenze, 15 20; Sommario delle cose della
citta di Lucca, 15 20; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da
Lucca, 1520; Istorie Florentine, 8 books, 1521-25;
Frammenti Storici, 1525.

xxiv Introduction

Other poems include Sonetti, Canzonl, Ottava, and
Canti Camascialeschi.

Works: Edition, Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tes-
tina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, 6 vols., 1782-86; del
Classici, Milaji, 10 vols., 1804-5; Molinari, Venice, 12
vols., 1811; d'ltalia, 8 vols., 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols.,
1820-22; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols, only
published, 1873-77.

Minor Works: Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere
Famigliari, ed. E. Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with
excisions; Tredited writings, ed. G. Canestrini, 1857;
Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri in tomo
alio scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro, II Principe, etc.

Translation of Works: H. Nevile, 1675, 2nd ed.,
1 720; E. P'ameworth, 2 vols., 1762, 1775; History of
Florence, and Affairs of Italy, Prince, etc., Bohn's
Standard Library, 1847; Historical, poUtical, and
diplomatic writings, C. E. Detmold, 4 vols., 1882;
The Prince and other pieces, Morley's Universal
Library, 1883; The Prince, N. HiU Thomson, 2nd ed.,
Clarendon Press, 1897; L. Ricci, World's Classics,
1903; Art of War (P. Whitehome, 1560), The Prince
(E. Davies, 1640), Florentine History (T. Bedingfield,
1595), Tudor Translations, 1905; Florentine History,
N. Hill Thomson, 2 vols., 1906.

Lives: Nitti, 1876; P. Villari, N. Machiavelli e i
suoi Tempi, 3 vols., 1877-82, 1895-97; Translation
of P. Villari's work by L. Villari. 1878, 1892 (91);
Tommasini, 1882; Mariano, 1886; F. Falco, 1896;
V. Turri, 1902. EngUsh: J. M. Robertson (Pioneer
Humanists), 1907; see also Macaulay, Critical and
Historical Essays; and Greenwood, Cosmopolis, 1897.

CONTENTS

PACE

Introduction ....... vii

Dedication to The Magnificent Lorenzo di

PiERO de' Medici . . . . i

chapter

I. How MANY Kinds of Principalities there are,

AND BY w-HAT Means they are acquired . 5

II. Concerning Hereditary Principalities . . 9

III. Concerning Mixed Principauties ... 13

rV. Why the Kingdom of Darius, conquered by
Alexander, did not rebel against the
Successors OF Alexander AT his Death . 29

V. Concerning the way to govern Cities or Prin-
cipalities which lived under their own
Laws before they were annexed . . 37

VI. Concerning Principalities which are acquired

BY one's own Arms and Ability . . 43

VII. Concerning new Principalities which are ac-
quired EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR UY

Good Fortune ..... 51

VIII. Concerning those who have obtained a Prin-

ciP.ALiTY BY Wickedness . . . .65

IX. Concerning a Civil Principality . . 75

X. Concerning the way in which the Strength of

ALL Principalities ought to be measured 83

XI. Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities . 89

XII. How uasy Kinds of Soldiery there are, and

concerning Mercenaries • • • 95

XIII. Concerning Auxiliaries, Mixed Soldiery, and

one's own ..... 105

XTV. That which concerns a Prince on the Subject

of the Art of War .... 113

XXV

xxvi Contents

CHAPTER PAGB

XV. Concerning things for which Men, and especi-
ally Princes, are praised or blamed . 119

XVI. Concerning Liberality and Meanness . . 125

XVII. Concernino Cruelty and Clemency, and

WHETHER it IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN

feared ....... 131

XVIII. Concerning the Way in which Princes should

keep Faith ...'... 139

XIX. That one should avoid being despised and

hated ....... 147

XX. Are Fortresses, and many other things to
which Princes resort, advantageous or
hurtful? ...... 165

XXI. How A Prince should conduct Himself so as

to gain Renown . . . . -175

XXII. Concerning the Secretaries of Princes . 183

XXIII. How Flatterers should be avoided . . 189

XXIV. Why the Princes of Italy have lost their

States ....... i95

XXV. What Fortune can effect in Human Affairs,

and how to withstand Her . . . 201

XXVI. An Exhortation to liberate Italy from the

Barbarians ...... 209

Description of the Methods adopted by the Duke
Valentino when murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli,
Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo and
the Duke di Gravini Orsini .... 217

The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca, written
BY NicoLO Machiavelli, and sent to his Friends
Zanobi Buondelmonti and Luigi Alamini . . 230

Notes and References ...... 273

Index 281

NICOLO MACHIAVELLI

TO THE

MAGNIFICENT LORENZO DI PIERO DE

MEDICI

Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a
prince -are accustomed to come before him with
such things as they hold most precious, or in
which they see him take most dehght: whence
one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, pre-
cious stones, and similar ornaments presented to
princes, worthy of their greatness.

Desiring therefore to present myself to Your
Magnificence with some testimony of my devo-
tion towards you, I have not found among my
possessions anything which I hold more dear
than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the
actions of great men, acquired by long experi-
ence in contemporary affairs, and a continual
study of antiquity ; which, having reflected upon
it with great and prolonged dihgence, I now
send, digested into a httle volume, to your
Magnificence.

And although I may consider this work un-
worthy of your countenance, nevertheless I

2 The Prince

trust much to your benignity that it may be
acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me
to make a better gift than to offer you the oppor-
tunity of understanding in the shortest time all
that I have learnt in so many years, and with
so many troubles and dangers; — which work I
have not embellished with swelling or magnifi-
cent words, nor stuffed with rounded periods,
nor with any extrinsic allurements or adorn-
ments whatever, with which so many are accus-
tomed to load and embellish their works; for I
have wished either that no honour should be
given it, or else that the truth of the matter
and the weightiness of the theme shall make it
acceptable.

Nor do I hold with those who regard it as pre-
sumption if a man of low and humble condition
dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes ;
because, just as those who draw landscapes place
themselves below in the plain to contemplate
the nature of the mountains and of lofty places,
and in order to contemplate the plains place
themselves high upon the mountains, even so to
understand the nature of the people it needs to
be a prince, and to understand that of princes
it needs to be of the people.

Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift
in the spirit in which I send it; wherein, if it be
diligently read and considered by you, you will
learn my extreme desire that you should attain

Dedication 3

that greatness which fortune and your other
attributes promise. And if your Magnificence
from the summit of your greatness will some-
times turn your eyes to these lower regions, you
will see how unmeritedly I suffer a great and
continued malignity of fortune.

FIRST CHAPTER

NOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE

ARE. AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY

ARE ACQUIRED

FIRST CHAPTER

HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE
ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE
ACQUIRED

All states, all powers, that have held and hold
rule over men have been and are either re-
publics or principalities.

Principalities are either hereditary, in which
the family has been long estabhshed; or they
are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan
to Francesco Sforza, or they are, as it were,
members annexed to the hereditary state of the
prince who has acquired them, as was the king-
dom of Naples to that of the King of Spain.

Such dominions thus acquired are either ac-
customed to live under a prince, or to live in
freedom; and are acquired either by the arms
of the prince himself, or of others, or else by
fortune or by ability.

3280

SECOND CHAPTER

CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

SECOND CHAPTER

CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I WILL leave out all discussion on republics,
inasmuch as in another place I have written ol
them at length, and will address myself only to
principahties. In doing so I will keep to the
order indicated above, and discuss how such
principahties are to be ruled and preserved,

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in
holding hereditary states, and those long accus-
tomed to the family of their prince, than new
ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress
the customs of his ancestors, and to deal pru-
dently with circumstances as they arise, for a
prince of average powers to maintain himself in
his state, unless he be deprived of it by some
extraordinary and excessive force; and if he
should be so deprived of it, whenever anything
sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of
Ferrara, who could not have withstood the
attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of
Pope Juhus in '10, unless he had been long
estabhshed in his dominions. For the heredi-

II

12 The Prince

tary prince has less cause and less necessity to
offend; hence it happens that he will be more
loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause
him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that
his subjects will be naturally well disposed to-
wards him; and in the antiquity and duration
of his rule the memories and motives that make
for change are lost, for one change always leaves
tlie addentellation for another.

THIRD CHAPTER

CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITtBS

THIRD CHAPTER

CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

But the difficulties occur in a new principality.
And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it
were, a member of a state which, taken collec-
tively, may be called composite, the changes
arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which
there is in all new principalities; for men change
their rulers willingly, hoping to better them-
selves, and this hope induces them to take up
arms against him who rules: wherein they are
deceived, because they afterwards find by ex-
perience they have gone from bad to worse.
This follows also on another natural and common
necessity, which always causes a new prince to
burthen those who have submitted to him with
his soldiery and with infinite other hardships
which he must put upon his new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those
whom you have injured in seizing that princi-
pahty, and you are not able to keep those friends
who put you there because of your not being
able to satisf}^ them in the way they expected,
and vou cannot take strong measures against

*B ^So I^

1 6 The Prince

them, feeling bound to them. For, although
one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in
entering a province one has always need of the
goodwill of the natives.

For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of
France, quickly occupied Milan, and as quickly
lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only
needed Lodovico's own forces; because those
who had opened the gates to him, finding
themselves deceived in their hopes of future
benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of
the new prince. It is very true that, after ac-
quiring rebellious provinces a second time, they
are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the
prince, with httle reluctance, takes the oppor-
tunity of the rebellion to punish the dehnquents,
to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen
himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause
France to lose Milan the first time it was enough
for the Duke Lodovico to raise insurrections on
the borders ; but to cause him to lose it a second
time it was necessary to bring the whole world
against him, and that his armies should be de-
feated and driven out of Italy; which followed
from the causes above mentioned.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France
both the first and the second time. The general
reasons for the first have been discussed; it re-
mains to name those for the second, and to see

* See Note.

Mixed Principalities 17

what resources he had, and what any one in his
situation would have had for maintaining him-
self more securely in his acquisition than did
the King of France,

Now I say that those dominions which, when
acquired, are added to an ancient state by him
who acquires them, are either of the same coun-
try and language, or they are not. When they
are, it is easier to hold them, especially when
they have not been accustomed to self-govern-
ment ; and to hold them securely it is enough to
have destroyed the family of the prince who was
ruling them; because the two peoples, preserv-
ing in other things the old conditions, and not
being unlike in customs, will live quietly to-
gether, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy,
Gascony, and Normandy, which have been
bound to France for so long a time: and, al-
though there may be some difference in language,
nevertheless the customs are alike, and the
people will easily be able to get on amongst
themselves. He who has annexed them, if he
wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind
two considerations: the one, that the family of
their former lord is extinguished; the other,
that neither their laws nor their taxes are
altered, so that in a very short time they will
become entirely one body with the old prin-
cipality.

But when states are acquired in a coxmtry

1 8 The Prince

differing in language, customs, or laws, there are
difficulties, and good fortune and great energy
are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest
and most real helps would be that he who has
acquired them should go and reside there. This
would make his position more secure and dur-
able, as it has made that of the Turk in Greece,
who, notwithstanding all the other measures
taken by him for holding that state, if he had not
settled there, would not have been able to keep
it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are
seen as they spring up, and one can quickly
remedy them ; but if one is not at hand, they are
heard of only when they are great, and then one
can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the
country is not pillaged by your officials; the
subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the
prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have
more cause to love him, and wishing to be other-
wise, to fear him. He who would attack that
state from the outside must have the utmost
caution; as long as the prince resides there it
can only be wrested from him with the greatest
difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies
to one or two places, which may be as keys to
that state, for it is necessary either to do this or
else to keep there a great number of cavalry
and infantry. A prince does not spend much
on colonies, for with little or no expense he

Mixed Principalities 19

can send them out and keep them there, and
he offends a minority only of the citizens
from whom he takes lands and houses to give
them to the new inhabitants; and those whom
he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are
never able to injure him; whilst the rest being
uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same
time are anxious not to err for fear it should
happen to them as it has to those who have
been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these
colonies are not costly, they are more faithful,
they injure less, and the injured, as has been said,
being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon
this one has to remark that men ought either
to be well treated or crushed, because they can
avenge themselves of hghter injuries, of more
serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury
that is to be done to a man ought to be of
such a kind that one does not stand in fear of
revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place
of colonies one spends much more, having to
consume on the garrison all the income from the
state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss,
and many more are exasperated, because the
whole state is injured; through the shifting of
the garrison up and down all become acquainted
with hardship, and all become hostile, and they
are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own
ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every

20 The Prince

reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a
colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differ-
ing in the above respects ought to make himself
the head and defender of his less powerful
neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful
amongst them, taking care that no foreigner as
powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a
footing there; for it will always happen that
such a one will be introduced by those who are
discontented, either through excess of ambi-
tion or through fear, as one has seen already.
The Romans were brought into Greece by the
iEtohans; and in every other country where
they obtained a footing they were brought in by
the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs
is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a
country, all the subject states are drawn to him,
moved by the hatred which they feel against
the ruUng power. So that in respect to these
subject states he has not to take any trouble to
gain them over to himself, for the whole of them
quickly rally to the state which he has acquired
there. He has only to take care that they do
not get hold of too much power and too much
authority, and then with his own forces, and
with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the
more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely
master in the country. And he who does not
properly manage this business will soon lose

Mixed Principalities 21

what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it
he will have endless diflficulties and troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they
annexed, observed closely these measures ; they
sent colonies and maintained friendly relations
with ^ the minor powers, without increasing their
stren^h; they kept down the greater, and did
not aUow any strong foreign powers to gain
authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for
an example. The Achaians and ^tolians were
kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Mace-
donia was humbled, Anriochus was driven out;
yet the merits of the Achaians and iEtolians
never secured for them permission to increase
their f)ower, nor did the persuasions of Philip
ever induce the Romans to be his friends without
first humbhng him, nor did the influence of
Antiochus make them agree that he should retain
any lordship over the country. Because the
Romans did in these instances what aU prudent
princes ought to do, who have to regard not only
present troubles, but also future ones, for which
they must prepare with every energy, because,
when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them ; but if
you wait until they approach, the medicine is no
longer in time because the malady has become
incurable; for it happens in this, as the physi-
cians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the
beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but

« See Note.

22 The Prince

difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not

having been either detected nor treated in the

beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult

to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state,

for when the evils that arise have been foreseen

(which it is only given to a wise man to see), they

can be quickly redressed, but when, through not

having been foreseen, they have been permitted

to grow in a way that every one can see them,

there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the

Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them

at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not

let them come to a head, for they knew that

war is not to be avoided, but is only put off to

the advantage of others; moreover they wished

to fight with Phihp and Antiochus in Greece so

as not to have to do it in Italy ; they could have

avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor

did that ever please them which is for ever in

the mouths of the wise ones of our time: — Let

us enjoy the benefits of the time — but rather the

benefits of their own valour and prudence, for

time drives everything before it, and is able to

bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well

as good.

But let us turn to France and inquire whether
she has done any of the things mentioned. I
will speak of Louis (and not of Charles) as the
one whose conduct is the better to be observed,
he having held possession of Italy for the longest

Mixed Principalities 23

period; and you will see that he has done the
opposite to those things which ought to be done
to retain a state composed of divers elements.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the
ambition of the Venetians, who desired to obtain
half the state of Lombardy by his interven-
tion. I will not blame the course taken by the
king, because, wishing to get a foot-hold in
Italy, and having no friends there — seeing rather
that every door was shut to him owing to the
conduct of Charles — he was forced to accept
those friendships which he could get, and he
would have succeeded very quickly in his design
if in other matters he had not made some mis-
takes. The king, however, having acquired
Lombardy, regained at once the authority which
Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Floren-
tines became his friends ; the Marquis of Mantua,
the Duke of Ferrara, the BentivogH, my lady of
Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini,
of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the
Pisanians, the Sienese — everybody made ad-
vances to him to become his friend. Then
could the Venetians reahse the rashness of the
course taken by them, which, in order that they
might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made
the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what httle
difficulty the king could have maintained his
position in Italy had he observed the rules above

24 The Prince

laid down, and kept all his friends secure and
protected ; for although they were numerous they
were both weak and timid, some afraid of the
Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they
would always have been forced to stand in with
him, and by their means he could easily have
made himself secure against those who remained
powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than
he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander
to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to
him that by this action he was weakening him-
self, depriving himself of friends and of those
who had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst
he aggrandised the Church by adding much tem-
poral power to the spiritual, thus giving it great
authority. And having committed this prime
error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much so
that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander,
and to prevent his becoming the master of Tus-
cany, he was himself forced to come into
Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggran-
dised the Church, and deprived himself of friends,
he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,
divides it with the King of Spain, and where he
was the prime arbiter of Italy he takes an asso-
ciate, so that the ambitious of that country and
the malcontents of his own should have where
to shelter; and whereas he could have left in
the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he

Mixed Principalities 25

drove him out, to put one there who was able to
drive him, Louis, out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural
and common, and men always do so when they
can, and for this they will be praised not blamed;
but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by
any means, then there is folly and blame. There-
fore, if France could have attacked Naples with
her own forces she ought to have done so ; if she
could not, then she ought not to have divided it.
And if the partition which she made with the
Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the ex-
cuse that by it she got a foot-hold in Italy, this
other partition merited blame, for it had not the
excuse of that necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he
destroyed the minor powers, he increased the
strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he
brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in
the country, he did not send colonies. Which
errors, if he had lived, were not enough to injure
him had he not made a sixth by taking away
their dominions from the Venetians; because,
had he not aggrandised the Church, nor brought
Spain into Italy, it would have been very
reasonable and necessary to humble them; but
having first taken these steps, he ought never to
have consented to their ruin, for they, being
powerful, would always have kept off others
from designs on Lombardy, to which the Vene-

26 The Prince

tians would never have consented except to be-
come masters themselves there; also because
the others would not wish to take Lombardy
from France in order to give it to the Venetians,
and to run counter to both they would not have
had the courage.

And if any one should say : King Louis yielded
the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to
Spain to avoid war, I answer for the reasons
given above that a blunder ought never to be
perpetrated to avoid war, because it is not
to be avoided, but is only deferred to your
disadvantage. And if another should allege
the pledge which the king had given to the
Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise
in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage
and for the cap to Rouen, to that I reply what
I shall write later on concerning the faith of
princes, and how it ought to be kept.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not hav-
ing followed any of the conditions observed by
those who have taken possession of countries
and wished to retain them. Nor is there any
miracle in this, but much that is reasonable and
quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at
Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare
Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually
called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal
Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not
understand war, I replied to him that the French

Mixed Principalities 27

did not understand statecraft, meaning that
otherwise they would not have allowed the
Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it
has been seen that the greatness of the Church
and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France,
and her ruin may be attributed to them. From
this a general rule is drawn which never or
rarely fails : that he who is the cause of another
becoming powerful is ruined; because that pre-
dominancy has been brought about either by
astuteness or else by force, and both are dis-
trusted by him who has been raised to power.

FOURTH CHAPTER

WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS. CONQUERED BY

ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST

THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER

AT HIS DEATH

FOURTH CHAPTER

WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY
ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE
SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

Considering the difficulties which men have
had to hold a newly acquired state, some might
wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great
became the master of Asia in a few years, and
died whilst it was yet scarcely settled (whence
it might appear reasonable that the whole em-
pire would have rebelled), nevertheless his suc-
cessors maintained themselves, and had to meet
no other difficulty than that which arose among
themselves from their own ambitions.

I answer that the principalities of which one
has record are found to be governed in two dif-
ferent ways : either by a prince, with a body of
servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom
as ministers by his favour and permission; or
by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity
by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of
the prince. Such barons have states and their
own subjects, who recognise them as lords and
hold them in natural affection. Those states

31

32 The Prince

that are governed by a prince and his servants
hold their prince in more consideration, because
in all the country there is no one who is recog-
nised as superior to him, and if they yield obedi-
ence to another they do it as to a minister and
official, and they do not bear him any particular
affection.

The examples of these two governments in
our time are the Turk and the King of France.
The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by
one lord, the others are his servants ; and, divid-
ing his kingdom into sandjacks,. he sends there
different administrators, and shifts and changes
them as he chooses. But the King of France is
placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords,
acknowledged by their own subjects, and be-
loved by them; they have their own preroga-
tives, nor can the king take these away except
at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both
of these states will recognise great diffi-
culties in seizing the state of the Turk, but,
once it is conquered, great ease in holding it.
The causes of the difficulties in seizing the king-
dom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be
called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can
he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt
of those whom the lord has around him. This
arises from the reasons given above; for his
ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can
only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one

Kingdom of Darius 33

can expect but little advantage from them when
they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry
the people with them, for the reasons assigned.
Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in
mind that he will find him united, and he will
have to rely more on his own strength than on
the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has
been conquered, and routed in the field in such a
way that he cannot replace his armies, there is
nothing to fear but the family of the prince, and,
this being exterminated, there remains no one
to fear, the others having no credit with the
people; and as the conqueror did not rely on
them before his victory, so he ought not to fear
them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed
like that of France, because one can easily enter
there by gaining over some baron of the king-
dom, for one always finds malcontents and such
as desire a change. Such men, for the reasons
given, can open the way into the state and
render the victory easy ; but if you wish to hold
it afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties,
both from those who have assisted you and
from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough
for you to have exterminated the family of the
prince, because the lords that remain make
themselves the heads of fresh movements
against you, and as you are unable either to

34 The Prince

satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost
whenever time brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature
of the government of Darius, you will find it
similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and there-
fore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to
overthrow him in the field, and then to take the
country from him. After which victory, Darius
being lolled, the state remained secure to Alex-
ander, for the above reasons. And if his suc-
cessors had been united they would have enjoyed
it securely and at their ease, for there were no
tumults raised in the kingdom except those they
provoked themselves.

But it is impossible to hold with such tran-
quillity states constituted like that of France.
Hence arose those frequent rebellions against
the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing
to the many principalities there were in these
states, of which, as long as the memory of them
endured, the Romans always held an insecure
possession; but with the power and long con-
tinuance of the empire the memory' of them
passed away, and the Romans then became
secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards
amongst themselves, each one was able to attach
to himself his own parts of the country, according
to the authority he had assumed there; and the
family of the former lord being exterminated,
none other than the Romans were acknowledged.

Kingdom of Darius 3 5

When these things are remembered no one
will marvel at the ease with which Alexander
held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties
which others have had to keep an acquisition,
such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is not
occasioned by the httle or abundance of ability
in the conqueror, but by the want of imifonnity
in the subject state.

FIFTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR

PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER

THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY

WERE ANNEXED

FIFTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR
PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR
OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

Whenever those states which have been ac-
quired as stated have been accustomed to hve
under their own laws and in freedom, there are
three courses for those who wish to hold them:
the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside
there in person, the third is to permit them to
live under their own laws, drawing a tribute,
and estabhshing within it an oligarchy which
will keep it friendly to you. Because such a
government, being created by the prince, knows
that it cannot stand \sithout his friendship and
interest, and does its utmost to support him;
and therefore he who would keep a city accus-
tomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the
means of its own citizens than in any other way.
There are, for example, the Spartans and
the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and
Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, never-
theless they lost them. The Romans, in order
c 280 29

4© The Prince

to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, dis-
mantled them, and did not lose them. They
wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it,
making it free and permitting its laws, and did
not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled
to dismantle many cities in the country, for in
truth there is no safe way to retain them other-
wise than by ruining them. And he who becomes
master of a city accustomed to freedom and
does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed
by it, for in rebellion it has always the watch-
word of hberty and its ancient privileges as a
ralljdng point, which neither time nor benefits
will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you
may do or provide against, they never forget
that name or their privileges unless they are
disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they
immediately rally to them, as Pisa did after the
one hundred years she had been held in bondage
by the Florentines.

But when cities or countries are accustomed
to Hve under a prince, and his family is exter-
minated, they, being on the one hand accus-
tomed to obey and on the other hand not having
the old prince, cannot agree in making one
from amongst themselves, and they do not know
how to govern themselves. For this reason they
are very slow to take up arms, and a prince can
gain them to himself and secure them much more
easily. But in republics there is more vitality.

The Way to Govern Cities 41

greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance,
which will never permit them to allow the
memory of their former hberty to rest; so that
the safest way is to destroy them or to reside
there.

SIXTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE

ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS

AND ABILITY

SIXTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE
ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY

Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of en-
tirely new principalities as I shall do, I adduce
the highest examples both of prince and of
state; because men, walking almost always in
paths beaten by others, and following by imita-
tion their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely
to the ways of others or attain to the power of
those they imitate. A wise man ought always to
follow the paths beaten by great men, and to
imitate those who have been supreme, so that if
his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will
savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers
who, designing to hit the mark which yet ap-
pears too far distant, and knowing the limits to
which the strength of their bow attains, take
aim much higher than the mark, not to reach
by their strength or arrow to so great a height,
but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to
hit the mark they wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new princi-
palities, where there is a new prince, more or

45

46 The Prince

less difficulty is found in keeping them, accord-
ingly as there is more or less abihty in him
who has acquired the state. Now, as the fact of
becoming a prince from a private station pre-
supposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that
one or other of these two things will mitigate in
some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he
who has relied least on fortune is established
the strongest. Further, it faciUtates matters
when the prince, having no other state, is com-
pelled to reside there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own
ability and not through fortune, have risen to
be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus,
Theseus, and such hke are the most excellent
examples. And although one may not discuss
Moses, he having been a mere executor of the
will of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only
for that favour which made him worthy to speak
with God. But in considering Cyrus and others
who have acquired or founded kingdoms, ail
will be found admirable ; and if their particular
deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will
not be found inferior to those of Moses, although
he had so great a preceptor. And in examining
their actions and lives one cannot see that they
owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity,
which brought them the material to mould into
the form which seemed best to them. Without
that opportunity their powers of mind would

New Principalities 47

have been extinguished, and without those
powers the opportunity would have come in
vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he
should find the people of Israel in Egypt en-
slaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order
that they should be disposed to follow him so as
to be deUvered out of bondage. It was neces-
sary that Romulus should not remain in Alba,
and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in
order that he should become King of Rome and
founder of the fatherland. It was necessary
that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented
with the government of the Medes, and the
Medes soft and effeminate through their long
peace. Theseus could not have shown his
ability had he not found the Athenians dis-
persed. These opportunities, therefore, made
those men fortunate, and their high ability
enabled them to recognise the opportunity
whereby their country was ennobled and made
famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes,
hke these men, acquire a principaUty with diffi-
culty, but they keep it with ease. The diffi-
culties they have in acquiring it arise in part
from the new rules and methods which they
are forced to introduce to establish their
government and its security. And it ought to
be remembered that there is nothing more diffi-

*Q 280

48 The Prince

cult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct,
or more uncertain in its success, than to take
the lead in the introduction of a new order of
things. Because the innovator has for enemies
all those who have done well under the old con-
ditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who
may do well under the new. This coolness arises
partly from fear of the opponents, who have
the laws on their side, and partly from the in-
credulity of men, who do not readily beheve in
new things until they have had a long experi-
ence of them. Thus it happens that whenever
those who axe hostile have the opportunity to
attack they do it like partisans, whilst the
others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that
the prince is endangered along with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to dis-
cuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether
these innovators can rely on themselves or
have to depend on others: that is to say,
whether, to consummate their enterprise, have
they to use prayers or can they use force?
In the first instance they always succeed badly,
and never compass anything; but when they
can rely on themselves and use force, then they
are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all
armed prophets have conquered, and the im-
armed ones have been destroyed. Besides the
reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is
variable, and whilst it is easy to peisuade them,

New Principalities 49

it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion.
And thus it is necessary to take such measures
that, when they beheve no longer, it may be
possible to make them believe by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had
been unarmed they could not have enforced
their constitutions for long — as happened in
our time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was
ruined with his new order of things immedi-
ately the multitude believed in him no longer,
and he had no means of keeping steadfast those
who beheved or of making the unbelievers to
beheve. Therefore such as these have great
difficulties in consummating their enterprise,
for aU their dangers are in the ascent, yet with
ability they will overcome them; but when
these are overcome, and those who envied them
their success are exterminated, they wLll begin
to be respected, and they will continue after-
wards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser
one; still it bears some resemblance to them,
and I wish it to suffice me for all of a Hke kind :
it is Hiero the Syracusan. This man rose from
a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor
did he, either, owe anything to fortune but
opportunity; for the Syracusans, being op-
pressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards
he was rewarded by being made their prince.
He was of so great abihty, even as a private

50 The Prince

citizen, that one who writes of him says he wanted
nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This man
aboHshed the old soldiery, organised the new,
gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as
he had his own soldiers and alhes, on such foun-
dations he was able to build any edifice : thus,
whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring,
he had but Uttle in keeping.

SEVENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE

ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF

OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

SEVENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE
ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS
OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

Those who solely by good fortune become
princes from being private citizens have little
trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop ;
they have not any difficulties on the way up,
because they fly, but they have many when
they reach the summit. Such are those to
whom some state is given either for money or by
the favour of him who bestows it; as happened
to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of
the Hellespont, where princes were made by
Darius, in order that they might hold the cities
both for his security and his glory; as also were
those emperors who, by the corruption of the
soldiers, from being citizens came to empire.
Such stand simply upon the goodwill and the
fortune of him who has elevated them — two
most inconstant and unstable things. Neither
have they the knowledge requisite for the posi-
tion; because, unless they are men of great
worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect

53

54 The Prince

that they should know how to command, having
always lived in a private condition; besides,
they cannot hold it because they have not forces
which they can keep friendly and faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, hke all
other things in nature which are bom and grow
rapidly, cannot have their foundations and
correspondencies i fixed in such a way that the
first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as
is said, those who unexpectedly become princes
are men of so much ability that they know they
have to be prepared at once to hold that which
fortune has thrown into their laps, and that
those foundations, which others have laid before
they became princes, they must lay afterwards.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be
a prince by abihty or fortune, I wish to adduce
two examples within our own recollection, and
these are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia.
Francesco, by proper means and with great
abiUty, from being a private person rose to be
Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired
with a thousand anxieties he kept with httle
trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia,
called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired
his State during the ascendency of his father,
and on its dechne he lost it, notwithstanding
that he had taken every measure and done all
that ought to be done by a wise and able man

• See Note.

New Principalities 55

to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms
and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not
first laid his foundations may be able with great
ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be
laid with trouble to the architect and danger to
the building. If, therefore, all the steps taken
by the duke be considered, it will be seen that he
laid solid foundations for his future power, and
I do not consider it superfluous to discuss them,
because I do not know what better precepts
to give a new prince than the example of his
actions ; and if his dispositions were of no avail,
that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and
extreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandise
the duke, his son, had many immediate and pro-
spective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his
way to make him master of any state that was
not a state of the Church ; and if he was willing
to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of
Milan and the Venetians would not consent,
because Faenza and Rimini were already under
the protection of the Venetians. Besides this,
he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by
which he might have been assisted, in hands
that would fear the aggrandisement of the Pope,
namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their
following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset
this state of affairs and embroil the powers, so as

56 The Prince

to make himself securely master of part of their
states. This was easy for him to do, because he
fotmd the Venetians, moved by other reasons,
inchned to bring back the French into Italy; he
would not only not oppose this, but he would
render it more easy by dissolving the former
marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king
came into Italy with the assistance of the Vene-
tians and the consent of Alexander. He was no
sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from
him for the attempt on the Romagna, which
yielded to him on the reputation of the king.
The duke, therefore, having acquired the
Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wish-
ing to hold that and to advance further, was
hindered by two things : the one, his forces did
not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill
of France : that is to say, he feared that the
forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would
not stand to him, that not only might they
hinder him from winning more, but might
themselves seize what he had won, and that the
king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he
had a warning when, after taking Faenza and
attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwil-
lingly to that attack. And as to the king, he
learned his mind when he himself, after taking
the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and
the king made him desist from that undertak-
ing; hence the duke decided to depend no more
upon the arms and the luck of others.

New Principalities 57

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini
and Colonnesi parties in Rome, by gaining to
himself all their adherents who were gentle-
men, making them his gentlemen, giving them
good pay, and, according to their rank, honour-
ing them with office and command in such a
way that in a few months aU attachment to the
factions was destroyed and turned entirely to
the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity
to crush the Orsini, having scattered the ad-
herents of the Colonna house. This came to him
soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiv-
ing at length that the aggrandisement of the
duke and the Church was ruin to them, called
a meeting at Magione in Perugia. From this
sprung the rebeUion at Urbino and the tumults
in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the
duke, all of which he overcame with the help of
the French. Having restored his authority, not
to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French
or other outside forces, he had recourse to his
wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his
mind that, by the mediation of Signor Pagolo —
whom the duke did not fail to secure with all
kinds of attentions, giving him money, apparel,
and horses — the Orsini were reconciled, so that
their simphcity brought them into his power at
Sinigaha.^ Having exterminated the leaders,
and turned their partisans into his friends, the

» See Note.

58 The Prince

duke had laid sufficiently good foundations to
his power, having all the Romagna and the
Duchy of Urbino; and the people now begin-
ning to appreciate their prosperity, he gained
them all over to himself. And as this point is
worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others,
I am not willing to leave it out.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he
found it under the rule of weak masters, who
rather plundered their subjects than ruled them,
and gave them more cause for disunion than for
union, so that the country was full of robbery,
-quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so,
•wishing to bring back peace and obedience to
authority, he considered it necessary to give it
a good governor. Thereupon he promoted
Messer Ramiro d'Orco, a swift and cruel man, to
whom he gave the fullest power. This man
in a short time restored peace and unity with
the greatest success. Afterwards the duke con-
sidered that it was not advisable to confer such
excessive authority, for he had no doubt but
that he would become odious, so he set up a
court of judgment in the country, under a most
excellent president, wherein all cities had their
advocates. And because he knew that the past
severity had caused some hatred against him-
self, so, to clear himself in the minds of the
people, and gain them entirely to himself, he
desired to show that, if any cruelty had been

New Principalities 59

practised, it had not originated with him, but
in the natural sternness of the minister. Under
this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning
caused him to be executed and left on the piazza
at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at
his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused
the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.

But let us return whence we started. I say
that the duke, finding himself now sufficiently
powerful and partly secured from immediate
dangers by having armed himself in his own way,
and having in a great measure crushed those
forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he
wished to proceed with his conquest, had next
to consider France, for he knew that the king,
who too late was aware of his mistake, would
not support him. And from this time he began
to seek new alliances and to temporise with
France in the expedition which she was making
towards the kingdom of Naples against the
Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It v/as
his intention to secure himself against them,
and this he would have quickly accomphshed
had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs.
But as to the future he had to fear, in the first
place, that a new successor to the Church might
not be friendly to him and might seek to take
from him that which Alexander had given him,
so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by

6o The Prince

exterminating the families of those lords whom
he had despoiled, so as to take away that pre-
text from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to
himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be
able to curb the Pope with their aid, as has been
observed. Thirdly, by converting the coUege
more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so
much power before the Pope should die that he
could by his own measures resist the first shock.
Of these four things, at the death of Alexander,
he had accomplished three. For he had killed
as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay
hands on, and few had escaped; he had won
over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the
most numerous party in the coUege. And as to
any fresh acquisition, he intended to become
master of Tuscany, for he already possessed
Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his
protection. And as he had no longer to study
France (for the French were already driven out
of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and
in this way both were compelled to buy liis good-
will), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this,
Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through
hatred and partly through fear of the Floren-
tines; and the Florentines would have had no
remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was
prospering the year that Alexander died, for he
had acquired so much power and reputation that
he would have stood by himself, and no longer

New Principalities 6i

have depended on the luck and the forces of
others, but solely on his own power and
ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had
first drawn the sword. He left the duke with
the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with
the rest in the air, between two most powerful
hostile armies, and sick unto death. Yet there
were in the duke such boldness and abiUty, and
he knew so well how men are to be won or lost,
and so firm were the foundations which in so
short a time he had laid, that if he had not had
those armies on his back, or if he had been in
good health, he would have overcome aU diffi-
culties. And it is seen that his foundations
were good, for the Romagna awaited him for
more than a month. In Rome, although but
half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the
Baghoni, the ViteUi, and the Orsini might come
to Rome, they could not effect anything against
him. If he could not have made Pope him
whom he wished, at least the one whom he did
not wish would not have been elected. But if
he had been in sound health at the death of
Alexander, everything would have been easy to
him. On the day that Juhus the Second was
elected, he told me that he had thought of every-
thing that might occur at the death of his father,
and had provided a remedy for all, except that
he had never anticipated that, when the death

^2 The Prince

did happen, he himself would be on the point
to die.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled,
I do not know how to blame him, but rather it
appears to me, as I have said, that I ought to
offer him for imitation to all those who, by the
fortune or the arms of others, are raised to
government. Because he, having a lofty spirit
and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated
his conduct otherwise, and only the shortness
of the Ufe of Alexander and his own sickness
frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who con-
siders it necessary to secure himself in his new
principality, to win friends, to overcome either
by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and
feared by the people, to be followed and re-
vered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who
had power or reason to hurt him, to change the old
order of things for new, to be severe cind gracious,
magnanimous and hberal, to destroy a disloyal
soldiery and to create new, to maintain friend-
ship with kings and princes in such a way that
they must help him with zeal and offend with
caution, cannot find a more Hvely example than
the actions of this man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of
Julius the Second, in whom he made a bad
choice, because, as is said, not being able to
elect a Pope to his own mind, he could have
hindered any other from being elected Pope;

New Principalities 63

and he ought never to have consented to the
election of any cardinal whom he had injured
or who had cause to fear him if they became
pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or
hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst
others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,
San Giorgio, and Ascanio. The rest, in becom-
ing Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and the
Spaniards excepted ; the latter from their rela-
tionship and obhgations, the former from his
influence, the kingdom of France having rela-
tions with him. Therefore, above everything,
the duke ought to have created a Spaniard
Pope, and, failing him, he ought to have con-
sented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula.
He who believes that new benefits will cause
great personages to forget old injuries is de-
ceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice,
and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

EIGHTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A
PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

EIGHTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A
PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

Although a prince may rise from a private
station in two ways, neither of which can be
entirely attributed to fori:une or genius, yet it is
manifest to me that I must not be silent on them,
although one could be more copiously treated
when I discuss republics. These methods are
when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways,
one ascends to the principality, or when by the
favour of his fellow-citizens a private person
becomes the prince of his country. And speak-
ing of the first method, it will be illustrated by
two examples — one ancient, the other modem —
and without entering further into the subject,
I consider these two examples will suffice those
who may be compelled to follow them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King of
Syracuse not only from a private but from a
low and abject position. This man, the son of a
potter, through all the changes in his fortunes
always led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he
accompanied his infamies with so much ability

67

68 The Prince

of mind and body that, having devoted himself
to the mihtary profession, he rose through its
ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being estab-
hshed in that position, and having dehberately
resolved to make himself prince and to seize
by violence, without obligation to others, that
which had been conceded to him by assent, he
came to an understanding for this purpose with
Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army,
was fighting in Sicily. One morning he as-
sembled the people and senate of Syracuse, as
if he had to discuss with them things relating to
the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers
killed all the senators and the richest of the
people; these dead, he seized and held the
princedom of that city without any civil com-
motion. And although he was twice routed by
the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet
not only was he able to defend his city, but
leaving part of his men for its defence, with the
others he attacked Africa, and in a short time
raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians,
reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled
to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving
Sicily to him, had to be content with the posses-
sion of Africa,

Therefore, he who considers the actions and
the genius of this man will see nothing, or little,
which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as
he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above.

A Principality Obtained 69

not by the favour of any one, but step by step in
the military profession, which steps were gained
with a thousand troubles and perils, and were
afterwards boldly held by him with many hazards
and dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent
to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be
without faith, without mercy, without religion;
such methods may gain empire, but not glory.
Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering
into and extricating himself from dangers be
considered, together with his greatness of mind
in enduring and overcoming hardships, it can-
not be seen why he should be esteemed less
than the most notable captain. Nevertheless, his
barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite
wickednesses do not permit him to be celebrated
among the most excellent men. What he
achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune
or to genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander
the Sixth, Oliverotto da Fermo, having been
left an orphan many years before, was brought
up by his maternal uncle, Giovanni Foghani,
and in the early days of his youth sent to fight
under Pagolo ViteUi, that, being trained under his
discipline, he might attain some high position in
the mihtary profession. After Pagolo died, he
fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a
very short time, being endowed with wit and a
vigorous body and mind, he became the first

70 The Prince

man in his profession. But it appearing to him
a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved,
with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom
the slavery of their country was dearer than its
hberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to
seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani
that, having been away from home for many
years, he wished to visit him and his city, and
in some measure to look into his patrimony;
and although he had not laboured to acquire
anything except honour, yet, in order that the
citizens should see he had not spent his time in
vain, he desired to come honourably, so would
be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his
friends and retainers ; and he entreated Giovanni
to arrange that he should be received honour-
ably by the Fermanese, all of which would be
not only to his honour, but also to that of
Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any atten-
tions due to his nephew, and he caused him to be
honourably received by the Fermanese, and he
lodged him in his own house, where, having
passed some days, and having arranged what
was necessary for his wicked designs, OHverotto
gave a solemn banquet to which he invited
Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of Fermo.
When the viands and all the other entertain-
ments that are usual in such banquets were
finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave

A Principality Obtained 71

discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope
Alexander and his son Cesare, and of their enter-
prises, to which discourse Giovanni and others
answered; but he rose at once, saying that such
matters ought to be discussed in a more private
place, and he betook himself to a chamber,
whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went
in after him. No sooner were they seated than
soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered
Giovanni and the rest. After these murders
Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and
down the town and besieged the chief magis-
trate in the palace, so that in fear the people
were forced to obey him, and to form a govern-
ment, of which he made himself the prince.
He killed all the malcontents who were able to
injure him, and strengthened himself with new
civil and military ordinances, in such a way
that, in the year during which he held the prin-
cipality, not only was he secure in the city of
Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his
neighbours. And his destruction would have
been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had
not allowed himself to be over-reached by Cesare
Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and
ViteUi at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus
one year after he had committed this parricide,
he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom
he had made his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that

J) 280

72 The Prince

Agathocles, and his like, after infinite treach-
eries and cruelties, should live for long secure in
his country, and defend himself from external
enemies, and never be conspired against by his
own citizens; seeing that many others, by means
of cruelty, have never been able even in peace-
ful times to hold the state, still less in the doubt-
ful times of war. I believe that this follows
from severities ^ being badly or properly used.
Those may be called properly used, if of evil it
is lawful to speak well, that are apphed at one
blow and are necessary to one's security, and
that are not persisted in afterwards unless they
can be turned to the advantage of the subjects.
The badly employed are those which, notwith-
standing they may be few in the commence-
ment, multiply with time rather than decrease.
Those who practise the first system are able, by
aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree
their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible
for those who follow the other to maintain
themselves.

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a
state, the usurper ought to examine closely into
all those injuries which it is necessary for him to
inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not
to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not
unsettling men he will be able to reassure them,
and win them to himself by benefits. He who

* See Note.

A Principality Obtained 73

does otherwise, either from timidity or ev-il
advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in
his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor
can they attach themselves to him, owing to their
continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries
ought to be done all at one time, so that, being
tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to
be given Uttle by httle, so that the flavour of
them may last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to live
amongst his people in such a way that no
unexpected circumstances, whether of good or
evil, shall make him change; because if the
necessity for this comes in troubled times, you
are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones
will not help you, for they will be considered as
breed from you, and no one will be under any
obhgation to you for them.

NINTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPAUTY

{

NINTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

But coming to the other point — where a leading
citizen becomes the prince of his country, not
by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but
by the favour of his fellow citizens — this may be
called a civil principality: nor is genius or
fortune altogether necessary to attain to it,
but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that
such a principahty is obtained either by the
favour of the people or by the favour of the
nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct
parties are found, and from this it arises that
the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed
by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and
oppress the people; and from these two opposite
desires there arises in cities one of three results,
either a principality , self-government, or anarchy.
A principality is created either by the people
or by the nobles, accordingly as one or other
of them has the opportunity; for the nobles,
seeing they cannot wathstand the people, begin
to cry up the reputation of one of themselves,
and they make him a prince, so that under his

77

78 The Prince

shadow they can give vent to their ambitions.
The people, finding they cannot resist the nobles,
also cry up the reputation of one of themselves,
and make him a prince so as to be defended
by his authority. He who obtains sovereignty
by the assistance of the nobles maintains him-
self with more difficulty than he who comes to
it by the aid of the people, because the former
finds himself with many around him who con-
sider themselves his equal, and because of this
he can neither rule nor manage them to his
liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by
popular favour finds himself alone, and has none
around him, or few, who are not piepared to
obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and
without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but
you can satisfy the people, for their object is
more righteous than that of the nobles, the
latter wishing to oppress, whilst the former only
desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added
also that a prince can never secure himself
against a hostile people, because of their being
too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure
himself, as they are few in number. The worst
that a prince may expect from a hostile people
is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile
nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but
also that they will lise against him; for they,
being m these affairs more far-seeing and astute,

A Civil Principality 79

always come forward in time to save themselves,
and to obtain favours from him whom they
expect to prevail. Further, the prince is com-
pelled to Uve always with the same people, but
he can do well without the same nobles, being
able to make and unmake them daily, and to
give or take away authority when it pleases
him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say
that the nobles ought to be looked at mainly in
two ways : that is to say, they either shape their
course in such a way as binds them entirely to
your fortune, or they do not. Those who so
bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to
be honoured and loved; those who do not bind
themselves may be dealt with in two ways;
they may fail to do this through pusillanimity
and a natural want of courage, in which case
you ought to make use of them, especially of
those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst
in prosperity you honour yourself, in adversity
you have not to fear them. But when for their
own ambitious ends they shun binding them-
selves, it is a token that they are giving more
thought to themselves than to you, and a prince
ought to guard against such, and to fear them
as if they were open enemies, because in adver-
sity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through
the favour of the people ought to keep them

»ri 280

8o The Prince

friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they
only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one
who, in opposition to the people, becomes a
prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above
everything, to seek to win the people over to
himself, and this he may easily do if he takes
them under his protection. Because men,
when they receive good from him of whom they
were expecting evil, are bound more closely to
their benefactor; thus the people quickly be-
come more devoted to him than if he had been
raised to the principality by their favours; and
the prince can win their affections in many
ways, but as these vary according to the circum-
stances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit
them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince
to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no
security in adversity,

Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, sustained
the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious
Roman army, and against them he defended his
country and his government ; and for the over-
coming of this peril it was only necessary for
him to make himself secure against a few, but
this would not have been sufficient if the people
had been hostile. And do not let any one im-
pugn this statement with the trite proverb that,
" He who builds on the people, builds on the
mud," for this is true when a private citizen
makes a foundation there, and persuades him-

A Civil Principality 8i

self that the people will free him when he is
oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates ;
wherein he would find himself very often de-
ceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome
and to Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. But
granted a prince who has established himself
as above, who can command, and is a man of
courage, undismayed in adversity, who does
not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his
resolution and energy, keeps the whole people
encouraged — such a one will never find himself
deceived in them, and it will be shown that he
has laid his foundations weU.

These principahties are hable to danger when
they are passing from the civil to the absolute
order of government, for such princes either
rule personally or through magistrates. In
the latter case their government is weaker
and more insecure, because it rests entirely on
the goodwill of those citizens who are raised
to the magistracy, and who, especially in
troubled times, can destroy the government
with great ease, either by intrigue or open
defiance; and the prince has not the chance
amid tumults to exercise absolute authorit>%
because the citizens and subjects, accustomed
to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a
mind to obey him amid these confusions, and
there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity
of men whom he can trust. For such a prince

82 The Prince

cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet
times, when citizens have need of the state,
because then every one agrees with him; they
all promise, and when death is far distant
they all wish to die for him; but in troubled
times, when the state has need of its citizens,
then he finds but few. And so much the more
is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can
only be tried once. Therefore a wise prince
ought to adopt such a course that his citizens
will always in every sort and kind of circiun-
stance have need of the state and of him, and
then he will always find them faithful.

TENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH

OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE

MEASURED

TENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH
OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED

It is necessary to consider another point in
examining the character of these principahties :
that is, whether a prince has such power that,
in case of need, he can support himself with his
own resources, or whether he has always need of
the assistance of others. And so to make this
quite clear I say that I consider those are able to
support themselves by their own resources who
can, either by abundance of men or money,
raise a sufificient army to join battle against
any one who comes to attack them ; and I con-
sider those always to have need of others who
cannot show themselves against the enemy in
the field, but are forced to defend themselves by
sheltering behind walls. The first case has been
discussed, but we will speak of it again should it
recur. In the second case one can say nothing
except to encourage such princes to provision
and fortify their towns, and not on any account
to defend the country. And whoever shall
fortify his town well, and shall have managed

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86 The Prince

the other concerns of his subjects in the way
stated above, and to be often repeated, will
never be attacked without great caution, for men
are always adverse to enterprises where difl6-
culties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be
an easy thing to attack one who has his town
well fortified, and is not hated by his people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free,
they own but little country around them, and
they yield obedience to the emperor when it
suits them, nor do they fear this or any other
power they may have near them, because they
are fortified in such a way that every one thinks
the taking of them by assault would be tedious
and diflScult, seeing they have proper ditches
and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and
they always keep in pubUc depots enough for
one year's eating, drinking, and firing. And
beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without
loss to the state, they always have the means of
giving work to the community in those labours
that are the Hfe and strength of the city, and on
the pursuit of which the people are supported;
they also hold military exercises in repute, and
moreover have many ordinances to uphold them.

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and
has not made himself odious, will not be at-
tacked, or if any one should attack he wiD only
be driven off with disgrace; again, because that

The Strength of Principalities 87

the affairs of this world are so changeable, it
is almost impossible to keep an army a whole
year in the field without being interfered with.
And whoever should reply: if the people have
property outside the city, and see it burnt, they
will not remain patient, and the long siege and
self-interest will make them forget their prince;
to this I answer that a powerful and courageous
prince will overcome all such difficulties by
giving at one time hope to his subjects that the
evil will not be for long, at another time fear of
the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving him-
self adroitly from those subjects who seem to
him to be too bold.

Further, the enemy would naturally on his
arrival at once bum and ruin the country at
the time when the spirits of the people are still
hot and ready for the defence ; and, therefore, so
much the less ought the prince to hesitate; be-
cause after a time, when spirits have cooled, the
damage is already done, the ills are incurred,
and there is no longer any remedy; and there-
fore they are so much the more ready to unite
with their prince, he appearing to be under
obligations to them now that their houses have
been burnt and their possessions mined in his
defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound
by the benefits they confer as much as by those
they receive. Therefore, if everything is well

88 The Prince

considered, it will not be difficult for a wise
prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast
from first to last, when he does not fail to
support and defend them.

ELEVENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

ELEVENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical
principalities, touching which all difficulties are
prior to getting possession, because they are ac-
quired either by capacity or good fortune, and
they can be held without either; for they are sus-
tained by the ancient ordinances of religion, which
are so all-powerful, and of such a character that
the principalities may be held no matter how their
princes behave and Hve. These princes alone
have states and do not defend them, they have
subjects and do not rule them; and the states,
although unguarded, are not taken from them,
and the subjects, although not ruled, do not
care, and they have neither the desire nor the
ability to aUenate themselves. Such princi-
palities only are secure and happy. But being
upheld by powers, to which the human mind
cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, be-
cause, being exalted and maintained by God, it
would be the act of a presumptuous and rash
man to discuss them.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how

91

g2 The Prince

comes it that the Church has attained such great-
ness in temporal power, seeing that from Alex-
ander backwards the Italian potentates (not
only those who have been called potentates, but
every baron and lord, though the smallest) have
valued the temporal power ver>' sUghtly — yet
now a king of France trembles before it, and it
has been able to drive him from Italy, and to
ruin the Venetians — although this may be very
manifest, it does not appear to me superfluous
to recall it in some measure to memory.

Before Charles, King of France, passed into
Italy, this country was under the dominion of
the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples,
the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These
potentates had two principal anxieties: the
one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under
arms; the other, that none of themselves should
seize more territory. Those about whom there
was the most anxiety were the Pope and the
Venetians. To restrain the Venetians the union
of all the others was necessary, as it was for the
defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope
they made use of the barons of Rome, who,
being divided into two factions, Orsini and
Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder,
and, standing with arms in their hands under
the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak
and powerless. And although there might arise
sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus,

Ecclesiastical Principalities 93

yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of
these annoyances. And the short life of a pope
is also a cause of weakness ; for in the ten years,
which is the average Hfe of a pope, he can with
difficulty lower one of the factions ; and if, so to
speak, one pope should almost destroy the
Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the
Orsini, who would support their opponents,
and yet would not have time to ruin the Orsini.
This was the reason why the temporal powers of
the pope were httle esteemed in Italy.

Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of
all the pontiffs that have ever been showed how
a pope with both money and arms was able to
prevail; and through the instrumentality of
the Duke Valentino, and by reason of the entry
of the French, he brought about all those things
which I have discussed above in the actions of
the duke. And although his intention was not
to aggrandise the Church, but the duke, never-
theless, what he did contributed to the greatness
of the Church, which, after his death and the
ruin of the duke, became the heir to all his
labours.

Pope Julius came afterwards and found the
Church strong, possessing all the Romagna, the
barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and,
through the chastisements of Alexander, the
factions wiped out ; he also found the way open
to accumulate money in a manner such as had

94 The Prince

never been practised before Alexander's time.
Such things Julius not only followed, but im-
proved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna,
to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the French
out of Italy. All of these enterprises prospered
with him, and so much the more to his credit,
inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the
Church and not any private person. He kept
also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within the
bounds in which he found them; and although
there was among them some mind to make
disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm :
the one, the greatness of the Church, -with which
he terrified them; and the other, not allowing
them to have their own cardinals, who cause
the disorders among them. For whenever
these factions have their cardinals they do not
remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster
the factions in Rome and out of it, and the
barons are compelled to support them, and
thus from the ambitions of prelates arise dis-
orders and tumults among the barons. For
these reasons his Holiness Pope Leo foimd the
pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped
that, if others made it great in arms, he will
make it still greater and more venerated by his
goodness and infinite other virtues.

TWELFTH CHAPTER

HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERS ARE^
AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES

i:

TWELFTH CHAPTER

HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, ANI>
CONCERNING MERCENARIES

Having discoursed particularly on the charac-
teristics of such principahties as in the begin-
ning I proposed to discuss, and having considered
in some degree the causes of their being good
or bad, and having shown the methods by
which many have sought to acquire them and to
hold them, it now remains for me to discuss
generally the means of offence and defence
which belong to each of them.

We have seen above how necessary it is for a
prince to have his foundations well laid, other-
wise it follows of necessity he will go to ruin.
The chief foundations of all states, new as well
as old or composite, are good laws and good
arms; and as there cannot be good laws where
the state is not well armed, it follows that where
they are well armed they have good laws. I
shall leave the laws out of the discussion and
shall speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a
prince defends his state are either his own. or

97

98 The Prince

they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and
dangerous; and if one holds his state based on
these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe;
for they are disunited, ambitious and without
discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends,
cowardly before enemies; they have neither
the fear of God nor fideHty to men, and de-
struction is deferred only so long as the attack
is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in
war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no
other attraction or reason for keeping the field
than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to
make them willing to die for you. They are
ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do
not make war, but if war comes they take them-
selves off or run from the foe; which I should
have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy
has been caused by nothing else than by resting
all her hopes for many years on mercenaries,
and although they formerly made some display
and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet
when the foreigners came they showed what
they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of
France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk
in hand; ^ and he who told us that our sins
were the cause of it told the truth, but they
were not the sins he imagined, but those
which I have related. And as they were the

> See Note.

Kinds of Soldiery 99

sins of princes, it is the princes who have also
suffered the penalty.

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of
these arms. The mercenary captains are either
capable men or they are not; if they are, you
cannot trust them, because they always aspire
to their own greatness, either by oppressing you,
who are their master, or others contrary to your
intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you
are ruined in the usual way.

And if it be urged that whoever is armed will
act in the same way, whether mercenary or not,
I reply that when arms have to be resorted to,
either by a prince or a repubhc, then the prince
ought to go in person and perform the duty of
captain; the repubhc has to send its citizens,
and when one is sent who does not turn out satis-
factorily, it ought to recall him, and when one is
worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he
does not leave the command. And experience
has shown princes and repubhcs, single-handed,
making the greatest progress, and mercenaries
doing nothing except damage ; and it is more
difficult to bring a repubhc, armed with its own
arms, under the sway of one of its citizens than
it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome
and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free.
The Switzers are completely armed and quite
free.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are

loo The Prince

the Carthaginians, who were oppressed by their
mercenary soldiers after the first war with the
Romans, although the Carthaginians had their
own citizens for captains. After the death of
Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made
captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and
after victory he took away their liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted
Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, and he,
having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,
allied himself with them to crush the Milanese,
his masters. His father, Sforza, having been
engaged by Queen Johanna of Naples, left her
unprotected, so that she was forced to throw
herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in
order to save her kingdom. And if the Vene-
tians and Florentines formerly extended their
dominions by these arms, and yet their cap-
tains did not make themselves princes, but have
defended them, I reply that the Florentines in
this case have been favoured by chance, for of
the able captains, of whom they might have
stood in fear, some have not conquered, some
have been opposed, and others have turned
their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not
conquer was Giovanni Acuto,^ and since he did
not conquer his fidehty cannot be proved; but
every one wiU acknowledge that, had he con-
quered, the Florentines would have stood at

» See Note.

Kinds of Soldiery i o i

his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi al-
ways against him, so they watched each other.
Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy;
Braccio against the Church and the kingdom
of Naples. But let us come to that which
happened a short while ago. The Florentines
appointed as their captain Pagolo ViteUi, a most
prudent man, who from a private position had
risen to the greatest renown. If this man had
taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have
been proper for the Florentines to keep in with
him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies
they had no means of resisting, and if they held
to him they must obey him. The Venetians,
if their achievements are considered, will be seen
to have acted safely and gloriously so long as
they sent to war their own men, when with
armed gentlemen and plebeians they did vali-
antly. This was before they turned to enter-
prises on land, but when they began to fight on
land they forsook this virtue and followed the
custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their
expansion on land, through not having much
territory, and because of their great reputation,
they had not much to fear from their captains;
but when they expanded, as imder Carmignuola,
they had a taste of this mistake; for, having
found him a most valiant man (they beat the
Duke of Milan under his leadership) , and, on the
other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in

I02 The Prince

the war, they feared they would no longer con-
quer under him, and for this reason they were
not willing, nor were they able, to let him go;
and so, not to lose again that which they had
acquired, they were compelled, in order to
secure themselves, to murder him. They had
afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da
Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the Count
of Pitigliano, and the Uke, under whom they had
to dread loss and not gain, as happened after-
wards at Vaila, where in one battle they lost
that which in eight hundred years they had
acquired with so much trouble. Because from
such arms conquests come but slowly, long
delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses
sudden and portentous.

And as with these examples I have reached
Italy, which has been ruled for many years by
mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seri-
ously, in order that, having seen their rise and
progress, one may be better prepared to counter-
act them. You must understand that the
empire has recently come to be repudiated in
Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal
power, and that Italy has been divided up into
more states, for the reason that many of the
great cities took up arms against their nobles,
who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were
oppressing them, whilst the Church was favour-
ing them so as to gain authority in temporal

Kinds of Soldiery 103

power: in many others their citizens became
princes. From this it came to pass that Italy
fell partly into the hands of the Church and of
republics, and, the Church consisting of priests
and the repubUc of citizens unaccustomed to
arms, both commenced to enUst foreigners.

The first who gave renown to this soldiery
was Alberigo da Conio, the Romagnian. From
the school of this man sprang, among others,
Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the
arbiters of Italy. After these came all the
other captains who till now have directed the
arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour
has been, that she has been over-run by Charles,
robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and in-
sulted by the Switzers. The principle that has
guided them has been, first, to lower the credit
of infantry so that they might increase their
own. They did this because, subsisting on their
pay and without territory, they were unable to
support many soldiers, and a few infantry did
not give them any authority; so they were led
to employ cavalry, with a moderate force of
which they were maintained and honoured;
and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in
an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were
not to be found two thousand foot soldiers.
They had, besides this, used every art to lessen
fatigue and danger to themselves and their

soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking

E280

I04 The Prince

prisoners and liberating without ransom. They
did not attack towns at night, nor did the garri-
sons of the towns attack encampments at night;
they did not surround the camp either with
stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign in the
winter. All these things were permitted by
their military rules, and devised by them to
avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers;
thus they have brought Italy to slavery and
contempt.

THIRTEENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY,
AND ONE'S OWN

THIRTEENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY,
AND one's own

Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm,
are employed when a prince is called in with his
forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope
Julius in the most recent times ; for he, having, in
the enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof
of his mercenaries, turned to auxiUaries, and
stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain, for
his assistance with men and arms. These arms
may be useful and good in themselves, but for
him who calls them in they are always disad-
vantageous; for losing, one is undone, and
winning, one is their captive.

And although ancient histories may be full of
examples, I do not wish to leave this recent one
of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which
cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to
get Ferrara, threw himself entirely into the
hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune
brought about a third event, so that he did not
reap the fruit of his rash choice ; because, having

his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the

107

io8 The Prince

Svvitzers having risen and driven out the con-
querors (against all expectation, both his and
others'), it so came to pass that he did not be-
come prisoner to his enemies, they having fled,
nor to his auxiharies, he having conquered by
other arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms,
sent ten thousand Frenchmen to take Pisa,
whereby they ran more danger than at any
other time of their troubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose

his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into

Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not

,wiUing to quit; this was the beginning of the

servitude of Greece to the infidels.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to con-
quer make use of these arms, for they are much
more hazardous than mercenaries, because with
them the ruin is ready made; they are all
united, all 5^eld obedience to others; but with
mercenaries, when they have conquered, more
time and better opportunities are needed to in-
jure you; they are not all of one community,
they are found and paid by you, and a third
party, which you have made their head, is not
able all at once to assume enough authority to
injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries
dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiharies,
valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always
avoided these arms and turned to his own; and

Auxiliaries and Mixed Soldiery 109

has been wiUing rather to lose with them than
to conquer with others, not deeming that a real
victory which is gained with the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia
and his actions. This duke entered the
Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only
French soldiers, and with them he captured
Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces
not appearing to him rehable, he turned to
mercenaries, discerning less danger in them,
and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom
presently, on handUng and finding them doubt-
ful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed and
turned to his own men. And the difference
between one and the other of these forces can
easily be seen when one considers the difference
there was in the reputation of the duke, when
he had the French, when he had the Orsini and
Vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers,
on whose fidelity he could always count and
found it ever increasing ; he was never esteemed
more highly than when every one saw that he
was complete master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Itahan and
recent examples, but I am unwilling to leave
out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those
I have named above. This man, as I have said,
made head of the army by the Syracusans, soon
found out that a mercenary soldiery, consti-
tuted like our Italian condottieri, was of no use ;

1 1 o The Prince

and it appearing to him that he could neither
keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut
to pieces, and afterwards made war with his
own forces and not with aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance
from the Old Testament applicable to this sub-
ject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with
Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give
him courage, Saul armed him with his own
weapons; which David rejected as soon as he
had them on his back, saying he could make no
use of them, and that he wished to meet the
enemy with his shng and his knife. In conclu-
sion, the arms of others either fall from your
back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you
fast.

Charles the Seventh, the father of King Louis
the Eleventh, having by good fortune and valour
liberated France from the Enghsh, recognised
the necessity of being armed with forces of
his own, and he established in his kingdom
ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infan-
try. Afterwards his son. King Louis, aboUshed
the infantry and began to enUst the Switzers,
which mistake, followed by others, is, as is
now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom;
because, having raised the reputation of the
Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value
of his own arms, for he has destroyed the in-
fantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he has

Auxiliaries and Mixed Soldiery 1 1 1

subordinated to others, for, being as they are
so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it
does not appear that they can now conquer
without them. Hence it arises that the French
cannot stand against the Switzers, and without
the Switzers they do not come off well against
others. The armies of the French have thus
become mixed, partly mercenary and partly
national, both of which arms together are much
better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries
alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces.
And this example proves it, for the kingdom of
France would be unconquerable if the ordin-
ance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering
into an affair which looks well at first, cannot
discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have
said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he
who rules a principality cannot recognise evils
until they are upon him, he is not truly wise;
and this insight is given to few. And if the
first disaster to the Roman Empire should be
examined, it will be found to have commenced
only with the enlisting of the Goths; because
from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire
began to decline, and all that valour which had
raised it passed away to others.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is

secure without having its own forces; on the

contrary', it is entirely dependent on good for-
*£ 280

1 1 2 The Prince

tune, not having the valour which in adversity
would defend it. And it has always been the
opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing
can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or
power not founded on its own strength. And
one's own forces are those which are composed
either of subjects, citizens, or dependents ; all
others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the
way to make ready one's own forces will be
easily found if the rules suggested by me shall
be reflected upon, and if one will consider how
Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and
many republics and princes have armed and
organised themselves, to which rules I entirely
commit myself.

I

FOURTEENTH CHAPTER

THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE
SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR

FOURTEENTH CHAPTER

THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE
SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR

A PRINCE ought to have no other aim or
thought^ nor select anything else for his study,
than war and its rules and discipline ; for this is
the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and
it is of such force that it not only upholds those
who are born princes, but it often enables men
to rise from a private station to that rank.
And, on the contrary, it is seen that when
princes have thought more of ease than of arms
they have lost their states. And the first cause
of your losing it is to neglect this art; and
what enables you to acquire a state is to be
master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through
being martial, from a private person became
Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding
the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes
became private persons. For among other
evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes
you to be despised, and this is one of those ig-
nominies against which a prince ought to guard
himself, as is shown later on. Because there is

115

I 1 6 The Prince

nothing proportionate between the armed and
the unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he
who is armed should 5deld obedience wiUingly
to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed
man should be secure among armed servants.
Because, there being in the one disdain and in
the other suspicion, it is not possible for them
to work well together. And therefore a prince
who does not understand the art of war, over
and above the other misfortunes already men-
tioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor
can he rely on them. He ought never, there-
fore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of
war, and in peace he should addict himself more
to its exercise than in war; this he can do in
two ways, the one by action, the other by
study.

As regards action, he ought above all things to
keep his men well organised and drilled, to follow
incessantly the chase, by which he accustoms
his body to hardships, and learns something
of the nature of locaUties, and gets to find
out how the mountains rise, how the valleys
open out, how the plains he, and to understand
the nature of rivers and marshes, and in all this
to take the greatest care. Which knowledge is
useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know
his country, and is better able to undertake its
defence ; afterwards, by means of the knowledge
and observation of that locahty, he under-

The Art of War 1 1 7

stands with ease any other which it may be
necessary for him to study hereafter; because
the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and
marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have
a certain resemblance to those of other countries,
so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one
country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of
others. And the prince that lacks this skill
lacks the essential which it is desirable that a
captain should possess, for it teaches him to
surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead
armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to
advantage.

Philopoemen, Prince of the Acheans, among
other praises which writers have bestowed on
him, is commended because in time of peace he
never had anything in his mind but the rules of
war; and when he was in the country with
friends, he often stopped and reasoned ^vith
them: " If the enemy should be upon that hiU,
and we should find ourselves here with our army,
with whom would be the advantage? How
should one best advance to meet him, keeping
the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, how
ought we to set about it? If they should re-
treat, how ought we to pursue ? " And he would
set forth to them, as he went, all the chances
that could befaU an army; he would hsten to
their opinion and state his, confirming it with
reasons, so that by these continual discussions

1 1 8 The Prince

there could never arise, in time of war, any
unexpected circumstances that he could not
deal with.

But to exercise the intellect the prince should
read histories, and study there the actions of
illustrious men, to see how they have borne
themselves in war, to examine the causes of
their victories and defeat, so as to avoid the
latter and imitate the former; and above all do
as an illustrious man did, who took as an exem-
plar one who had been praised and famous before
him, and whose achievements and deeds he
always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander
the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander,
Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the hfe of
Cjniis, written by Xenophon, wiU recognise after-
wards in the life of Scipio how that imitation
was his glory, and how in chastity, affability,
humanity, and liberaUty Scipio conformed
to those things which have been written of
Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to
observe some such rules, and never in peaceful
times stand idle, but increase his resources with
industry in such a way that they may be avail-
able to him in adversity, so that if fortune
changes it may find him prepared to resist her
blows.

FIFPEENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND

ESPECIALLY PRINCES. ARE PRAISED

OR BLAMED

FIFTEENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND
ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR
BLAMED

It remains now to see what ought to be the rules
of conduct for a prince towards subject and
friends. And as I know that many have
written on this point, I expect I shall be con-
sidered presimiptuous in mentioning it again,
especially as in discussing it I shaU depart from
the methods of other people. But, it being my
intention to write a thing which shall be useful
to him who apprehends it, it app)ears to me more
appropriate to foUow up the real truth of a
matter than the imagination of it; for many
have pictured repubhcs and principahties which
in fact have never been known or seen, because
how one Hves is so far distant from how one
ought to hve, that he who neglects what is done
for what ought to be done, sooner effects his
ruin than his preservation; for a man who
wishes to act entirely up to his professions of
virtue soon meets with what destroys him among
so much that is evil.

121

122 The Prince

Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to
hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to
make use of it or not according to necessity.
Therefore, putting on one side imaginary- things
concerning a prince, and discussing those which
are real, I say that all men when they are spoken
of, and chiefly princes for being more highly
placed, are remarkable for some of those quali-
ties which bring them either blame or praise;
and thus it is that one is reputed hberal, another
miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avari-
cious person in our language is still he who
desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one
miserly who deprives himself too much of the
use of his own) ; one is reputed generous, one
rapacious ; one cruel, one compassionate ; one
faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and
cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable,
another haughty; one lascivious, another
chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard,
another easy; one grave, another frivolous;
one rehgious, another unbeheving, and the Uke.
And I know that every one will confess that it
would be most praiseworthy in a prince to
exhibit all the above quahties that are con-
sidered good; but because they can neither be
entirely possessed nor observed, for human con-
ditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him
to be sufficiently prudent that he may know
how to avoid the reproach of those vices which

Concerning Praise or Blame 123

would lose him his state; and also to keep him-
self, if it be possible, from those which would
not lose him it; but this not being possible, he
may with less hesitation abandon himself to
them. And again, he need not make himself
uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices
without which the state can only be saved with
difficulty, for if everything is considered care-
fully, it will be found that something which
looks hke virtue, if followed, would be his ruin;
whilst something else, which looks hke vice, yet
followed brings him security and prosperity.

SIXTEENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING LIBERALITY OR MEANNESS

SIXTEENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS

Commencing then with the first of the above-
named characteristics, I sav that it would be
well to be reputed hberal. Nevertheless,
liberality exercised in a way that does not brinjg;
you the reputation for it, injures you ; for if one
exercises it honestly and as it should be exer-
cised, it may not become known, and you will
not avoid the reproach of its opposite. There-
fore, any one wishing to maintain among men
the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attri-
bute of magnificence; so that a prince thus
inclined will consume in such acts all his pro-
perty, and will be compelled in the end, if he
wish to maintain the name of Hberal, to unduly
weigh down his people, and tax them, and do
everything he can to get money. This will soon
make him odious to his subjects, and becoming
poor he will be httle valued by any one; thus,
with his hberahty, having offended many and
rewarded few, he is affected by the very first
trouble and imperilled by whatever may be

the first danger; recognising this himself, and

127

128 The Prince

wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once
into the reproach of being miserly.

Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise
this virtue of liberaUty in such a way that it is
recognised, except to his cost, if he is wise he
ought not to fear the reputation of being mean,
for in time he will come to be more considered
than if Uberal, seeing that with his economy his
revenues are enough, that he can defend him-
self against all attacks, and is able to engage in
enterprises without burdening his people; thus
it comes to pass that he exercises liberaUty
towards all from whom he does not take, who
are munberless, and meanness towards those to
whom he does not give, who are few.

We have not seen great things done in our
time except by those who have been considered
mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the
Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by
a reputation for liberality, yet he did not strive
afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on
the King of France; and he made many wars
without imposing any extraordinary tax on his
subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses
out of his long thriftiness. The present King
of Spain would not have undertaken or con-
quered in so many enterprises if he had been re-
puted liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that
he has not to rob his subjects, that he can de-
fend himself, that he does not become poor and

Liberality and Meanness 129

abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious,
ought to hold of little account a reputation
for being mean, for it is one of those vices
which will enable him to govern.

And if any one should say: Caesar obtained
empire by liberality, and many others have
reached the highest positions by having been
Uberal, and by being considered so, I answer:
Either you are a prince in fact, or in a way to
become one. In the first case this Hberahty is
dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to
be considered liberal; and Caesar was one of
those who wished to become pre-eminent in
Rome; but if he had survived after becoming
so, and had not moderated his expenses, he
would have destroyed his government. And if
any one should reply : Many have been princes,
and have done great things with armies, who
have been considered very Hberal, I reply:
Either a prince spends that which is his own or
his subjects' or else that of others. In the first
case he ought to be sparing, in the second he
ought not to neglect any opportunity for liber-
ality. And to the prince who goes forth with
his army, supporting it by piUage, sack, and
extortion, handhng that which belongs to others,
this hberahty is necessary, otherwise he would
not be followed by soldiers. And of that which
is neither yours nor your subjects' you can
be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and

I 30 The Prince

Alexander; because it does not take away your
reputation if you squander that of others, but
adds to it ; it is only squandering your own that
injures you.

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as
liberality, for even whilst you exercise it you
lose the power to do so, and so become either
poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty,
rapacious and hated. And a prince should
guard himself, above all things, against being
despised and hated; and liberaHty leads you to
both. Therefore it is wiser to have a reputa-
tion for meanness which brings reproach
without hatred, than to be compelled through
seeking a reputation for liberahty to incur a
name for rapacity which begets reproach with
hatred.

SEVENTEENTH CHAFFER

CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND

WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED

THAN FEARED

SEVENTEENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND
WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN
FEARED

Coming now to the other qualities mentioned
above, I say that every prince ought to desire to
be considered clement and not crud. Never-
theless he ought to take care not to misuse
this^clemency. Cesare Borgia was considered
cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled
the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace
and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered,
he will be seen to have been much more merci-
ful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a
reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be
destroyed. Therefore a prince, so long as he
keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not
to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with
a few examples he will be more merciful than
those who, through too much mercy, allow dis-
orders to arise, from which follow murder or
robbery; for these are wont to injure the whole
people, whilst those executions which originate
with a prince offend the individual only.

^33

134 The Prince

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new
prince to avoid the imputation of cruelty, OM^ang
to new states being full of dangers. Hence
Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the
inhumanity of her reign owing to its being new,
saymg:—

" Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and
to act, nor should he himself show fear, but pro-
ceed in a temperate manner with prudence and
humanity, so that too much confidence may
not make him incautious and too much distrust
render him intolerable.
A" Upon__this a question arises: whether it bg
better to be loved than feared or feared than
loved? It may be answered that one should
wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to
unite them in one person, it is much safer to be
feared than loved, when, of the two, either must
be dispensed with. Because this is to be as-
serted in general of men, that they are ungrate-
ful, fickle, false, cowards, covetous, and as long
as you succeed they are yours entirely ; they
will offer you their blood, property, hfe, and
children, as is said above, when the need is far
distant; but when it approaches they turn
against__you. And that prince who, relying
entirely on their promises, has neglected other

Cruelty and Clemency 135

precautions, is ruined; because friendships that
are obtained by pa5m[ients, and not by greatness
or nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but
they are not secured, and in time of need cannot
be relied upon; and men have less scruple in
offending one who is beloved than one who is
feared, for love is preserved bv the link (^
obhgation which, owing to the baseness of men,
is broken at every opportunity for their advan-
tage; but fear preserves you by a dread of
punishment which never fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in
such a way that, if he does not win love, he
avoids hatred; because he can endure very well
being feared whilst he is not hated, which will
always be as long as he abstains from the pro-
perty of his citizens and subjects and from their
women. But when it is necessary for him to
proceed against the life of some one, he must do
it on proper justification and for manifest cause,
but above aU things he must keep his hands off
the property of others, because men more
quickly forget the death of their father than
the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts
for taking away the property are never wanting ;
for he who has once begim to live by robbery
wiU always find pretexts for seizing what belongs
to others; but reasons for taking life, on the
contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner
lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and

I 36 The Prince

has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it
is quite necessary for him to disregard the re-
putation of cruelty, for without it he would
never hold his army united or disposed to its
duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this
one is enumerated : that having led an enorm.ous
army, composed of many various races of men,
to fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose
either among them or against the prince, whether
in his bad or in his good fortune. This arose
from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty,
which, with his boundless valour, made him
revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers,
but without that cruelty, his other virtues were
not sufficient to produce this effect. And
short-sighted writers admire his deeds from one
point of view and from another condemn the
principal cause of them. That it is true his
other virtues would not have been sufficient for
him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that
most excellent man, not only of his own times
but within the memory of man, against whom,
nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this
arose from nothing but his too great forbear-
ance, which gave his soldiers more hcence than is
consistent with military discipline. For this he
was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus,
and called the corruptor of the Roman soldiery.
The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of

Cruelty and Clemency 137

Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor
was the insolence of the legate punished, owing
entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that
some one in the Senate, wishing to excuse him,
said there were many men who knew much
better how not to err than to correct the errors of
others. This disposition, if he had been con-
tinued in the command, would have destroyed in
time the fame and glory of Scipio ; but, he being
under the control of the Senate, this injurious
characteristic not only concealed itself, but
contributed to his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or
loved, I come to the conclusion that, men loving
according to their own will and feanng accord-
ing to that of the prince, a wise prince should
estabUsh himself on that which is in his own
control and not in that of others; he must
endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.

EIGHTEENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES
SHOULD KEEP FAITH

EIGHTEENTH CHAPTER

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES
SHOULD KEEP FAITH

Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a
prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity
and not with craft. Nevertheless our experi-
ence has been that those princes who have done
great things have held good faith of little ac-
count, and have known how to circumvent the
intellect of men by craft, and in the end have
overcome those who have relied on their word.
You must know there are two ways of contest-
ing, the one by the law, the other by force ; ^
the first method is proper to men, the second to
beasts; but because the first is frequently not
sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the
second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince
to understand how to avail himself of the beast
and the man. This has been figuratively taught
to princes by ancient writers, who describe how
AchiUes and many other princes of old were
given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who
brought them up in his discipHne; which means

^ See Note.
141

142 The Prince

solely that, as they had for a teacher one who
was half beast and half man, so it is necessary
for a prince to know how to make use of both
natures, and that one without the other is not
durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled
knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose
the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot
defend himself against snares and the fox
cannot defend himself against wolves. There-
fore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the
snares and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those
who rely simply on the lion do not understand
what they are about. Therefore a wise lord
cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such
observance may be turned against him, and
when the reasons that caused him to pledge it
exist no longer. If men were entirely good
this precept would not hold, but because they
are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you
too are not bound to observe it with them.
Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legiti
mate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of
this endless modem examples could be given,
showing how many treaties and engagements
have been made void and of no effect through
the faithlessness of princes; and he who has
known best how to employ the fox has suc-
ceeded best.

But it is necessary to know well how to
disguise this characteristic, and to be a great

The Way Princes Should Keep Faith 143

pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple,
and so subject to present necessities, that he
who seeks to deceive will always find some one
who will allow himself to be deceived. One
recent example I cannot pass over in silence.
Alexander the Sixth did nothing else but de-
ceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise,
and he always found victims; for there never
was a man who had greater power m asserting,
or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing,
yet would observe it less; nevertheless his de-
ceits always succeeded according to his wishes,^
because he well understood this side of mankind.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to
have all the good qualities I have enumerated,
but it is very necessary to appear to have them.
And I shall dare to say this also, that to have
them and always to observe them is injurious,
and that to appear to have them is useful; to
appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, up-
right, and to be so, but with a mind so framed
that should you require not to be so, you may be
able and know how to change to the opposite.

And you have to understand this, that a
prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all
those things for which men are esteemed, being
often forced, in order to maintain the state, to
act contrary to fidelity,^ friendship, humanity,
and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him

' See Note.

*p 280

144 The Prince

to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly
as the winds and variations of fortune force it,
yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from
the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if com-
pelled, then to know how to set about it.

For this reason a prince ought to take care that
he never lets anything shp from his hps that is
not replete with the above-named five quahties,
that he may appear to him who sees and hears
him altogether merciful, faithful,^ humane,
upright, and rehgious. There is nothing more
necessary to appear to have than this last
quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more
by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs
to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch
with you. Every one sees what you appear to
be, few really know what you are, and those
few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion
of the many, who have the majesty of the state
to defend them; and in the actions of all men,
and especially of princes, which it is not prudent
to challenge, one judges by the result.

For that reason, let a prince have the credit
of conquering and holding his state, the means
will always be considered honest, and he will be
praised by everybody; because the vulgar are
always taken by what a thing seems to be
and by what comes of it ; and in the world there
are only the vulgar, for the few nnd a place

» Seo Note.

The Way Princes Should Keep Faith 1 45

there only when the many have no ground to
rest on.

One prince of the present time, whom it is not
well to name, never preaches anything else but
peace and good faith, and to both he is most
hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have
deprived him of reputation and kingdom many
a time.

NINETEENTH CHAPTER

THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED
AND HATED

NINETEENTH CHAPTER

THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED
AND HATED

Now, concerning the characteristics of which
mention is made above, I have spoken of the
more important ones, the others I wish to dis-
cuss briefly under this generality, that the
prince must consider, as has been in part said
before, how to avoid those things which wiU
make him hated or contemptible; and as often
as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled
his part, and he need not fear any danger in
other reproaches.

It makes him hated above all things, as I
have said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator
of the property and women of his subjects, from
both of which he must abstain. And when
neither their property nor honour is touched,
the majority of men live content, and he has
only to contend with the ambition of a few,
whom he can curb with ease in many ways.

It makes him contemptible to be considered
fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, ir-
resolute, from all of which a prince should guard

149

150 The Prince

himself as from a rock ; and he should endeavour
to show in his actions greatness, courage, gravity,
and fortitude; and in his private dealings with
his subjects let him show that his judgments are
irrevocable, and maintain himself in such re-
putation that no one can hope either to deceive
him or to get round him.

That prince is highly esteemed who conveys
this impression of himself, and he who is highly
esteemed is not easily conspired against; for,
provided it is well known that he is an excellent
man and revered by his people, he can only
be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a
prince ought to have two fears, one from within,
on account of his subjects, the other from with-
out, on account of external powers. From the
latter he is defended by being well armed and
having good allies, and if he is well armed he
will have good friends, and affairs will always
remain quiet within when they are quiet with-
out, imless they should have been ab^eady dis-
turbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs
outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his
preparations and has lived as I have said, as
long as he does not despair, he will resist every
attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairs out-
side are disturbed he has only to fear that they
will conspire secretly, from which a prince can
easily secure himself by avoiding being hated

Despised and Hated 151

and despised, and by keeping the people satis-
fied with him, which it is most necessary foi
him to accomphsh, as I said above at length.
And one of the most efficacious remedies that a
prince can have against conspiracies is not to be
hated and despised by the people, for he who
conspires against a prince always expects to
please them by his removal; but when the con-
spirator can only look forward to offending
them, he will not have the courage to take such
a course, for the difficulties that confront a con-
spirator are infinite. And as experience shows,
many have been the conspiracies, but few have
been successful; because he who conspires
cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion
except from those whom he believes to be mal-
contents, and as soon as you have opened your
mind to a malcontent you have given him the
material with which to content himself, for by
denouncing you he can look for every advan-
tage; so that, seeing the gain from this course
to be assured, and seeing the other to be doubt-
ful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare
friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the
prince, to keep faith with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small com-
pass, I say that, on the side of the conspirator,
there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of
punishment to terrify him; but on the side of
the prince there is the majesty of the princi-

152 The Prince

pality, the laws, the protection of friends and
the state to defend him; so that, adding to all
these things the popular goodwill, it is impos-
sible that any one should be so rash as to con-
spire. For whereas in general the conspirator has
to fear before the execution of his plot, in this
case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime ;
because on account of it he has the people for
an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any
escape.

Endless examples could be given on this sub-
ject, but I will be content with one, brought to
pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer
Annibale BentivogH, who was prince in Bologna
(grandfather of the present Annibale), having
been murdered by the Canneschi, who had
conspired against him, not one of his family
survived but Messer Giovanni, who was in
childhood: immediately after his assassination
the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi.
This sprung from the popular goodwill which
the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days
in Bologna; which was so great that, although
none remained there after the death of Anni-
bale who were able to rule the state, the Bolog-
nese, having information that there was one of
the Bentivogli family in Florence, who up to
that time had been considered the son of a
blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave
him the government of their city, and it was

Despised and Hated 153

ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in
due course to the government.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought
to reckon conspiracies of Httle account when his
people hold him in esteem ; but when it is hostile
to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought
to fear everything and everybody. And well-
ordered states and wise princes have taken
every care not to drive the nobles to despera-
tion, and to keep the people satisfied and con-
tented, for this is one of the most important
objects a prince can have.

Among the best ordered and governed king-
doms of our times is France, and in it are found
many good institutions on which depend the
liberty and security of the king; of these the
first is the parliament and its authority, because
he who founded the kingdom, knowing the
ambition of the nobility and their boldness,
considered that a bit in their mouths would be
necessary to hold them in ; and, on the other side,
knowing the hatred of the people, founded in
fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect
them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the]
particular care of the king; therefore, to take
away the reproach which he would be liable to
from the nobles for favouring the people, and
from the people for favouring the nobles, he set
up an arbiter, who should be one who could
beat down the great and favour the lesser

154 The Prince

without reproach to the king. Neither could you
have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or
a greater source of security to the king and king-
dom. From this one can draw another im-
portant conclusion, that princes ought to leave
affairs of reproach to the management of others,
and keep those of grace in their own hands.
And further, I consider that a prince ought to
cherish the nobles, but not so as to make himself
hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have
examined the lives and deaths of the Roman
emperors that many of them would be an
example contrary to my opinion, seeing that
some of them lived nobly and showed great
qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost
their empire or have been killed by subjects
who have conspired against them. Wishing,
therefore, to answer these objections, I will re-
call the characters of some of the emperors, and
will show that the causes of their ruin were not
different to those alleged by me; at the same
time I will only submit for consideration those
things that are noteworthy to him who studies
the affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those
emperors who succeeded to the empire from
Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus;
they were Marcus and his son Commodus,
Pertinax, Julius, Sevenis and his son Antoninus

Despised and Hated 155

Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander,
and Maximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in other
principaHties the ambition of the nobles and
the insolence of the people only have to be con-
tended with, the Roman emperors had a third
difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty
and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset
with difficulties that it was the ruin of many;
for it was a hard thing to give satisfaction both
to soldiers and people; because the people
loved peace, and for this reason they loved the
unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers loved the
warhke prince who was bold, cruel, and rapa-
cious, which qualities they were quite willing
he should exercise upon the people, so that they
could get double pay and give vent to their
greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those
emperors were always overthrown who, either
by birth or training, had no great authority, and
most of them, especially those who came new
to the principaUty, recognising the difficulty of
these two opposing humours, were incUned to
give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little
about injuring the people. Which course was
necessary, because, as princes cannot help being
hated by some one, they ought, in the first place,
to avoid being hated by every one, and when
they cannot compass this, they ought to en-
deavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the

I 56 The Prince

hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those
emperors who through inexperience had need
of special favour adhered more readily to the
soldiers than to the people; a course which
turned out advantageous to them or not, ac-
cordingly as the prince knew how to maintain
authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, Per-
tinax, and Alexander, being all men of modest
life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane,
and benignant, came to a sad end except Mar-
cus; he alone lived and died honoured, because
he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary
title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or
the people; and afterwards, being possessed of
many virtues which made him respected, he
always kept both orders in their places whilst
he lived, and was neither hated nor despised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against
the wishes of the soldiers, who, being accus-
tomed to Uve Ucentiously under Commodus,
could not endure the honest Ufe to which Per-
tinax wished to reduce them; thus, having
given cause for hatred, to which hatred there
was added contempt for his old age, he was over-
thrown at the very beginning of his administra-
tion. And here it should be noted that hatred
is acquired as much by good works as by bad
ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing
to keep his state is very often forced to do evil ;

Despised and Hated 157

for when that body is corrupt whom you think
you have need of to maintain yourself — it may
be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles
— you have to submit to its humours and to
gratify them, and then good works will do you
harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man
of such great goodness, that among the other
praises which are accorded him is this, that in
the fourteen years he held the empire no one
was ever put to death by him unjudged; never-
theless, being considered effeminate and a man
who allowed himself to be governed by his
mother, he became despised, the army con-
spired against him, and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of
Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and
Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and
rapacious — men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did
not hesitate to commit every kind of iniquity
against the people ; and all, except Severus, came
to a bad end; but in Severus there was so
much valour that, keeping the soldiers friendly,
although the people were oppressed by him, he
reigned successfully; for his valour made him
so much admired in the sight of the soldiers and
people that the latter were kept in a way
astonished and awed and the former respectful
and satisfied. And because the actions of this
man, as a new prince, were great, I \vish to show

158 The Prince

briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the
fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above,
it is necessary for a prince to imitate.

Knowing the sloth of the Emperor JuHan, he
persuaded the army in Sclavonia, of which he
was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome
and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been
killed by the Pretorian soldiers ; and under this
pretext, without appearing to aspire to the
throne, he moved the army on Rome, and
reached Italy before it was kno^vn that he had
started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate,
through fear, elected him emperor and killed
Julian. After this there remained for Severus,
who wished to make himself master of the whole
empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where
Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had caused
himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in
the West where Albinus was, who also aspired to
the throne. And as he considered it dangerous
to declare himself hostile to both, he decided
to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the
latter he wrote that, being elected emperor
by the Senate, he was willing to share that
dignity with him and sent him the title of
Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had
made Albinus his colleague; which things were
accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus
had conquered and killed Niger, and settled
Oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and com-

Despised and Hated 159

plained to the Senate that Albinus, httle recog-
nising the benefits that he had received from
him, had by treachery sought to murder him,
and for this ingratitude he was compelled to
punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in
France, and took from him his government and
Hfe. He who will, therefore, carefully examine
the actions of this man will find him a most
vahant lion and a most cunning fox; he will
find him feared and respected by every one, and
not hated by the army; and it need not be
wondered at that he, a new man, was able to
hold the empire so well, because his supreme
renown always protected him from that hatred
which the people might have conceived against
him for his violence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent
man, and had very excellent qualities, which
made him admirable in the sight of the people
and acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a war-
hke man, most enduring of fatigue, a despiser
of all delicate food and other luxuries, which
caused him to be beloved by the armies. Never-
theless, his ferocity and cruelties were so great
and so unheard of that, after endless single
murders, he killed a large number of the people
of Rome and all those of Alexandria. He be-
came hated by the whole world, and also feared
by those he had around him, to such an extent
that he was murdered in the midst of his army

i6o The Prince

by a centurion. And here it must be noted
that such hke deaths, which are dehberately
inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage,
cannot be avoided by princes, because any one
who does not fear to die can inflict them; but
a prince may fear them the less because they
are very rare ; he has only to be careful not to
do any grave injury to those whom he employs
or has around him in the service of the state.
Antoninus had not taken this care, but had
contumeliously killed a brother of that cen-
turion, whom also he daily threatened, yet
retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned
out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the
emperor's ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it
should have been very easy to hold the empire,
for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it,
and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his
father to please his people and soldiers; but,
being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave him-
self up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting
them, so that he might indulge his rapacity upon
the people; on the other hand, not maintaining
his dignity, often descending to the theatre to
compete with gladiators, and doing other vile
things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he
fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being
hated by one party and despised by the other,
he was conspired against and killed.

Despised and Hated 1 6 1

It remains to discuss the character of Maxi-
minus. He was a very warUke man, and the
armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of
Alexander, of whom I have akeady spoken,
killed him and elected Maximinus to the throne.
This he did not possess for long, for two things
made him hated and despised; the one, his
having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him
into contempt (it being well known to all, and
considered a great indignity by every one), and
the other, his having at the accession to his
dominions deferred going to Rome and taking
possession of the imperial seat; he had also
gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by
having, through his prefects in Rome and else-
where in the empire, practised many cruelties,
so that the whole world was moved to anger at
the meanness of his birth and to fear at his bar-
barity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate
with all the people of Rome, and all Italy con-'
spired against him, to which may be added his
own army : this latter, besieging Aquileia and
meeting with difficulties in taking it, were
disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him
less when they found so many against him,
murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss HeHogabalus, Mac-
rinus, or Juhan, who, being thoroughly contemp-
tible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring
this discourse to a conclusion by saying that

1 62 The Prince

princes in our times have this difficulty of giving
inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far
less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to
give them some indulgence, that is soon done;
none of these princes have armies that are
veterans in the governance and administration
of provinces, as were the armies of the Roman
Empire ; and whereas it was then more necessary
to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the
people, it is now more necessary to all princes,
except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the
people rather than the soldiers, because the
people are the more powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk,
who always keeps round him twelve thousand
infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which
depend the security and strength of the king-
dom, and it is necessary that, putting aside
every consideration for the people, he should
keep them his friends. The kingdom of the
Soldan is similar ; being entirely in the hands of
soldiers, it foUows again that, without regard to
the people, he must keep them his friends. But
you must note that the state of the Soldan is
unUke all other principalities, for the reason
that it is like the Christian pontificate, which
cannot be called either an hereditary or a newly
formed principahty ; because the sons of the old
prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected
to that position by those who have authority,

Despised and Hated 163

and the sons remain only noblemen. And this
being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a
new principaUty, because there are none of
those difficulties in it that are met with in new
ones; for although the prince is new, the consti-
tution of the state is old, and it is framed so as
to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse,
I say that whoever will consider it will acknow-
ledge that either hatred or contempt has been
fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will
be recognised also how it happened that, a
number of them acting in one way and a number
in another, only one in each way came to a happy
end and the rest to unhappy ones. Because
it would have been useless and dangerous for
Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to
imitate Marcus, who was heir to the principality :
and hkewise it would have been utterly de-
structive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maxi-
minus to have imitated Severus, they not
having sufficient valour to enable them to tread
in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the
principality, cannot imitate the actions of
Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those
of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus
those parts which are necessary to found his
state, and from Marcus those which are proper
and glorious to keep a state that may already be
stable and firm.

TWENTIETH CHAPTER

ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY THINGS TO WHICH

PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS

OR HURTFUL?

T\VENTIETH CHAPTER

ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY THINGS TO WHICH
PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR
HURTFUL?

I, Some princes, so as to hold securely the
state, have disarmed their subjects; others have
kept their subject towns distracted by factions;
others have fostered enmities against them-
selves; others have laid themselves out to gain
over those whom they distrusted in the begin-
ning of their governments; some have built
fortresses ; some have overthrown and destroyed
them. And although one cannot give a final
judgment on all of these things unless one pos-
sesses the particulars of those states in which a
decision has to be made, nevertheless I will
speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself
will admit.

2. There never was a new prince who has dis-
armed his subjects; rather when he has found
them disarmed he has always armed them, be-
cause, by arming them, those arms become
yours, those men who were distrusted become

faithful, and those who were faithful are kept
G^so 167

I 68 The Prince

so, and your subjects become your adherents.
And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet
when those whom you do arm are benefited,
the others can be handled more freely, and this
difference in their treatment, which they quite
understand, makes the former your dependents,
and the latter, considering it to be necessary
that those who have the most danger and ser-
vice should have the most reward, excuse you.
But when you disarm them, you at once offend
them by showing that you distrust them, either
for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either
of these opinions breeds hatred against you.
And because you cannot remain unarmed, it
follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are
of the character already shown; even if they
should be good they would not be sufficient to
defend you against powerful enemies and dis-
trusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a
new prince in a new principahty has always dis-
tributed arms. Histories are full of examples.
But when a prince acquires a new state, which
he adds as a province to his old one, then it
is necessary to disarm the men of that state,
except those who have been his adherents in
acquiring it; and these again, with time and op-
portunity, should be rendered soft and effemin-
ate; and matters should be managed in such a
way that all the armed men in the state shall be
your own soldiers who in your old state were
living near you.

Arc Fortresses Advantageous ? 169

3. Our forefathers, and those who were
reckoned wise, were accustomed to say that it
was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and
Pisa by fortresses; and with this idea they
fostered quarrels in some of their tributary
towns so as to keep possession of them the more
easily. This may have been well enough in
those times when Italy was in a way balanced,
but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a
precept for to-day, because I do not beUeve that
factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain
that when the enemy comes upon you in divided
cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest
party will always assist the outside forces and
the other will not be able to resist. The Vene-
tians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons,
fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in
their tributary cities; and although they never
allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they
nursed these disputes amongst them, so that
the citizens, distracted by their differences,
should not unite against them. Which, as we
saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected,
because, after the rout at Vaila, one party at
once took courage and seized the state. Such
methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince,
because these factions will never be permitted
in a vigorous principality; such methods for
enabling one the more easily to manage sub-
jects are only useful in times of peace, but if war
comes this policy proves fallacious.

lyo The Prince

4. Without doubt princes become great when
they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by
which they are confronted, ajid therefore fortune,
especially when she desires to make a new prince
great, who has a greater necessity to earn re-
nown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to
arise and form designs against him, in order
that he may have the opportunity of overcom-
ing them, and by them to mount higher, as by a
ladder which his enemies have raised. For this
reason many consider that a wise prince, when
he has the opportunity, ought with craft to
foster some animosity against himself, so that,
having crushed it, his renown may rise higher.

5. Princes, especially new ones, have found
more fidehty and assistance in those men who
in the beginning of their rule were distrusted
than among those who in the beginning were
trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena,
ruled his state more by those who had been dis-
trusted than by others. But on this question
one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much
with the individual; I will only say this, that
those men who at the commencement of a
princedom have been hostile, if they are of a
description to need assistance to support them-
selves, can always be gained over with the
greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to
serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they
know it to be very necessary for them to cancel

Arc Fortresses Advantageous ? 171

by deeds the bad impression which he had
formed of them; and thus the prince always ex-
tracts more profit from them than from those
who, serving him in too much security, may
neglect his affairs. And since the matter de-
mands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who
by means of secret favours has acquired a new
state, that he must well consider the reasons
which induced those to favour him who did so;
and if it be not a natural affection towards
him, but only discontent with theit government,
then he will only keep them friendly with great
trouble and difiiculty, for it will be impossible to
satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons
for this in those examples which can be taken
from ancient and modem affairs, we shall find
that it is easier for the prince to make friends
of those men who were contented under the
former government, and are therefore his enemies,
than of those who, being discontented with it,
were favourable to him and encouraged him to
seize it.

6. It has been a custom with princes, in order
to hold their states more securely, to build for-
tresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to
those who might design to work against them,
and as a place of refuge from a first attack. I
praise this system because it has been made use of
formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo
Vitelli in our times has been seen to demohsh

172 The Prince

two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he
might keep that state ; Guido Ubaldo, Duke
of Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence
he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, rased to
the foundations all the fortresses in that pro-
vince, and considered that without them it
would be more difficult to lose it ; the Benti-
vogli returning to Bologna came to a similar
decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or
not according to circumstances; if they do you
good in one way they injure you in another.
And this question can be reasoned thus: the
prince who has more to fear from the people
than from foreigners ought to build fortresses,
but he who has more to fear from foreigners than
from the people ought to leave them alone.
The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza,
has made, and will make, more trouble for the
house of Sforza than any other disorder in the
state. For this reason the best possible fortress
is — not to be hated by the people, because,
although you may hold the fortresses, yet they
wiU not save you if the people hate you, for
there will never be wanting foreigners to assist a
people who have taken arms against you. It
has not been seen in our times that such for-
tresses have been of use to any prince, unless to
the Countess of Forli, when the Count Giro-
lamo, her consort, was killed ; for by that means
she was able to withstand the popular attack

Arc Fortresses Advantageous ? 173

and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus re-
cover her state; and the posture of affairs was
such at that time that the foreigners could not
assist the people. But fortresses were of little
value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia at-
tacked her, and when the people, her enemy,
were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would
have been safer for her, both then and before, not
to have been hated by the people than to have
had the fortresses. All these things considered
then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as
well as him who does not, and I shall blame who-
ever, trusting in them, cares little about being
hated by the people.

TWENTY-FIRST CHAPTER

HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO
AS TO GAIN RENOWN

i=Q 280

TWENTY-FIRST CHAPTER

HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS
TO GAIN RENOWN

Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as
great enterprises and setting a fine example.
We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the
present King of Spain. He can aknost be called
a new prince, because he has risen, by fame and
glory, from being an insignificant king to be the
foremost king in Christendom; and if you will
consider his deeds you will find them aU great
and some of them extraordinary. In the be-
ginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and
this enterprise was the foundation of his
dominions. He did this quietly at first and
without any fear of hindrance, for he held the
minds of the barons of Castille occupied in
thinking of the war and not anticipating any
innovations; thus they did not perceive that
by these means he was acquiring power and
authority over them. He was able with the
money of the Church and of the people to sus-
tain his armies, and by that long war to lay
the foundation for the military skiU which has
since distinguished him. Further, always using

177

178 The Prince

religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater
schemes, he devoted himself with a pious cruelty
to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the
Moors; nor could there be a more admirable
example, nor one more rare. Under this same
cloak he assailed Africa, he came down on Italy,
he has finally attacked France; and thus his
achievements and designs have always been
great, and have kept the minds of his people in
suspense and admiration and occupied with the
issue of them. And his actions have arisen in
such a way, one out of the other, that men have
never been given time to work steadily against
him.

Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual
examples in internal affairs, similar to those
which are related of Messer Bemabo da Milano,
who, when he had the opportunity, by any one
in civil life doing some extraordinary thing,
either good or bad, would take some method of
rewarding or punishing him, which would be
much spoken about. And a prince ought, above
all things, always to endeavour in every action to
gain for himself the reputation of being a great
and remarkable man.

A prince is also respected when he is either a
true friend or a downright enemy, that is to say,
when, without any reservation, he declares him-
self in favour of one party against the other;
which course will always be more advantageous

To Gain Renown 179

than standing neutral; because if two of your
powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of
such a character that, if one of them conquers,
you have either to fear him or not. In either
case it will always be more advantageous for
you to declare yourself and to make war strenu-
ously; because, in the first case, if you do not
declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey
to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfac-
tion of him who has been conquered, and you
will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to
protect or to shelter you. Because he who con-
quers does not want doubtful friends who will
not aid him in the time of trial ; and he who loses
will not harbour you because you did not will-
ingly, sword in hand, court his fate.

Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by
the iEtolians to drive out the Romans. He sent
envoys to the Acheans, who were friends of the
Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral;
and on the other hand the Romans urged them
to take up arms. This question came to be dis-
cussed in the council of the Acheans, where the
legate of Antiochus urged them to stand neutral.
To this the Roman legate answered: " As for
that which has been said, that it is better and
more advantageous for your state not to inter-
fere in our wax, nothing can be more erroneous;
because by not interfering you will be left, with-
out favour or consideration, the guerdon of the

i8o The Prince

conqueror." Thus it will always happen that
he who is not your friend will demand your
neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will en-
treat you to declare yourself with arms. And
irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers,
generally follow the neutral path, and are gener-
ally ruined. But when a prince declares him-
self gallantly in favour of one side, if the party
with whom he aUies himself conquers, although
the victor may be powerful and may have him
at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there
is estabhshed a bond of amity; and men are
never so shameless as to become a monument of
ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after
aU are never so complete that the victor must
not show some regard, especially to justice.
But if he with whom you aUy yourself loses, you
may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able
he may aid you, and you become companions in
a fortune that may rise again.

In the second case, when those who fight are
of such a character that you have no anxiety as
to who may conquer, so much the more is it
greater prudence to be aUied, because you assist
at the destruction of one by the aid of another
who, if he had been wise, would have saved him ;
and conquering, as it is impossible that he should
not with your assistance, he remains at your
discretion. And here it is to be noted that a
prince ought to take care never to make an alii-

To Gain Renown 1 8 i

ance with one more powerful than himself for
the purpose of attacking others, unless necessity
compels him, as is said above; because if he
conquers you are at his discretion, and princes
ought to avoid as much as possible being at the
discretion of any one. The Venetians joined
with France against the Duke of Milan, and this
alliance, which caused their ruin, could have been
avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as
happened to the Florentines when the Pope and
Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then in
such a case, for the above reasons, the prince
ought to favour one of the parties.

Never let any Government imagine that it
can choose perfectly safe courses ; rather let it
expect to have to take very doubtful ones,
because it is found in ordinary affairs that one
never seeks to avoid one trouble without run-
ning into another; but prudence consists in
knowing how to distinguish the character of
troubles, and for choice to take the lesser evil.

A prince ought also to show himself a patron
of abihty, and to honour the proficient in every
art. At the same time he should encourage his
citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both
in commerce and agriculture, and in every other
following, so that the one should not be deterred
from improving his possessions for fear lest they
be taken away from him or another from open-
ing up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince

1 82 The Prince

ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do
these things and designs in any way to honour
his city or state.

Further, he ought to entertain the people with
festivals and spectacles at convenient seasons
of the year; and as every city is divided into
guilds or into societies/ he ought to hold such
bodies in esteem, and associate with them some-
times, and show himself an example of courtesy
and hberality; nevertheless, always maintain-
ing the majesty of his rank, for this he must
never consent to abate in anything.

» See Noto.

TWENTY-SECOND CHAPTER

CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES

TWENTY-SECOND CHAPTER

CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES

The choice of servants is of no little importance
to a prince, and they are good or not according
to the discrimination of the prince. And the first
opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his
understanding, is by observing the men he has
aromid him; and when they are capable and
faithful he may always be considered wise, be-
cause he has known how to recognise the capable
and to keep them faithful. But when they are
otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of
him, for the prime error which he made was in
choosing them.

There were none who knew Messer Antonio
da Venafro as the servant of Pandolfo Petrucci,
Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pan-
dolfo to be a very clever man in having Venafro
for his servant. Because there are three classes
of intellects : one which comprehends by itself ;
another which appreciates what others compre-
hend; and a third which neither comprehends

by itself nor by the showing of others ; the first

185

1 86 The Prince

is the most excellent, the second is good, the
third is useless. Therefore, it foUows neces-
sarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank,
he was in the second, for whenever one has judg-
ment to know good or bad when it is said and
done, although he himself may not have the
initiative, yet he can recognise the good and the
bad in his servant, and the one he can praise
and the other correct; thus the servant cannot
hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.

But to enable a prince to form an opinion of
his servant there is one test which never fails;
when you see the servant thinking more of his
own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly
his own profit in everything, such a man wiH
never make a good servant, nor wiU you ever be
able to trust him ; because he who has the state of
another in his hands ought never to think of him-
self, but always of his prince, and never pay any
attention to matters in which the prince is not
concerned.

On the other hand, to keep his servant honest
the prince ought to study him, honouring him,
enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing
with him the honours and cares; and at the
same time let him see that he cannot stand
alone, so that many honours may not make him
desire more, many riches make him wish for
more, and that many cares may make hira
dread changes. When, therefore, servants, and

Secretaries of Princes 187

princes towards servants, are thus disposed,
they can trust each other, but when it is other-
wise, the end will always be disastrous for either
one or the other.

TWENTY-THIRD CHAPTER

HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

i

TWENTY-THIRD CHAPTER

HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

I DO not wish to leave out an important branch
of this subject, for it is a danger from which
princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they
are very careful and discriminating. It is that
of flatterers, of whom courts are fuU, because
men are so self-complacent in their own affairs,
and in a way so deceived in them, that they are
preserved with difficulty from this pest, and if
they wish to defend themselves they run the
danger of falling into contempt. Because there
is no other way of guarding oneself from flat-
terers except letting men understand that to
teU you the truth does not offend you; but
when every one may tell you the truth, respect
for you abates.

Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third
course by choosing the wise men in his state,
and giving to them only the hberty of speaking
the truth to him, and then only of those things
of which he inquires, and of none others; but
he ought to question them upon everything, and
listen to their opinions, and afterwards form
his own conclusions. With these councillors,

separately and collectively, he ought to cany

191

192 The Prince

himself in such a way that each of them should
know that, the more freely he shall speak, the
more he shall be preferred; outside of these,
he should listen to no one, pursue the thing re-
solved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions.
He who does otherwise is either overthrown by
flatterers, or is so often changed by varying
opinions that he falls into contempt.

I wish on this subject to adduce a modern
example. Fra Luca, the man of affairs to
Maximilian, the present emperor, speaking of
his majesty, said: He consulted with no one,
yet never got his own way in anything. This
arose because of his following a practice the
opposite to the above; for the emperor is a
secretive man — he does not communicate his
designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions
on them. But as in carrying them into effect
they become revealed and known, they are at
once obstructed bv those men whom he has
around him, and he, being pliant, is diverted
from them. Hence it follows that those things
he does one day he undoes the next, and no one
ever understands what he wishes or intends to
do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.

A prince, therefore, ought always to take
counsel, but only when he wishes and not when
others wish; he ought rather to discourage
every one from offering advice unless he asks it ;
but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer,

How Flatterers Should be Avoided 193

and afterwards a patient listener concerning the
things of which he inquired; also, on learning
that any one, on any consideration, has not told
him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.

And if there are some who think that a prince
who conveys an impression of his wisdom is
not so through his own ability, but through the
good advisers that he has around him, beyond
doubt they are deceived, because this is an
axiom which never fails: that a prince who is
not wise himself will never take good advice,
unless by chance he lias yielded his affairs en-
tirely to one person who happens to be a very
prudent man. In this case indeed he may be
well governed, but it would not be for long, be-
cause such a governor would in a short time take
away his state from him.

But if a prince who is not experienced should
take counsel from more than one he will never
get united counsels, nor wiU he know how to
unite them. Each of the counsellors will think
of his own interests, and the prince will not
know how to control them or to see through
them. And they are not to be found otherwise,
because men wiU always prove untrue to you
unless they are kept honest by constraint.
Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels,
whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom
of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince
from good counsels.

TWENTY-FOURTH CHAPTER

WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR

STATES

TWENTY-FOURTH CHAPTER

WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR

STATES

The previous suggestions, carefully observed,
will enable a new prince to appear well estab-
lished, and render him at once more secure and
fixed in the state than if he had been long seated
there. For the actions of a new prince are more
narrowly observed than those of an hereditary
one, and when they are seen to be able they gain
more men and bind far tighter than ancient
blood; because men are attracted more by the
present than by the past, and when they find
the present good they enjoy it and seek no
further ; they will also make the utmost defence
for a prince if he fails them not in other things.
Thus it will be a double glory to him to have
estabUshed a new principaUty, and adorned and
strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good
allies, and with a good example ; so will it be a
double disgrace to him who, bom a prince, shall
lose his state by want of wisdom.

And if those seigniors are considered who
have lost their states in Italy in our times, such

197

198 The Prince

as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and
others, there will be found in them, firstly, one
common defect in regard to arms from the
causes which ha-ve been discussed at length; in
the next place, some one of them will be seen,
either to have had the people hostile, or if he
has had the people friendly, he has not known
how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these
defects states that have power enough to keep
an army in the field cannot be lost.

Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alex-
ander the Great, but he who was conquered by
Titus Quintius, had not much territory com-
pared to the greatness of the Romans and of
Greece who attacked him, yet being a warlike
man who knew how to attract the people and
secure the nobles, he sustained the war against
his enemies for many years, and if in the end he
lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he
retained the kingdom.

Therefore, do not let our princes accuse for-
tune for the loss of their principalities after so
many years' possession, but rather their own
sloth, because in quiet times they never thought
there could be a change (it is a common defect
in man not to make any provision in the calm
against the tempest), and when afterwards the
bad times came they thought of flight and not
of defending themselves, and they hoped that
the people, disgusted with the insolence of the

Princes of Italy 199

conquerors, would recall them. This course,
when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad
to have neglected all other expedients for that,
since you would never wish to fall because you
trusted to be able to find some one later on to
restore you. This again either does not happen,
or, if it does, it will not be for your security,
because that deliverance is of no avail which
does not depend upon yourself; those only are
rehable, certain, and durable that depend on
yourself and your valour.

H 280

TWENTY-FIFTH CHAPTER

WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS.
AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

TWENTY-FIFTH CHAPTER

V,TIAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS,
AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

It is not unknown to me how many men have
had, and stiU have, the opinion that the affairs
of the world are in such wise governed by for-
tune and by God that men with their wisdom
cannot direct them and that no one can even
help them ; and because of this they would have
us beheve that it is not necessary to labour much
in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This
opinion has been more credited in our times
because of the great changes in affairs which
have been seen, and may still be seen, every
day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes
pondering over this, I am in some degree in-
clined to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to
extinguish our free -wiU, I hold it to be true that
fortune is the arbiter of one half of our actions,
but that she still leaves us to direct the other
half, or perhaps a Httle less.

I compare her to one of those raging rivers,
which when in flood overflows the plains, sweep-
ing away trees and buildings, bearing away the

soil from place to place; everything flies before

203

204 The Prince

it, all yield to its violence, without being able in
any way to withstand it; and yet, though its
nature be such, it does not follow therefore that
men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not
make provision, both with defences and barriers,
in such a manner that, rising again, the waters
may pass away by canal, and their force be
neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it
happens with fortune, who shows her power
where valour has not prepared to resist her, and
thither she turns her forces where she knows
that barriers and defences have not been raised
to constrain her.

And if you will consider Italy, which is the
seat of these changes, and which has given to
them their impulse, you will see it to be an open
country without barriers and without any de-
fence. For if it had been defended by proper
valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France,
either this invasion would not have made the
great changes it has made or it would not have
come at all. And this I consider enough to say
concerning resistance to fortune in general.

But confining myself more to the particular,
I say that a prince may be seen happy to-day
and ruined to-morrow without having shown
any change of disposition or character. This,
I beheve, arises firstly from causes that have
already been discussed at length, namely, that
the prince who rehes entirely upon fortune is

What Fortune Can Effect 205

lost when it changes, I believe also that he will
be successful who directs his actions according
to the spirit of the times, and that he whose
actions do not accord with the times will not be
successful. Because men are seen, in affairs
that lead to the end which every man has before
him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by
various methods; one with caution, another
with haste; one by force, another by skill; one
by patience, another by its opposite; and each
one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different
method. One can also see of two cautious men
the one attain his end, the other fail; and
similarly, two men by different observances are
equally successful, the one being cautious, the
other impetuous; all this arises from nothing
else than whether or not they conform in their
methods to the spirit of the times. This follows
from what I have said, that two men working
differently bring about the same effect, and of
two working similarly, one attains his object
and the other does not.

Changes in estate also issue from this, for if,
to one who governs himself with caution and
patience, times and affairs converge in such a
way that his administration is successful, his
fortune is made ; but if times and affairs
change, he is ruined if he does not change his
course of action. But a man is not often found
sufficiently circumspect to know how to accom-

2o6 The Prince

modate himself to the change, both because he
cannot deviate from what natm-e inchnes him
to, and also because, having always prospered
by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded
that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the
cautious man, when it is time to turn adventur-
ous, does not know how to do it, hence he is
ruined; but had he changed his conduct with
the times fortune would not have changed.

Pope Juhus the Second went to work impetu-
ously in all his affairs, and found the times and
circumstances conform so well to that line of
action that he alwa)^ met with success. Con-
sider his first enterprise against Bologna, Messer
Giovanni BentivogH being stiU ahve The
Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the
King of Spain, and he had the enterprise still
under discussion with the King of France ; never-
theless he personally entered upon the expedi-
tion with his accustomed boldness and energy,
a move which made Spain and the Venetians
stand irresolute and passive, the latter from
fear, the former from desire to recover all the
kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, he drew
after him the King of France, because that king,
having observed the movement, and desiring
to make the Pope his friend so as to humble
the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse
him soldiers without manifestly offending him.
Therefore Juhus with his impetuous action

What Fortune Can Effect 207

accomplished what no other pontiff with simple
human wisdom could have done; for if he had
waited in Rome until he could get away, with
his plans arranged and everything fixed, as any
other pontiff would have done, he would never
have succeeded. Because the King of France
would have made a thousand excuses, and the
others would have raised a thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as thev
were aU alike, and they all succeeded, for the
shortness of his Kfe did not let him experience
the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen
which required him to go cautiously, his ruin
would have followed, because he would never
have deviated from those ways to which nature
inclined him.

I conclude therefore that, fortune being
changeful and mankind steadfast in their ways,
so long as the two are in agreement men are
successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out.
For my part I consider that it is better to be
adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a
woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is
necessary to beat and iU-use her; and it is seen
that she allows herself to be mastered by the
adventurous rather than by those who go to
work more coldly. She is, therefore, always,
woman-hke, a lover of young men, because they
are less cautious, more violent, and with more

audacity command her,

*jj 280

TWENTY-SIXTH CHAPTER

AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM
THE BARBARIANS

TWENTY-SIXTH CHAPTER

AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE

BARBARIANS

Having carefully considered the subject of the
above discourses, and wondering within myself
whether the present times were propitious to a
new prince, and whether there were the elements
that would give an opportunity to a wise and
virtuous one to introduce a new order of things
which would do honour to him and good to the
people of this country, it appears to me that so
many things concur to favour a new prince that
I never knew a time more fit than the present.

And if, as I said, it was necessary that the
people of Israel should be captive so as to make
manifest the ability of Moses ; that the Persians
should be oppressed by the Medes so as to dis
cover the greatness of the soul of Cyrus; and
that the Athenians should be dispersed to illus-
trate the capabihties of Theseus: then at the
present time, in order to discover the virtue of
an Italian spirit, it v/as necessary that Italy
should be reduced to the extremity she is now in,
that she should be more enslaved than the
Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians,

211

212 The Prince

more scattered than the Athenians; without
head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn,
overrun; and to have endured every kind of
desolation.

Although lately some spark may have been
shown by one, which made us think he was
ordained by God for our redemption, neverthe-
less it was afterwards seen, in the height of his
career, that fortune rejected him; so that Italy,
left as Av-ithout Hfe, waits for him who shall yet
heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging
and plundering of Lombardy, to the swindhng
and taxing of the Kingdom and of Tuscany, and
cleanse those sores that for long have festered.
It is seen how she entreats God to send some one
who shall dehver her from these wrongs and
barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she
is ready and willing to follow a banner if only
some one will raise it.

Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom
she can place more hope than in your illustrious
house, with its valour and fortune, favoured by
God and by the Church of which it is now the
chief, and which could be made the head of this
redemption. This will not be difficult if you
will recall to yourself the actions and Uves of
the men I have named. And although they
were great and wonderful men, yet they were
men, and each one of them had no more oppor-
tunity than the present offers, for their enter-

To Liberate Italy 2 1 3

prises were neither more just nor easier than
this, nor was God more their friend than He is
yours.

With us there is great justice, because that
war is just which is necessary, and arms are
hallowed when there is no other hope but in
them. Here there is the greatest wilUngness,
and where the willingness is great the difficul-
ties cannot be great if you will only follow those
men to whom I have directed your attention.
Further than this, how extraordinarily the ways
of God have been manifested beyond example:
the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the
rock has poured forth water, it has rained manna,
everything has contributed to your greatness;
you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to
do everything, and thus take away our free will
and that share of glory which belongs to us.

And it is not to be wondered at if none of the
above-named ItaUans have been able to accom-
pUsh all that is expected from your illustrious
house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy,
and in so many campaigns, it has always ap-
peared as if mihtary virtue were exhausted,
this has happened because the old order of things
was not good, and none of us have known how
to find a new one. And nothing honours a man
more than to estabhsh new laws and new ordin-
ances when he himself has newly risen. Such
things when they are well founded and dignified

2 I J. The Prince

wX mike hira nevened and admired, and in
Itah- there are not wantmi: oppwmimties to
bmis: such intc^ use in e\"er%" lorm.

Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst

it fails in the head. Look attentively at the

dDeb and the hand-to-hand combats, bow

?v.;>?r - ■ '■ ■ - re m strenirth. dexterity.

:■. -. It comes to armies

i~r_ : hr.. -— -md this springs

entiTi. : -•- the leaders.

- "'^ ' — r 20t obedient,

-fif to know, there

bav. _ e so distxnguisbed

: rest. e::her by \-alour c*r iortime. that

others >-ieId : Hence it is that for

>. .... . :.:--r r. h.^hting in

: : : : : ere has been

- ~ a. it nas aiwavs given a

> ' " -• ess to this is

-u ^ : -.^-~ .-^: ..7ua. G^ioa.

Vail.. , ; ^^-?:-

.: : i- ~-hes to

e re-
- : . ::-v. it is ^e•^e?^=ry before all
:. - V enterprise,

to be 7 d with your own .ise

there can be :re faith: .: .: Dener

s - An. y are good,

:ter when they
nnc :: - - . : ■ ''"': rrlnce.

To Liberate Italy 215

hoiioiared by him, and mamtained at his e^tpense.
TheT(tiore it is necessary to be prepared with
STich arms, so that you can be defended against
foreigners by Italian valour.

And although Swiss and Spanish infantry
may be considered very formidable, neverthe-
less there is a defect in both, by reason of which
a third order would not only be able to oppose
them, but might be relied upon to overthrow
them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry,
and the Switzers are afraid of infantry when-
ever they encounter them in close combat.
Owing to this, as has been and may again be
seen, the Spaniards are unable to resist French
cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrowr. by
Spanish infantry. And although a complete
proof of this latter cannot be shown, neverthe-
less there was some evidence of it at the battle
of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were
confronted by German battalions, who follow
the same tactics as the Swiss; when the
Spaniards, by a^gilrty of body and with the aid
of th-uetr shields, got in under the pikes of the
Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack,
while tte Germans stood helpless, and, if the
cavalry had not: dashed up, all would have been
over with them. > . . posJbie, therefore, know-
ing the detects of both these infantries, to in-
vent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not
be afraid of infantry ; tins seed not create a new

2 1 6 The Prince

order of arms, but a variation upon the old.
And these are the kind of improvements which
confer reputation and power upon a new prince.
This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be
allowed to pass for letting Italy at last see her
Hberator appear. Nor can one express the
love with which he would be received in all
those provinces which have suffered so much
from these foreign scourings, with what thirst
for revenge, with what stubborn faith, with
what devotion, with what tears. What door
would be closed to him? Who would refuse
obedience to him? What envy would hinder
him? What Itahan would refuse him homage?
To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks.
Let, therefore, your illustrious house take up
this charge with that courage and hope with
which all just enterprises are undertaken, so
that under its standard our native country may
be ennobled, and under its auspices may be
verified that saying of Petrarch : —

Virtii contro al Furore
Prendera rarme, e fia U combatter corto:

Che I'antico valore
Negli italic! cuor non h ancor morto.

DESCRIPTION OF THE IVIETHODS

ADOPl-ED BY

THE DUKE VALENTINO

WHEN MURDERING

VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO,
THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE
DI GRAVINA ORSINI

By NICOLO MACCHIAVELLI.

THE MURDER OF VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVER-
OTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO,
AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI

The Duke Valentino had returned from Lom-
bardy, where he had been to clear himself with
the King of France from the calumnies which
had been raised against him by the Florentines
concerning the rebeUion of Arezzo and other
towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at
Imola, whence he intended with his army to
enter upon the campaign against Giovanni
Bentivogh, the tyrant of Bologna: for he in-
tended to bring that city under his domination,
and to make it the head of his Romagnian duchy.
These matters coming to the knowledge of the
Vitelli and Orsini and their following, it ap-
peared to them that the duke would become too
powerful, and it was feared that, having seized
Bologna, he would seek to destroy them in order
that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon
this a meeting was called at Magione in the
district of Perugia, to vvhich came the cardinal,
Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, Vitel-
lozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagalo
Baghoni, the tyrant of Perugia, and Messer

2IQ

220 The Duke Valentino

Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolpho
Petrucci, the prince of Siena. Here were dis-
cussed the power and courage of the duke and
the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which
might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being
ruined. And they decided not to abandon the
BentivogU, but to strive to win over the Floren-
tines; and they sent their men to one place and
another, promising to one party assistance and
to another encouragement to unite ^^'ith them
against the common enemy. This meeting was
at once reported throughout all Italy, and those
who were discontented under the duke, among
whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of
effecting a revolution.

Thus it arose that, men's minds being thus un-
settled, it was decided by certain men of Urbino
to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held
for the duke, and which they captured by the
following means. The castellan was fortifying
the rock and causing timber to be taken there;
so the conspirators watched, and when certain
beams which were being carried to the rock were
upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from
being drawn up by those inside, they took the
opportunity of leaping upon the bridge and
thence into the fortress. Upon this capture
being effected, the whole state rebelled and re-
called the old duke, being encouraged in this,
not so much by the capture of the fort, as by the

The Duke Valentino 221

Diet at Magione, from whom they expected to
get assistance.

Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino
thought they would not lose the opportunity,
and at once assembled their men so as to take
any town, should any remain in the hands of
the duke in that state; and they sent again to
Florence to beg that repubhc to join with them
in destroying the common firebrand, showing
that the risk was lessened and that they ought
not to wait for another opportunity.

But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry
reasons, of the ViteUi and Orsini, not only
would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo
Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and
assistance to the duke against his enemies. The
duke was found full of fear at Imola, because,
against everybody's expectation, his soldiers had
at once gone over to the enemy and he found
liimself disarmed and war at his door. But re-
covering courage from the offers of the Floren-
tines, he decided to temporise before fighting
with the few soldiers that remained to him, and
to negotiate for a reconcihation, and also to get
assistance. This latter he obtained in two ways,
by sending to the King of France for men and by
enlisting men-at-arms and others wfiom he turned
into cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money.

Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near
to him, and approached Fossombrone, where

2 22 The Duke Valentino

they encountered some men of the duke and,
with the aid of the Orsini and Vitelh, routed
them. When this happened, the duke resolved
at once to see if he could not close the trouble
with offers of reconciliation, and being a most
perfect dissembler he did not fail in any prac-
tices to make the insurgents understand that he
wished every man who had acquired anything
to keep it, as it was enough for him to have the
title of prince, whilst others might have the
principahty.

And the duke succeeded so well in this that
they sent Signer Pagolo to him to negotiate for
a reconcihation, and they brought their army to
a standstill. But the duke did not stop his pre-
parations, and took every care to provide himself
with cavalry and infantry, and that such pre-
parations might not be apparent to the others,
he sent his troops in separate parties to every
j^art of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there
came also to him five himdred French lancers,
and although he found himself sufhciently strong
to take vengeance on his enemies in open war, he
considered that it would be safer and more ad-
vantageous to outwit them, and for this reason
he did not stop the work of reconciliation.

And that this might be effected the duke
concluded a peace with them in which he con-
firmed their former covenants; he gave them
four thousand ducats at once; he promised not

The Duke Valentino 223

to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed an alli-
ance with Giovanni ; and moreover he would not
force them to come personally into his presence
unless it pleased them to do so. On the other
hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy
of Urbino and other places seized by them, to
serve him in all his expeditions, and not to make
war against or ally themselves with any one
without his permission.

This reconciliation being completed, Guido
Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, again fled to Venice,
having first destroyed all the fortresses in his
state ; because, trusting in the people, he did not
wish that the fortresses, which he did not think
he could defend, should be held by the enemy,
since by these means a check would be kept upon
his friends. But the Duke Valentino, having
completed this convention, and dispersed his
men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola
at the end of November together with his French
men-at-arms : thence he went to Cesena, where he
stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys
of the Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled
with their men in the duchy of Urbino, as to the
enterprise in which they should now take part;
but nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da
Fermo was sent to propose that if the duke
wished to undertake an expedition against Tus-
cany they were ready; if he did not wish it,
then they would besiege SinigaUa. To this the

224 The Duke Valentino

duke replied that he did not wish to enter into
war with Tuscany and thus become hostile to
the Florentines, but that he was very wiUing to
proceed against Sinigalia,

It happened that not long afterwards the town
surrendered, but the fortress would not yield to
them because the castellan would not give it up
to any one but the duke in person;- therefore
they exhorted him to come there. This ap-
peared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being
invited by them, and not going of his own will,
he would awaken no suspicions. And the more
to reassure them, he allowed all the French men-
at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to
depart, except the hundred lancers under Mons.
di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena
about the middle of December, and went to
Fano, and with the utmost cunning and clever-
ness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to wait
for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that
any lack of compliance would cast a doubt upon
the sincerity and permanency of the reconcilia-
tion, and that he was a man who wished to make
use of the arms and councils of his friends. But
Vitellozzo remained very stubborn, for the death
of his brother warned him that he should not
offend a prince and afterwards trust him ; never-
theless, persuaded by Pagolo Orsini, whom the
duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he
agreed to wait.

The Duke Valentino 225

Upon this the duke, before his departure from
Fano, which was to be on December 30,
1502, communicated his designs to eight of his
most trusted followers, among whom were Don
Michele and the Monsignor d'Euna, who was
afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon
as Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, Duke di Gravina,
and OHverotto should arrive, his followers in
pairs should take them one by one, entrusting
certain men to certain pairs, who should enter-
tain them until they reached Sinigalia; nor
should they be permitted to leave until they
came to the duke's quarters, where they should
be seized.

The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen
and infantry, of which there were more than
two thousand cavalry and ten thousand foot-
men, to assemble by daybreak at the Metauro,
a river five miles distant from Fano, and await
him there. He found himself, therefore, on the
last day of December at the Metauro with his
men, and having sent a cavalcade of about two
hundred horsemen before him, he then moved
forward the infantry, whom he accompanied
with the rest of the men-at-arms.

Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca
situate on the shore of the Adriatic Sea, fifteen
miles distant from each other, so that he who
goes towards Sinigaha has the mountains on his
right hand, the bases of which are touched by

2 26 The Duke Valentino

the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia is
distant from the foot of the mountains a Httle
more than a bow-shot and from the shore about
a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs a
little river which bathes that part of the walls
looking towards Fano, facing the high road.
Thus he who draws near to Sinigaha comes for a
good space by road along the mountains, and
reaches the river which passes by Sinigaha. If
he turn to his left hand along the bank of it, and
goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he arrives at
a bridge which crosses the river; he is then
almost abreast of the gate that leads into Sini-
gaha, not by a straight line, but transversely.
Before this gate there stands a collection of
houses with a square to which the bank of the
river forms one side.

The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders
to wait for the duke, and to honour him in
person, sent away their men to several castles
distant from Sinigalia about six miles, so that
room could be made for the men of the duke;
and they left in Sinigaha only Oliverotto and
his band, which consisted of one thousand in-
fantry and one hundred and fifty horsemen, who
were quartered in the suburb mentioned above.
Matters having been thus arranged, the Duke
Valentino left for Sinigaha, and when the leaders
of the cavalry reached the bridge they did not
pass over, but having opened it, one portion

The Duke Valentino 227

wheeled towards the river and the other to-
wards the country, and a way was left in the
middle through which the infantry passed, with-
out stopping, into the town.

Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina
on mules, accompanied by a few horsemen, went
towards the duke; Vitellozzo, unarmed and
wearing a cape lined with green, appeared very
dejected, as if conscious of his approaching
death — a circumstance which, in view of the
abihty of the man and his former fortune,
caused some amazement. And it is said that
when he parted from his men before setting out
for Sinigaha to meet the duke he acted as if it
were his last parting from them. He recom-
mended his house and its fortunes to his cap-
tains, and advised his nephews that it was not
the fortune of their house but the virtues of
their fathers that should be kept in mind.
These three, therefore, came before the duke
and saluted him respectfully, and were received
by him with goodwill; they were at once
placed between those who were commissioned
to look after them.

But the duke noticing that OHverotto, who
had remained with his band in Sinigaha, was
missing — for Ohverotto was waiting in the
square before his quarters near the river, keep-
mg his men in order and drilling them — signalled
with his eye to Don Michele, to whom the care

228 The Duke Valentino

of Oliverotto had been committed, that he
should take measures that Oliverotto should
not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off
and joined Oliverotto, telling him that it was
not right to keep his men out of their quarters,
because these might be taken up by the men of
the duke; and he advised him to send them at
once to their quarters and to come himself to
meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken
this advice, came before the duke, who, when he
saw him, called to him; and OHverotto, having
made his obeisance, joined the others.

So the whole party entered SinigaUa, dis-
mounted at the duke's quarters, and went with
him into a secret chamber, where the duke made
them prisoners ; he then mounted on horseback,
and issued orders that the men of Oliverotto
and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms.
Those of OUverotto, being at hand, were quickly
settled, but those of the Orsini and ViteUi, being
at a distance, and having a presentiment of the
destruction of their masters, had time to prepare
themselves, and bearing in mind the valour and
disciphne of the Orsinian and Vitellescan houses,
they stood together against the hostile forces of
the country and saved themselves.

But the duke's soldiers, not being content
with having pillaged the men of Ohverotto, be-
gan to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not
repressed this outrage by kiUing scue of them,

The Duke Valentino 229

they would have completely sacked it. Night
having come and the tumult being silenced, the
duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto ;
he led them into a room and caused them to be
strangled. Neither of them used words in keep-
ing with their past hves : Vitellozzo prayed that
he might ask of the Pope full pardon for his sins ;
OUverotto cringed and laid the blame for all
injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo
and the Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive
until the duke heard from Rome that the Pope
had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop
of Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce.
After which news, on January 18, 1502, in the
castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the
same way.

CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI

1284 — 1328

It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonder-
ful thing to those who have considered the
matter, that all men, or the larger number of
them, who have performed great deeds in the
world, and excelled all others in their day, have
had their birth and beginning in baseness and
obscurity; or have been aggrieved by fortune
in some outrageous way. They have either
been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or
they have had so mean a parentage that in
shame they have given themselves out to be
the sons of Jove or of some other deity. It
would be wearisome to relate who these persons
may have been because they are well known to
everybody, and, as such tales would not be
particularly edifying to those who read them,
they are omitted. I beUeve that these lowly
beginnings of great men occur because Fortune
is desirous of showing to the world that such
men owe much to her and little to wdsdom,
because she begins to show her hand when
wisdom can really take no oart in their career:

230

Castruccio Castracani 231

thus all success must be attributed to her.
Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those
men who did great deeds, if he is measured by
the times in which he Hved and the city in which
he was bom; but, Uke many others, he was
neither fortunate nor distinguished in his birth,
as the course of this history will show. It
appeared to me desirable to recall his memory,
because I have discerned in him such indica-
tions of valour and fortune as should make him
a great examplar to men. I think also that I
ought to call your attention to his actions,
because you of all the men I know dehght most
in noble deeds.

The family of Castracani was formerly
numbered among the noble families of Lucca,
but in the days of which I speak it had some-
what fallen in estate, as so often happens in this
world. To this family was bom a son Antonio,
who became a priest of the order of San Michele
of Lucca, and for this reason was honoured with
the title of Messer Antonio. He had an only
sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso
Cenami, but Buonaccorso dying she became a
widow, and not wishing to marry again went to
Uve with her brother. Messer Antonio had a
vineyard behind the house where he resided,
and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens,
any person could have access to it without

difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise,
J 280

232 Castruccio Castracani

Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer
Antonio was called, had occasion to go into the
vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning
the dinner, and hearing a sHght rusthng among
the leaves of a vine she turned her eyes in that
direction, and heard something resembUng the
cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards
it, and saw the hands and face of a baby who
was lying wrapped up in paper, and who seemed
to be crying for its mother. Partly wondering
and partly fearing, yet full of compassion, she
lifted it up and carried it to the house, where she
washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is
customary, and showed it to Messer Antonio
when he returned home. When he heard what
had happened and saw the child he was not
less surprised or compassionate than his sister.
They discussed between themselves what should
be done, and seeing that he was a priest and
that she had no children, they finally deter-
mined to bring it up. They had a nurse for it,
and it was reared and loved as if it were their
own child. They baptised it, and gave it the
name of Castruccio after their father. As the
years passed Castruccio grew very handsome,
and gave evidence of wit and discretion, and
learnt with a quickness beyond his years those
lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him.
Messer Antonio intended to make a priest of
him, and in time would have inducted him into

Castruccio Castracani 233

his canonry and other benefices, and all his
instruction was given with this object; but
Antonio discovered that the character of Cas-
truccio was quite unfitted for the priesthood.
As soon as Castruccio reached the age of fourteen
he began to take less notice of the chiding of
Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no
longer to fear them; he left off reading ecclesi-
astical books, and turned to playing with arms,
delighting in nothing so much as in learning their
uses, and in running, leaping, and wrestling with
other boys. In all exercises he far excelled his
companions in courage and bodily strength, and
if at any time he did turn to books, only those
pleased him which told of wars and the mighty
deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this
with vexation and sorrow.

There Hved in the city of Lucca a gentleman
of the Guinigi family, named Messer Francesco,
whose profession was arms and who in riches,
bodily strength, and valour excelled all other
men in Lucca. He had often fought under the
command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a
Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party
in Lucca. This gentleman resided in Lucca
and was accustomed to assemble with others
most mornings and evenings under the balcony
of the Podesta, which is at the top of the square
of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and
he had often seen Castruccio taking part with

2 34 Castruccio Castracani

other children of the street in those games of
which I have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio
far excelled the other boys, and that he appeared
to exercise a royal authority over them, and that
they loved and obeyed him, Messer Francesco
became greatly desirous of learning who he was.
Being informed of the circumstances of the
bringing up of Castruccio he felt a greater desire
to have him near to him. Therefore he called
him one day and asked him whether he would
more willingly Uve in the house of a gentleman,
where he would learn to ride horses and use arms,
or in the house of a priest, where he would learn
nothing but masses and the services of the
Church. Messer Francesco could see that it
pleased Castruccio greatly to hear horses and
arms spoken of, even though he stood silent,
blushing modestly; but being encouraged by
Messer Francesco to speak, he answered that, if
his master were agreeable, nothing would please
him more than to give up his priestly studies and
take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted
Messer Francesco, and in a very short time he
obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who
was driven to jdeld by his knowledge of the
nature of the lad, and the fear that he would not
be able to hold him much longer.

Thus Castruccio passed from the house of
Messer Antonio the priest to the house of Messer
Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was

Castruccio Castracani 235

astonishing to find that in a very short time he
manifested all that virtue and bearing which we
are accustomed to associate with a true gentle-
man. In the first place he became an accom-
phshed horseman, and could manage with ease
the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and
tournaments, although still a youth, he was
observed beyond all others, and he excelled in
aU exercises of strength and dexterity. But
what enhanced so much the charm of these
accomphshments, was the delightful modesty
which enabled him to avoid offence in either act
or word to others, for he was deferential to the
great men, modest with his equals, and courteous
to his inferiors. These gifts made him beloved,
not only by all the Guinigi family, but by
all Lucca. When Castruccio had reached his
eighteenth year, the GhibeUines were driven
from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Fran-
cesco was sent by the visconti to assist the Ghibel-
lines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge
of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of
his prudence and courage in this expedition,
acquiring greater reputation than any other
captain, and his name and fame were known,
not only in Pavia, but throughout aU Lombardy.
Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far
higher estimation than he left it, did not omit to
use all the means in his power to gain as many
friends as he could, neglecting none of those

236 Castruccio Castracani

arts which are necessary for that purpose.
About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving
a son thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and
having appointed Castruccio to be his son's
tutor and administrator of his estate. Before
he died Francesco called Castruccio to him, and
prayed him to show Pagolo that goodwill which
he (Francesco) had always shown to him, and
to render to the son the gratitude which he had
not been able to repay to the father. Upon
the death of Francesco, Castruccio became the
governor and tutor of Pagolo, which increased
enormously his power and position, and created
a certain amount of envy against him in Lucca
in place of the former universal goodwill, for
many men suspected him of harbouring tyran-
nical intentions. Among these the leading man
was Giorgio degU Opizi, the head of the Guelph
party. This man hoped after the death of
Messer Francesco to become the chief man in
Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio,
with the great abihties which he already showed,
and holding the position of governor, deprived
him of his opportunity; therefore he began to
sow those seeds which should rob Castruccio of his
eminence. Castruccio at first treated this with
scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking
that Messer Giorgio might be able to bring him
into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto
of Naples and have him driven out of Lucca.

Castruccio Castracani 237

The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione
of the Faggiuola of Arezzo, who being in the
first place elected their captain afterwards
became their lord. There resided in Pisa some
exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, with whom
Castruccio held communications with the object
of effecting their restoration by the help of
Uguccione. Castruccio also brought into his
plans friends from Lucca who would not endure
the authority of the Opizi. Having fixed upon
a plan to be followed, Castruccio cautiously
fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it with
suppHes and munitions of war, in order that it
might stand a siege for a few days in case of
need. When the night came which had been
agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied
the plain between the mountains and Pisa with
many men, the signal was given, and without
being observed Uguccione approached the gate
of San Piero and set fire to the portcullis.
Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city,
calling the people to arms and forcing open the
gate from his side. Uguccione entered with
his men, poured through the town, and killed
Messer Giorgio with aU his family and many of
his friends and supporters. The governor was
driven out, and the government reformed
according to the wishes of Uguccione, to the
detriment of the city, because it was found
that more than one hundred famihes were exiled

238 Castruccio Castracani

at that time. Of those who fled, part went to
Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was
the headquarters of the Guelph party, and for
this reason it became most hostile to Uguccione
and the Lucchese.

As it now appeared to the Florentines and
others of the Guelph party that the Ghibellines
absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they deter-
mined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca.
They assembled a large army in the Val di
Nievole, and seized Montecatini ; from thence
they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure
the free passage into Lucca. Upon this Uguc-
cione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces,
and with a number of German cavalry which
he drew out of Lombardy, he moved against
the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the
appearance of the enemy withdrew from Monte-
carlo, and posted themselves between Monte-
catini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a
position near to Montecarlo, and within about
two miles of the enemy, and shght skirmishes
between the horse of both parties were of daily
occurrence. Owing to the iUness of Uguccione,
the Pisans and Lucchese delayed coming to
battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding
himself growing worse, went to Montecarlo to
be cured, and left the command of the army in
the hands of Castruccio. This change brought
about the ruin of the Guelphs, who, thinking that

Castruccio Castracani 239

the hostile army having lost its captain had
lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio
observed this, and allowed some days to pass in
order to encourage this belief; he also showed
signs of fear, and did not allow any of the muni-
tions of the camp to be used. On the other
side, the Guelphs grew more insolent the more
they saw these evidences of fear, and every day
they drew out in the order of battle in front of
the army of Castruccio. Presently, deeming
that the enemy was sufiiciently emboldened,
and having mastered their tactics, he decided to
join battle with them. First he spoke a few
words of encouragement to his soldiers, and
pointed out to them the certainty of victory
if they would but obey his commands. Cas-
truccio had noticed how the enemy had placed
all his best troops in the centre of the line of
battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of
the army: whereupon he did exactly the oppo-
site, putting his most vahant men on the flanks,
while those on whom he could not so strongly
rely he moved to the centre. Observing this
order of battle, he drew out of his lines and
quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as
usual, had come in their insolence to defy him.
He then commanded his centre squadrons to
march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward
those on the wings. Thus, when they came into

contact with the enemy, only the wings of the
*j 280

240 Castruccio Castracani

two armies became engaged, whilst the centre
battalions remained out of action, for these two
portions of the line of battle were separated
from each other by a long interval and thus
unable to reach each other. By this expedient
the more valiant of Castruccio's men were
opposed to the weaker part of his enemy's troops,
and the most efficient men of the enemy were
disengaged; and thus the Florentines were un-
able to fight with those who were arrayed oppo-
site to them, or to give any assistance to their
own flanks. So, without much difficulty, Cas-
truccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks,
and the centre battalions took to flight when
they found themselves exposed to attack, with-
out having a chance of displaying their valour.
The defeat was complete, and the loss in men
very heavy, there being more than 10,000
men killed with many officers and knights of
the Guelph party in Tuscany, and also many
princes who had come to help them, among
whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto,
and Carlo, his nephew, and Filippo, the lord of
Taranto. On the part of Castruccio the loss did
not amount to more than 300 men, among whom
was Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being
young and rash, was killed in the first onset.

This victory so greatly increased the reputa-
tion of Castruccio that Uguccione conceived
some jealousy and suspicion of him, and bent all

Castruccio Castracani 241

his thoughts upon destro5dng him, because it
appeared to Uguccione that this victory had
given him no increase of power, but rather had
diminished it. Being of this mind, he only
waited for an opportunity to give effect to it.
This occurred on the death of Pier Agnolo
Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in
Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house
of Castruccio for refuge. On the sergeants of
the captain going to arrest the murderer, they
were driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer
escaped. This affair coming to the knowledge
of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared
to him a proper opportunity to punish Cas-
truccio. He therefore sent for his son Neri, who
was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned
him to take Castruccio prisoner at a banquet
and put him to death. Castruccio, fearing no
evil, went to the governor in a friendly way, was
entertained at supper, and then thrown into
prison. But Neri, fearing to put him to death
lest the people should be incensed, kept him
ahve, in order to hear further from his father
concerning his intentions. Uguccione cursed
the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at
once set out from Pisa to Lucca with 400 horse-
men to finish the business in his own way; but
he had not yet reached the baths when the
Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death
and created Count Gaddo della Gheradesca

242 Castruccio Castracani

their lord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca
he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did
not appear wise to him to turn back, lest the
Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them
should close their gates against him. But the
Lucchese, having heard of what had happened
at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity
to demand the Uberation of Castruccio, notwith-
standing that Uguccione had arrived in their
city. They first began to speak of it in private
circles, afterwards openly in the squares and
streets; then they raised a tumult, and with
arms in their hands went to Uguccione and
demanded that Castruccio should be set at
liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might
happen, released him from prison. Whereupon
Castruccio gathered his friends around him, and
with the help of the people attacked Uguccione ;
who, finding he had no resource but in flight,
rode away with his friends to Lombardy, to the
lords of Scala, where he died in poverty.

But Castruccio from being a prisoner became
almost a prince in Lucca, and he carried him-
self so discreetly with his friends and the people
that they appointed him captain of their army
for one year. Having obtained this, and wish-
ing to gain renown in war, he planned the
recovery of the many towTis which had rebelled
after the departure of Uguccione, and with the
help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded

Castruccio Castracani 243

a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture
this place he constructed a fort against it, which
was afterwards walled-in by the Florentines,
and is called to-day Zerezzanello ; in the course
of two months Castruccio captured the town.
With the reputation gained at that siege, he
rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza,
and in a short time had overrun the whole of
Lunigiana. In order to close the pass which
leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he besieged
Pontremoli, and wrested it from the hands of
Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the lord
of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca,
and was welcomed by the whole people. And
now Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any longer
to defer making himself a prince, got himself
created the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino
del Poggio, PuccineUo dal Portico, Francesco
Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he
had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly
and deliberately elected prince by the people.
At this time Frederic of Bavaria, the King of the
Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial
crown, and Castruccio, in order that he might
make friends with him, met him at the head of
500 horsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy
in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high
estimation, because of the people's love for the
memory of his father. Castruccio was received
in great honour by Frederic, and many privi-

244 Castruccio Castracani

leges were conferred upon him, and he was
appointed the emperor's Lieutenant in Tuscany.
At this time the Pisans were in great fear of
Gaddo della Gheradesca, whom they had driven
out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance
to Frederic. Frederic created Castruccio the
lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the
Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines,
were constrained to accept him as their lord.

Frederic, having appointed a governor in
Rome to watch his Itahan affairs, returned to
Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian
Ghibellines, who followed the Imperial lead, had
recourse to Castruccio for help and counsel, and
all promised him the governorship of his coim-
try, if enabled to recover it with his assistance.
Among these exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo
Scolari, Lupo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, and
Piero Buonacorsi, all exiled Florentines and
Ghibellines. Castruccio had the secret inten-
tion of becoming the master of all Tuscany
by the aid of these men and of his own
forces; and in order to gain greater weight in
affairs, he entered into a league with Messer
Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and
organised for him the forces of his city and the
country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he
divided his own country districts into five parts,
which he suppHed with arms, and enrolled the
men under captains and ensigns, so that he coiild

Castruccio Castracani 245

quickly bring into the field 20,000 soldiers,
without those whom he could summon to his
assistance from Pisa. While he surrounded him-
self with these forces and allies, it happened
that Messer Matteo Visconti was attacked by
the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven out the
Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine
army and the King Ruberto. Messer Matteo
caUed upon Castruccio to invade the Florentines
in their own territories, so that, being attacked
at home, they should be compelled to draw their
army out of Lombardy in order to defend them-
selves. Castruccio invaded the Valdamo, and
seized Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting
immense damage upon the country. Where-
upon the Florentines recalled their army, which
had scarcely reached Tuscany, when Castruccio
was forced by other necessities to return to
Lucca.

Tliere resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio
family, who were so powerful that they could not
Cttily elevate Castruccio, but even advance him
to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to
them they had not received such rewards for
their services as they deserved, they incited
other famihes to rebel and to drive Castruccio
out of Lucca. They found their opportunity
one morning, and armmg themselves, they
set upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had
left to maintain order and killed him. They

246 Castruccio Castracani

endeavoured then to raise the people in revolt, but
Stefano di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had
taken no hand in the rebellion, intervened and
compelled them by his authority to lay down
their arms; and he offered to be their mediator
with Castruccio to obtain from him what they
desired. Therefore they laid down their arms
with no greater intelligence than they had taken
them up. Castruccio, having heard the news of
what had happened at Lucca, at once put
Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and
with a troop of cavalry set out for home. Con-
trary to his expectations, he found the rebellion
at an end, yet he posted his men in the most
advantageous places throughout the city. As it
appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be
very much obhged to him, he sought him out,
and without saying anything on his own behalf,
for he did not recognise any need for doing so,
he begged Castruccio to pardon the other mem-
bers of his family by reason of their youth, their
former friendships, and the obhgations which
Castruccio was under to their house. To this
Castruccio graciously responded, and begged
Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it
gave him more pleasure to find the tumult at an
end than it had ever caused him anxiety to hear
of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to
bring his family to him, sajdng that he thanked
God for having given him the opportunity of

Castruccio Castracani 247

showing his clemency and liberality. Upon
the word of Stefano and Castruccio they sur-
rendered, and with Stefano were immediately
thrown into prison and put to death. Mean-
while the Florentines had recovered San Miniato,
whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to
make peace, as it did not appear to him that he
was sufficiently secure at Lucca to leave home.
He approached the Florentines with the pro-
posal of a truce, which they readily entertained,
for they were weary of the war, and desirous of
getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was
concluded with them for two years, by which
both parties agreed to keep the conquests they
had made. Castruccio, thus released from this
trouble, turned his attention to affairs in Lucca,
and in order that he should not again be subject
to the perils from which he had just escaped,
he, under various pretences and reasons, first
wiped out all those who by their ambition might
aspire to the principahty; not sparing one of
them, but depriving them of country and
property, and those whom he had in his hands
of hfe also, stating that he had found by experi-
ence that none of them were to be trusted. Then
for his further security he raised a fortress in
Lucca with the stones of the towers of those
whom he had killed or hunted out of the state.

Whilst Castruccio made peace with the
Florentines, and strengthened his position in

248 Castruccio Castracani

Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of
open war, of increasing his importance else-
where. It appeared to him that if he could get
possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot
in Florence, which was his great desire. He,
therefore, in various ways made friends with the
mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia
that both parties confided their secrets to him.
Pistoia was divided, as it always had been, into
the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the
Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the
Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each of these men held
secret communications with Castruccio, and each
desired to drive the other out of the city; and,
after many threatenings, they came to blows.
Jacopo fortified himself at the Florentine gate,
Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the
city; both trusted more in Castruccio than in
the Florentines, because they beheved that
Castruccio was far more ready and \viUing to
fight than the Florentines, and they both sent
to him for assistance. He gave promises to
both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in
person, and to Jacopo that he would send his
pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the appointed time
he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and
went himself direct to Pistoia; at midnight
both of them met outside the city, and both
were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders
entered, and at a signal given by Castruccio, one

Castruccio Castracani 249

killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other Bastiano di
Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the
partisans of either faction. Without further
opposition Pistoia passed into the hands of Cas-
truccio, who, having forced the Signoria to
leave the palace, compelled the people to yield
obedience to him, making them many promises
and remitting their old debts. The countryside
flocked into the city to see the new prince, and
adl were filled with hope and quickly settled
down, influenced in a great measure by his great
valour.

About this time great disturbances arose in
Rome, owing to the deamess of living which
was caused by the absence of the pontiff at
Avignon. The German governor, Enrico, was
much blamed for what happened — murders and
tumults following each other daily, without his
being able to put an end to them. This caused
Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should
call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would
drive the Germans out of the city, and bring
back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to
whom he could apply for help than Castruccio,
he sent to him, begging him not only to give him
assistance, but also to come in person to Rome.
Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesi-
tate to render the emperor this service, because
he beUeved that he himself would not be safe if
at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome.

250 Castruccio Castracani

Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command at Lucca,
Castruccio set out for Rome with 600 horsemen,
where he was received by Enrico with the
greatest distinction. In a short time the pre-
sence of Castruccio obtained such respect for the
emperor that, without bloodshed or violence,
good order was restored, chiefly by reason of
Castruccio having sent by sea from the country
round Pisa large quantities of com, and thus
removed the source of the trouble. When he
had chastised some of the Roman leaders, and
admonished others, voluntary obedience was
rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many
honours, and was made a Roman senator. This
dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp,
Castruccio being clothed in a brocaded toga,
which had the following words embroidered on
its front: " I am what God wills." Whilst on
the back was: " What God desires shall be."

During this time the Florentines, who were
much enraged that Castruccio should have
seized Pistoia during the truce, considered
how they could tempt that city to rebel, to do
which they thought would not be difficult in
his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in
Florence were Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini,
both men of leading and ready to face danger.
These men kept up communications with their
friends in Pistoia, and with the aid of the Floren-
tines entered the city by night, and after driving

Castruccio Castracani 251

out some of Castniccio's officials and partisans,
and killing others, they restored the city to its
freedom. The news of this greatly angered
Castruccio, and taking leave of Enrico, he
pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the
Florentines heard of his return, knowing that he
would lose no time, they decided to intercept
him with their forces in the Val di Nievole,
under the belief that by doing so they would cut
off his road to Pistoia. Assembhng a great army
of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the Floren-
tines entered the Pistoian territories. On the
other hand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo with
his army; and having heard where the Floren-
tines' lay, he decided not to encounter it in the
plains of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of
Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, to attack
it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He beheved
that if he succeeded in this design, victory was
assured, although he was informed that the
Florentines had 30,000 men, whilst he had only
12,000. Although he had every confidence in
his own abilities and the valour of his troops, yet
he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open
lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers.
Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and Pistoia,
situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nie-
vole, not in the exact pass, but about a bow-
shot beyond; the pass itself is in places narrow
and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently.

252 Castruccio Castracani

but is still narrow, especially at the summit where
the waters divide, so that twenty men side by
side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was
Manfred, a German, who, before Castruccio
became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to re-
main in possession of the castle, it being common
to the Lucchese and the Pistoians, and unclaimed
by either — neither of them wishing to displace
Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neu-
traUty, and came under obUgations to no one.
For these reasons, and also because the castle was
well fortified, he had always been able to main-
tain his position. It was here that Castruccio
had determined to fall upon his enemy, for
here his few men would have the advantage,
and there was no fear lest, seeing the large
masses of the hostile force before they became
engaged, they should not stand. As soon as
this trouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw
the immense advantage which possession of
this castle would give him, and having an in-
timate friendship with a resident in the castle,
he managed matters so with him that 400 of
his men were to be admitted into the castle the
night before the attack on the Florentines, and
the castellan put to death.

Castruccio, having prepared everything, had
now to encourage the Florentines to persist in
their desire to carry the seat of war away from
Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did

Castruccio Castracani 253

not move his army from Montecarlo. Thus the
Florentines hurried on until they reached their
encampment under Serravalle, intending to
cross the hill on the following morning. In the
meantime, Castruccio had seized the castle at
night, had also moved his army from Monte-
carlo, and marching from thence at midnight in
dead silence, had reached the foot of Serravalle :
thus he and the Florentines commenced the
ascent of the hill at the same time in the morn-
ing. Castruccio sent forward his infantry by
the main road, and a troop of 400 horsemen by
a path on the left towards the castle. The
Florentines sent forward 400 cavalry ahead of
their army which was following, never expecting
to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor
were they aware of his having seized the castle.
Thus it happened that the Florentine horsemen
mounting the hill were completely taken by
surprise when they discovered the infantry of
Castruccio, and so close were they upon it they
had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It
was a case of unready soldiers being attacked
by ready, and they were assailed with such
vigour that with difficulty they could hold their
own, although some few of them got through.
When the noise of the fighting reached the
Florentine camp below, it was filled with
confusion. The cavalry and infantry became
inextricably mixed: the captains were imable

2 54 Castruccio Castracani

to get their men either backwards or fon\'ard,
owing to the narrowness of the pass, and amid
all this tumult no one knew what ought to be
done or what could be done. In a short time
the cavalry who were engaged with the enemy's
infantry were scattered or killed without having
made any effective defence because of their
unfortunate position, although in sheer despera-
tion they had offered a stout resistance. Re-
treat had been impossible, with the mountains
on both flanks, whilst in front were their enemies,
and in the rear their friends. When Castruccio
saw that his men were unable to strike a decisive
blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he
sent 1000 infantrymen round by the castle,
with orders to join the 400 horsemen he had
previously despatched there, and commanded
the whole force to fall upon the flank of the
enemy. These orders they carried out with
such fury that the Florentines could not sustain
the attack, but gave way, and were soon in full
retreat — conquered more by their unfortunate
position than by the valour of their enemy.
Those in the rear turned towards Pistoia, and
spread through the plains, each man seeking
only his own safety. The defeat was complete
and very sanguinary. Many captains were
taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini dei
Rossi, Francesco Brunnelleschi, and Giovanni
della Tosa, all Florentine noblemen, with many

Castruccio Castracani 255

Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on the
Florentine side, having been sent by King
Ruberto to assist the Guelphs. Immediately the
Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out the
friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Cas-
truccio. He was not content with occupying
Prato and all the castles on the plains on both
sides of the Amo, but marched his army into the
plain of Peretola, about two miles from Florence.
Here he remained many days, dividing the spoils,
and celebrating his victory with feasts and
games, holding horse races, and foot races for
men and women. He also struck medals in
commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines.
He endeavoured to corrupt some of the citizens
of Florence, who were to open the city gates at
night ; but the conspiracy was discovered, and
the participators in it taken and beheaded,
among whom were Tomasso Lopacci and Lam-
bertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the
Florentines great anxiety, and despairing of
preserving their liberty, they sent envoys to
King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the
dominion of their city ; and he, knowing of what
immense importance the maintenance of the
Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed
with the Florentines to receive from them a
yearly tribute of 200,000 florins, and he sent his
son Carlo to Florence with 4000 horsemen.
Shortly after this the Florentines were

256 Castruccio Castracani

relieved in some degree of the pressure of Cas-
tniccio's army, owing to his being compelled to
leave his positions before Florence and march
on Pisa, in order to suppress a conspiracy that
had been raised against him by Benedetto Lan-
franchi, one of the first men in Pisa, who could
not endure that his fatherland should be under
the dominion of a Lucchese. He had formed
this conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel,
kill the partisans of Castruccio, and drive out the
garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy paucity
of niunbers is essential to secrecy, so for its
execution a few are not sufi&cient, and m seeking
more adherents to his conspiracy Lanfranchi
encountered a person who revealed the design to
Castruccio. This betrayal cannot be passed by
without severe reproach to Bonifacio Cerchi and
Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were
suffering their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon
Castruccio seized Benedetto and put him to
death, and beheaded many other noble citizens,
and drove their families into exile. It now ap-
peared to Castruccio that both Pisa and Pistoia
were thoroughly disaffected ; he employed much
thought and energy upon securing his position
there, and this gave the Florentines their op-
portunity to reorganise their army, and to await
the coming of Carlo, the son of the King of
Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided to
lose no more time, and assembled a great army

Castruccio Castracani 257

of more than 30,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry
— having called to their aid every Guelph there
was in Italy. They consulted whether they
should attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided
that it would be better to march on the latter — a
course, owing to the recent conspiracy, more
likely to succeed, and of more advantage to
them, because they believed that the surrender
of Pistoia would follow the acquisition of Pisa.
In the early part of May, 1328, the Florentines
put in motion this army and quickly occupied
Lastra, Signa, Monteupo, and Empoli, passing
from thence on to San Miniato. When Cas-
truccio heard of the enormous army which the
Florentines were sending against him, he was in
no degree alarmed, believing that the time had
now arrived when Fortune would dehver the
empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no
reason to think that his enemy would make a
better fight, or had better prospects of success,
than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled 20,000
foot soldiers and 4000 horsemen, and with this
army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo
Guinigi to Pisa with 5000 infantry. Fucecchio
has a stronger position than any other town in
the Pisan district, owing to its situation between
the rivers Amo and Gusciana and its slight
elevation above the surrounding plain. More-
over, the enemy could not hinder its being vic-
tualled unless they divided their forces, nor

258 Castruccio Castracani

could they approach it either from the direction
of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to
Pisa, or attack Castruccio 's forces except at a
disadvantage. In one case they would find
themselves placed between his two armies, the
one under his own command and the other
under Pagolo, and in the other case they would
have to cross the Amo to get to close quarters
with the enemy, an undertaking of great
hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to
take this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his
men from the banks of the river and placed them
under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide ex-
panse of land between them and the river.

The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato,
held a council of wax to decide whether they
should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio,
and, having weighed the difficulties of both
courses, they decided upon the latter. The
river Amo was at that time low enough to be
fordable, yet the water reached to the shoulders
of the infantry-men and to the saddles of
the horsemen. On the morning of June 10,
1328, the Florentines commenced the battle by
ordering forward a number of cavalry and 10,000
infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was
fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once
attacked the Florentines with 5000 infantry
and 3000 horsemen, not allowing them to issue
from the river before he charged them; he also

Castruccio Castracani 259

sent 1000 light infantry up the river bank, and
the same number down the Amo. The infantry
of the Florentines were so much impeded by
their arms and the water that they were not able
to mount the banks of the river, whilst the
cavalry had made the passage of the river more
difl&cult for the others, by reason of the few who
had crossed having broken up the bed of the
river, and this being deep with mud, many of the
horses rolled over with their riders and many of
them had stuck so fast that they could not
move. When the Florentine captains saw the
difficulties their men were meeting, they with-
drew them and moved higher up the river,
hoping to find the river bed less treacherous
and the banks more adapted for landing. These
men were met at the bank by the forces which
Castruccio had already sent forward, who, being
light armed with bucklers and javelins in their
hands, let fly with tremendous shouts into the
faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses,
alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would
not move forward, and trampled each other in
great confusion. The fight between the men of
Castruccio and those of the enemy who suc-
ceeded in crossing was sharp and terrible ; both
sides fought with the utmost desperation and
neither would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio
fought to drive the others back into the river,
whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on

2 6o Castruccio Castracani

land in order to make room for the others press-
ing forward, who if they could but get out of the
water would be able to fight, and in this ob-
stinate conflict they were urged on by their
captains. Castruccio shouted to his men that
these were the same enemies whom they had
before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the
Florentines reproached each other that the many
should be overcome by the few. At length
Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had
lasted, and that both his men and the enemy
were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had
many killed and wounded, pushed forward
another body of infantry to take up a position at
the rear of those who were fighting ; he then com-
manded these latter to open their ranks as if
they intended to retreat, and one part of them
to turn to the right and another to the left.
This cleared a space of which the Florentines
at once took advantage, and thus gained posses-
sion of a portion of the battle-field. But when
these tired soldiers found themselves at close
quarters with Castruccio's reserves they could
not stand against them and at once fell back
into the river. The cavalry of either side had
not as yet gained any decisive advantage over
the other, because Castruccio, knowing his
inferiority in this arm, had commanded his
leaders only to stand on the defensive against
the attacks of their adversaries, as he hooed that

Castruccio Castracani 261

when he had overcome the infantry he would
be able to make short work of the cavalry.
This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw
the Florentine army driven back across the
river he ordered the remainder of his infantry
to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they
did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their
own cavalry, feU upon the enemy with the
greatest fury and soon put him to flight. The
Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty
their cavalry had met with in crossing the river,
had attempted to make their infantry cross
lower down the river, in order to attack the
flanks of Castruccio's army. But here, also, the
banks were steep and already lined by the men
of Castruccio, and this movement was quite
useless. Thus the Florentines were so com-
pletely defeated at all points that scarcely a
third of them escaped, and Castruccio was again
covered with glory. Many captains were taken
prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto,
with Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli
Albizzd, the Florentine commissioners, fled to
Empoh. If the spoils were great, the slaughter
was infinitely greater, as might be expected in
such a battle. Of the Florentines there fell
20,231 men, whilst Castruccio lost 1570 men.

But Fortune growing envious of the glory of
Castruccio took away his hfe just at the time
when she should have preserved it, and thus

262 Castruccio Castracani

ruined all those plans which for so long a time
he had worked to carry into effect, and in the
successful prosecution of which nothing but
death could have stopped him. Castruccio was
in the thick of the battle the whole of the day ;
and when the end of it came, although fatigued
and over-heated, he stood at the gate of Fucec-
chio to welcome his men on their return from
victory and personally thank them. He was
also on the watch for any attempt of the enemy
to retrieve the fortunes of the day; he being of
the opinion that it was the duty of a good general
to be the first man in the saddle and the last out
of it. Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind
which often rises at mid-day on the banks of the
Amo, and which is often very unhealthy ; from
this he took a chill, of which he thought nothing,
as he was accustomed to such troubles; but it
was the cause of his death. On the following
night he was attacked with high fever, which
increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it
must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called
Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as
follows : —

" If I could have believed that Fortune would
have cut me off in the midst of the career which
was leading to that glory which all my successes
promised, I should have laboured less, and I
should have left thee, if a smaller state, at least
with fewer enemies and perils, because I should

Castruccio Castracani 263

have been content with the governorships

of Lucca and Pisa. I should neither have

subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the

Florentines with so many injuries. But I

would have made both these peoples my

friends, and I should have Uved, if no longer,

at least more peacefully, and have left you

a state without doubt smaller, but one more

secure and estabHshed on a surer foundation.

But Fortune, who insists upon having the

arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me

with sufficient judgment to recognise this from

the first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou

hast heard, for many have told thee, and I have

never concealed it, how I entered the house of

thy father whilst yet a boy — a stranger to all

those ambitions which every generous soul

should feel — and how I was brought up by him,

and loved as though I had been bom of his blood ;

how under his governance I learned to be

valiant and capable of availing myself of all

that fortune, of which thou hast been witness.

When thy good father came to die, he committed

thee and all his possession to my care, and I have

brought thee up with that love, and increased

thy estate with that care, which I was bound to

show. And in order that thou shouldst not only

possess the estate which thy father left, but also

that which my fortune and abilities have gained,

I have never married, so that the love of children

^260

264 Castruccio Castracani

should never deflect my mind from that gratitude
which I owed to the children of thy father.
Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I am
well content, but I am deeply concerned, inas-
much as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure.
Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which
will never rest contented under thy government.
Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are of nature
changeable and unreliable, who, although they
may be sometimes held in subjection, yet they
will ever disdain to serve under a Lucchese.
Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten
up with factions and deeply incensed against
thy family by reason of the wrongs recently
inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours
the offended Florentines, injured by us in a
thousand ways, but not utterly destroyed, who
will hail the news of my death with more delight
than they would the acquisition of all Tuscany.
In the emperor and in the princes of Milan
thou canst place no reliance, for they are far
distant, slow, and their help is very long in com-
ing. Therefore, thou hast no hope in anything
but in thine own abilities, and in the memory of
my valour, and in the prestige which this latest
victory has brought thee; which, as thou
knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist
thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who,
as they are suffering under this great defeat,
should be inclined to Hsten to thee. And

Castruccio Castracani 265

whereas I have sought to make them my
enemies, because I beHeved that war with them
would conduce to my power and glory, thou hast
every inducement to make friends of them,
because their aUiance will bring thee advantages
and security. It is of the greatest importance
in this world that a man should know himself,
and the measure of his own strength and means ;
and he who knows that he has not a genius for
fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of
peace. And it will be well for thee to rule thy
conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this way
to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have
gained ; and in this thou wilt easily succeed
when thou hast learnt to beheve that what I
have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly
indebted to me, in that I have left thee this
realm and have taught thee how to keep it."

After this there came to Castruccio those
citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, and Lucca, who had been
fighting at his side, and whilst recommending
Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedi-
ence to him as his successor, he died. He left
a happy memory to those who had known him,
and no prince of those times was ever loved with
such devotion as he was. His obsequies were
celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he
was buried in San Francesco at Lucca, Fortune
was not so friendly to Pagolo Guinigi as she
had been to Castruccio, for he had not the

266 Castruccio Castracani

abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio,
Pagolo lost Pisa, and then Pistoia, and only
with difficulty held on to Lucca, This latter
city continued in the family of Guinigi until the
time of the great-grandson of Pagolo.

From what has been related here it will be
seen that Castruccio was a man of exceptional
abilities, not only measured by men of his own
time, but also by those of an earlier date. In
stature he was above the ordinary height, and
perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious
presence, and he welcomed men with such
urbanity that those who spoke with him rarely
left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be
red, and he wore it cut short above the ears, and,
whether it rained or snowed, he always went
without a hat. He was delightful among
friends, but terrible to his enemies; just to his
subjects; ready to play false with the unfaithful,
and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he
desired to subdue, because he was wont to say
that it was the victory that brought the glory, not
the methods of achieving it. No one was bolder
in facing danger, none more prudent in extri-
cating himself. He was accustomed to say that
men ought to attempt everything and fear
nothing; that God is a lover of strong men,
because one always sees that the weak are
chastised by the strong. He was also wonder-
fully sharp or biting though courteous in his

Castruccio Castracani 267

answers; and as he did not look for any indul-
gence in this way of speaking from others, so he
was not angered when others did not show it to
him. It has often happened that he has listened
quietly when others have spoken sharply to him,
as on the following occasions. He had caused
a ducat to be given for a partridge, and was
taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom
Castruccio said, " You would not have given
more than a penny." " That is true," answered
the friend. Then said Castruccio to him, "A
ducat is much less to me." Having about him
a flatterer on whom he had spat to show that he
scorned him, the flatterer said to him, " Fisher-
men are willing to let the waters of the sea
saturate them in order that they may take a few
little fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by
spittle that I may catch a whale; " and this was
not only heard by Castruccio with patience but
rewarded. When told by a priest that it was
wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Cas-
truccio said, " If that be a vice then you should
not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our
saints." Passing through a street he saw a
young man as he came out of a house of ill fame
blush at being seen by Castruccio, and said to
him, " Thoushouldst not be ashamed when thou
comest out, but when thou goest into such
places." A friend gave him a very curiously tied
knot to undo and was told, " Fool, do you think

268 Castruccio Castracani

that I wish to untie a thing which gave so much
trouble to fasten." Castruccio said to one who
professed to be a philosopher, " You are like the
dogs who always run after those who will give
them the best to eat," and was answered, " We
are rather hke the doctors who go to the houses
of those who have the greatest need of them."
Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio
was much disturbed by a dangerous storm that
sprang up, and was reproached for cowardice by
one of those with him, who said that he did not
fear anything. Castruccio answered that he did
not wonder at that, since every man valued his
soul for what it was worth. Being asked by one
what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said,
" When thou goest to a banquet take care that
thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon
another." To a person who was boasting that
he had read many things, Castruccio said, " He
knows better than to boast of remembering
many things." Some one bragged that he could
drink much without becoming intoxicated.
Castruccio rephed, " An ox does the same."
Castruccio was acquainted with a girl with whom
he had intimate relations, and being blamed by
a friend who told him that it was undignified for
him to be taken in by a woman, he said, " She
has not taken me in, I have taken her." Being
also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he
answered, " Thou dost not spend as much as I

Castruccio Castracani 269

do? " and being told that it was true, he con-
tinued, " Then thou art more avaricious than I
am gluttonous." Being invited by Taddeo
Bemardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of
Lucca, to supper, he went to the house and was
shown by Taddeo into a chamber hung with silk
and paved with fine stones representing flowers
and foliage of the most beautiful colouring.
Castruccio gathered some saliva in his mouth
and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him
much disturbed by this, said to him, " I knew not
where to spit in order to offend thee less."
Being asked how Caesar died he said, " God will-
ing I will die as he did." Being one night in the
house of one of his gentlemen where many ladies
were assembled, he was reproved by one of his
friends for dancing and amusing himself with them
more than was usual in one of his station, so he
said, "He who is considered wise by day will not
be considered a fool at night." A person came to
demand a favour of Castruccio, and thinking he
was not Ustening to his plea threw himself on his
knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved
by Castruccio, said, " Thou art the reason of my
acting thus for thou hast thy ears in thy feet,"
whereupon he obtained double the favour he
had asked. Castruccio used to say that the way
to hell was an easy one, seeing that it was in a
downward direction and you travelled bhnd-
folded. Being asked a favour by one who used

270 Castruccio Castracani

many superfluous words, he said to him, " When

you have another request to make, send some one

else to make it." Having been wearied by a

similar man with a long oration who wound up

by saying, " Perhaps I have fatigued you by

speaking so long," Castruccio said, " You have

not, because I have not hstened to a word you

said." He used to say of one who had been a

beautiful child and who afterwards became a

fine man, that he was dangerous, because he

first took the husbands from the wives and now

he took the wives from their husbands. To an

envious man who laughed, he said, " Do you

laugh because you are successful or because

another is unfortunate? " Whilst he was still in

the charge of Messer Francesco Guinigi, one of

his companions said to him, " What shall I give

you if you will let me give you a blow on the

nose?" Castruccio answered, "A helmet."

Ha\dng put to death a citizen of Lucca who had

been instrumental in raising him to power, and

being told that he had done wrong to kill one of

his old friends, he answered that people deceived

themselves; he had only killed a new enemy.

Castruccio praised greatly those men who

intended to take a wife and then did not do so,

saying that they were like men who said they

would go to sea, and then refused when the time

came. He said that it always struck him with

surprise that whilst men in buying an earthen or

Castruccio Castracani 271

glass vase would sound it first to learn if it were
good, yet in choosing a wife they were content
with only looking at her. He was once asked in
what manner he would wish to be buried when
he died, and answered, " With the face turned
downwards, for I know when I am gone this
country will be turned upside down." On being
asked if it had ever occurred to him to become a
friar in order to save his soul, he answered that
it had not, because it appeared strange to him
that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and
Uguccione della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He
was once asked when should a man eat to pre-
serve his health, and replied, " li the man be rich
let him eat when he is hungry ; if he be poor, then
when he can." Seeing one of his gentlemen
make a member of his family lace him up, he said
to him, " I pray God that you will let him feed
you also." Seeing that some one had written
upon his house in Latin the words, " May God
preserve this house from the wicked," he said,
" The owner must never go in." Passing
through one of the streets he saw a small house
with a very large door, and remarked, " That
house will fly through the door." He was hav-
ing a discussion with the ambassador of the King
of Naples concerning the property of some
banished nobles, when a dispute arose between
them, and the ambassador asked him if he had

no fear of the king. " Is this king of yours a

*j; 2S0

272 Castruccio Castracani

bad man or a good one? " asked Castruccio, and
was told that he was a good one, whereupon he
said, " Why should you suggest that I should be
afraid of a good man? "

I could recount many other stories of his say-
ings both witty and weighty, but I think that
the above will be sufficient testimony to his high
qualities. He hved forty-four years, and was in
every way a prince. And as he was surrounded
by many evidences of his good fortune, so he also
desired to have near him some memorials of his
bad fortune ; therefore the manacles with which
he was chained in prison are to be seen to this
day fixed up in the tower of «his residence, where
they were placed by him to testify for ever to
his days of adversity. As in his life he was
inferior neither to Philip of Macedon, the father
of Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died
in the same year of his age as they did, and he
would doubtless have excelled both of them had
Fortune decreed that he should be bom, not in
Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

PACE

1 6. Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of
Francesco Sforza, who married Beatrice d'Este.
He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and
died in 15 10.

21. "Maintained friendly relations," etc. See re-

mark in the introduction on page xxii. on the
word " intrattenere."

22. Louis XII., King of France, " The Father of the

People," bom 1462, died 1515.

„ Charles VIII., King of France, bom 1470, died
1498.

26. Louis XII. divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of
Louis XL, and married in 1499 Anne of Brit-
tany, widow of Charles VIII. , in order to retain
the duchy of Brittany for the crown.

„ Rouen. The Archbishop of Rouen. He was
George d'Amboise, created a cardinal by Alex-
ander VI. Bom 1460, died 15 10.

49. Hiero IL, bom about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.

54. Francesco Sforza, bom 1401, died 1466. He
married Bianca Maria Visconti, a natural
daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan,
on whose death he procured his own elevation
to the duchy.
„ " Le radici e corrispondenze,'' their roots {i.e.,
foundations) and correspondencies or relations
with other states — a common meaning of
" correspondence " and " correspondency " in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
273

274 Notes and References

PAGE

54. Machiavelli was the accredited agent of the
Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (1478-
1507) during the transactions which led up to
the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at
SinigaUa, and along with his letters to his
chiefs in Florence he has left an account,
written ten years before The Prince, of the
proceedings of the duke in his " Descritione del
modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammaz-
zare Vitellozzo Vitelli," etc., a translation of
which is appended to the present work.

57. SinigaJia, December 31, 1502.

58. Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

61. Alexander VI. died of fever, August 18, 1503.
,, Julius II. was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of

San Pietro ad Vincula, bom 1443, died 151 3.
63. San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is

Asccinio Sforza.
67. Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289

B.C.

72. " Severities." Mr. Burd suggests that this word
probably comes nearer the modern equivaJent
of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of
" crudelta " than the more obvious " cruelties."

80. Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans

under Flamininus in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.

81 . Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in

Machiavelli's " Florentine History," book iii.

92. Charles VIII. invaded Italy in 1494.

94. Pope Leo X. was the Cardinal de' Medici.

98. " With chalk in hand," " col gesso." This is one
of the hon mots of Alexander VI., and refers to
the ease with which Charles VIII. seized Italy,
implying -"-hat it was only necessary for him to
send his quartermasters to chalk up the billets
for his soldiers to conquer the country. Cf.
"The History of Henry VII.," by Lord
Bacon: — " King Charles had conquered the

Notes and References 275

PAGE

realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind of
a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole
length of Italy without resistance: so that it
was true what Pope Alexander was wont to say.
That the Frenchmen came into Italy with
chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings,
rather than with swords to fight."

100. Battle of Caravaggio, September 15, 1448.

,, Johanna II. of Naples, the widow of Ladislao,
King of Naples.

,, Giovanni Acuto. An English knight v/hose name
was Sir John Hawkwood. He fought in the
English wars in France, and was knighted by
Edward III. ; afterwards he collected a body of
troops and went into Italy. These became the
famous " White Company." He took part in
many wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He
was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a
village in Essex. He married Domnia, a
daughter of Bernabo Visconti.

1 01. Carmignuola. Francesco Bossone, born at

Carmagnola about 1390, executed at Venice,
May 5, 1432.

102. Bartolomeo CoUeoe of Bergamo, died 1475.

„ Roberto of San Severino, died fighting for Venice
against Sigismond, Duke of Austria, in 1487.
" Primo capitano in Italia," Machiavelli.

„ Count of Pitigliano. Nicolo Orsini, bom 1442,
died 1 5 10.

„ Battle of Vaila in 1509.

103. Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count

of Cunio in Romagna. He was the leader of
the famous " Company of St. George," com-
posed entirely of Itahan soldiers. He died in
1409.
107. Ferdinand, King of Spain. Ferdinand V. (F. II.
of Aragon and Sicily, F. III. of Naples), sur-
named " The Catholic," born 1452, died 15 16.

276

Notes and References

PAGE

108. The Emperor of Constantinople, Joannes Can-
tacuzenus, bom 1300, died 1383.

no. Charles VII. of France, sumamed " The Victori-
ous," born 1403, died 1461.
„ Louis XI., son of the above, bom 1423, diod 1483.

III. ". . . first disaster to the Roman Empire."
" Many speakers in the House the other night
in the debate on the reduction of armaments
seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance
of the conditions under which the British
Empire maintains its existence. When Mr.
Balfour replied to the allegations that the
Roman Empire sank under the weight of its
military obligations, he said that this was
' wholly unhistorical.' He might well have
added that the Roman power was at its zenith
when every citizen acknowledged his Liability
to fight for the state, but that it began to de-
cUne as soon as this obligation was no longer
recognised." — Pall Mall Gazette, May 15, 1906.

117. Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks," bom
252 B.C., died 183 B.C.

133, " Pistoia to be destroyed;" during the rioting

between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi fac-
tions in 1502 and 1503.

134. Virgil.

"... against my will, my fate,
A throne unsettled, and an infant state.
Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs,
And guard with these severities my shores."

Christ. Pitt.

141. Chapter XVIII. "The present chapter has
given greater offence than any other portion
of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, " II Prin-
cipe," p. 297.
„ " Contesting," i.e., " striving for mastery."
Mr. Burd points out that this passage is
imitated directly from Cicero's "De Ofl&ciis":

Notes and References 277

PAGE

" Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum
per disceptationem, alterum per vimm;
cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc belu-
arum; confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti
non licet superiore."
143. " Nevertheless his deceits alwa)^ succeeded ac-
cording to his wishes." " Nondimanco sempre
gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum)." The
words " ad votum " axe omitted in the Testina
Edition, 1550.

" Alexander never did what he said,
Cesare never said what he did."

Italian Proverb.

„ " Contrary to fidelity " or " faith, " contro alia
fede," and " tutto fede," " altogether faithful,"
on the following page. It is noteworthy that
these t^vo phrases, " contro alia fede " and
" tutto fede," were omitted in the " Testina
Edition," which was published vnth the sanc-
tion of the papal authorities. It may be that
the meaning attached to the word " fede " was
" the faith," i.e., the cathoUc creed, and not
as rendered here " fideUty " and "faithful."
Observe that the word " reUgione " was suffered
to stand in the text of the Testina, being used
to signify indifferently every shade of belief,
as witness " the religion," a phrase invariably
employed to designate the Huguenot heresy.
South in his Sermon IX., p. 69, ed. 1843, com-
ments on this passage as follows: — " That
great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe,
Nicolo Mcichiavel, laid down this for a master
rule in his poUtical scheme : ' That the show of
religion was helpifui to the poUtician, but the
reality of it hurtful amd pernicious.' "

545. " One prince," etc. Ferdinand of Aragon.
" When MachiaveUi was writing The Prince it

278

PAGE

Notes and References

would have been clearly impossible to mention
Ferdinand's name here without giving oSence."
Burd's " II Principe," p. 308.

152. Giovanni Bentivogli, born at Bologna 1438, died
at Milan 1508. He ruled Bologna from 1462
to 1506. Machiavelli's strong condemnation
of conspiracies may get its edge from his own
very recent (February, 15 13), when he had been
arrested and tortured for his alleged com-
plicity in the Boscoli conspiracy.

172. Countess of Forli, Catherine Sforza, a daughter of
Gcileazzo Sforza and Lucrezia Landriani, bom
1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of
Forli that Machiavelli was sent as envoy in
1499. A letter from Fortunati to the Countess
announces the appointment: — " I have been
with the signori," wrote Fortunati, " to learn
whom they would send and when. They tell
me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young
Florentine noble, secretairy to my Lords of the
Ten, is to leave with me at once." Cf.
" Catherine Sforza," by Count Pasolini, trans-
lated by P. Sylvester, 1898.

182. "Guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu."
" Arti " were craft or trade guilds, cf. Florio:
" Arte ... a whole company of any trade in
any city or corporation town." The guilds of
Florence are most admirably described by Mr.
Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject
(Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat
similar character, called " artel," exist in
Russia to-day, cf. Sir Mackenzie Wallace's
"Russia," ed. 1905: "The sons . . . were
always during the working season members of
an artel. In some of the larger towns there
are artels of a much more complex kind — per-
manent associations, possessing large capital,
and pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the

Notes and References 279

PAGE

individual members." The word " artel,"
despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr. Aylmer
Maude assures me, no connection with " ars "
or " arte." Its root is that of the verb
" rotisya," to bind oneself by an oath; and it
is generally admitted to be only another form
of " rota," which now signil&es a " regimental
company." In both words the underlying
idea is that of a body of men united by an oath.
" Tribu " were possibly gentile groups, united
by common descent, and included individuals
connected by marriage. Perhaps our words
" septs " or " clans " would be most appro-
priate.

192. Maximilian I., bom in 1459, died 1519, Emperor
of the Holy Roman Empire. He married,
first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold;
after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus be-
came involved in Italian politics.

203. " Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our
actions." Frederick the Great was accustomed
to say, " The older one gets the more con-
vinced one becomes that his Majesty King
Chance does three-quarters of the business of
this miserable universe." Sorel's " Eastern
Question."

212. "Your illustrious house." Giuliano de' Medici.
He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X.
In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and takes
the title of Clement VII.

214. The battles of II Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499;
Capua, 1501; Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509;
Bologna, 151 1; Mestri, 15 13.

216. " Virtu contro al Furore," etc.

" Virtue against fury shall advance the fight.
And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight;
For the old Roman valour is not dead.
Nor in th* Italians' brests extinguished."

Edward Dacre, 1640.

INDEX

Achilles, meaning of the story
that, was given to the Cen-
taur Chiron to nurse, 141

Agathocles, a Sicilian, became
King of Syracuse, 67 ; the son
of a potter, 67; his ability,
67; Praetor of Syracuse, 68;
his understanding with Amil-
car the Carthaginian, 68;
treacherously kills senators
and richest of the people, 68 ;
attacked Africa, 68; compels
Carthaginians to come to
terms, 68; his cruelty and
wickedness, 69; his success
and security attributed to
his severity, 72

Alberigo da Conio, Romagnian,
first gave renown to mer-
cenary soldiers, 103

Alexander the Great, his con-
quest of Asia, 31; acquisi-
tions of, in Asia, secure after
death of Darius, 34; ease
with which he held the Em-
pire of Asia, 35; how he
armed and organised his
forces should be studied, 112;
imitated Achilles, 118; imi-
tated bv Caesar, 118; liberal
with the results of pillage,
130

Alexander VI., Pope, assisted
by Louis XII. to occupy the
Romagna, 24, 56; difficulties
of, in his attempts to aga^an-
dise his son (Cesare Borgia),
55; the course he foUowed,
56; consented to the entrance
of Louis XII. into Italy, 56;
his death, 61 ; showed how a
pope with money and arms
could prevail, 93; used Duke

Valentino as an instrument,
93; his intention was to ag-
grandise Duke Valentino, not
the Church, 93; but the
Church reaped the benefit, 93 ;
did nothing else but deceive
men, 143

Amilcar the Carthaginian, his
understanding with Aga-
thocles, 68

Antiochus, conflicts of, with
Romans, 22; sent for by the
^tolians to drive out the
Romans, 179

Antoninus CaracaUa, Emperor,
cruel and rapacious, 157; had
excellent qualities, 159; mur-
dered in the midst of his
army, 159

Antonio da Venafro, servant of
Pandolfo Petrucci, 185; sent
to attend the meeting at
Magione, 220

Arms, good, one of the chief
foundations of states, 97

Ascanio, Cardinal, one who had
been injured by Duke Valen-
tino, 63

Auxiliaries (soldiers), useless
and dangerous, 98; rob a
prince in time of peace, 98;
useless to him who seeks their
aid, 107 ; to use, is much more
hazardous than to employ
mercenaries, 108

BagUoni, Gianpagalo, attends
the meeting at Magione, 219

Barons, of Rome, divided into
two factions, Orsini and
Colonnesi, 92; the ambitions
of prelates create disorder
among the, 94
Si

282

Index

Bartolomeo da Bergamo, fought
for the Venetians, 102.

Benedetto Lanfranchi, conspires
against Castruccio Castra-
cani, 256; put to death, 256

Benefits, Machiavelli's rule for
the conferring of, 73; men
bound by those received, as
well as by those conferred, 87

Bentivogli, Annibole, murdered
by the Canneschi, 152

Bentivogli, Giovanni, tyrant of
Bologna, 219; forms an alli-
ance with Duke Valentino,
223

Borgia, Cesare, son [second] of
Pope Alexander, 26; usually
called Duke Valentino, 26;
acquired his state during the
ascendency of his father, 54,
lost it by extreme malignity
of fortune, 55; suspects the
faith of the Orsini, 56, and
of Louis XII., 56; how he
weakened the Orsini and
Colonnesi parties in Rome,
57; crushed the Orsini, 57;
his measures recommended
for imitation, 58, 62; ap-
pointed Ramiro d'Oroo gover-
nor in the Romagna, 62; set
up a com-t of judgment, 62;
seeks new allies and tem-
porises with France, 59;
courses he pursued to
strengthen his position, 60;
his party most numerous in
the College of Cardinals, 60;
Lucca and Siena yield to him,
60; his strong position at the
death of his father, 60; a
statement made by him to
Machiavelli, 61 ; his father's
death and his own sickness
frustrate his designs, 62; his
mistaken policy in allowing
the election of Julius II., 62;
ought to have made a
Spaniard Pope, 63 ; this mis-
take the cause of his ultimate
ruin, 63; takes Oliverotto da
Fermo at Sinigalia, 71; an
instrument of Alexander VI.,

93 ; captured Imola and Forli
with French auxiliaries, 109;
was considered cruel, 133;
sends to King of France for
assistance, 221; a most p>er-
fect dissembler, 222; con-
cludes a peace with his
adversaries, 222 ; forms an
alliance with Giovanni Benti-
vogli, 223; Sinigalia yields to,
224; goes to Fano, 224; his
measures for the destruction
of his enemies, 225 ; orders
his forces to assemble at the
Metauro, 225; receives his
adversaries with apparent
goodwill, 227; causes them to
be strangled, 229

Canneschi, the, killed by the
people for the murder of Anni-
bale Bentivogli, 152

Capua, course followed by
Romans to hold, 40

Cardinals, foster factions in
Rome, and out of it, 94

Carmignuola, a valiant man,
employed by the Venetians,
loi; murdered by the Vene-
tians, 102

Carthage, course followed by
Romans to hold, 40

Carthaginians, compelled by
Agathocles to come to terms,
68; oppressed by their mer-
cenary soldiers, 100

Castruccio Castracani, a man
who did great deeds, 231 ; the
infancy of, 232; is received
into the house of Messer Fran-
cesco Guinigi, 234; acquires
great fame as a captain, 235 ;
appointed governor and tutor
to Pagolo Guinigi, 236; forti-
fies and provisions the tower
of Oresti, 237; commands the
army of the Ghibellines, 238;
decides to join battle with
the Guelphs, 239; his skil-
ful tactics, 239; defeats the
Guelphs, 240; thrown into
prison, 241 ; becomes power-
ful in Lucca, 242; captures

Index

283

Serezzana, 243; created lord
of Lucca, 243; honoured by
Frederic of Bavaria, 243;
enters into a league with
Matteo Visconti, Prince of
Mflan, 245 ; the Poggio family
rebel against, 245; destroys
the Poggio family, 247;
builds a fortress in Lucca,
247; takes Pistoia, 249;
assists Enrico, German gover-
nor of Rome, 250; defeats the
Florentines, 254; Benedetto
Lanfranchi conspires against,
256; Florentines send an
enormous army against, 257;
gives battle on the banks of
the Amo, 259; wins a com-
plete victory, 261; contracts
a fatal iUness, 262; his ad-
dress to Pagolo Guinigi,
262-5; his death, 265; is
buried at San Francesco at
Lucca, 265; his appearance
and character, 266; several
anecdotes of, 267-72; was
not inferior to Philip of Mace-
don or Scipio of Rome, 272

Cesare Borgia. See Borgia

Charles VIL of France, liberates
France from the English, no;
established ordinances for
men-at-arms and infantry,
no; his ordinance, if carried
out, would have made France
unconquerable, in

Charles VIIL of France, his con-
duct compared with that of
Louis XIL, 22; allowed to
seize Italy, 98; over-ran
Italy, 103

Church, Roman, a dominant
power in Italy, 92; not the in-
tention of Alexander VI. to
aggrandise the, 93; became
heir to all Alexander's labours,
93; strong at the election of
Julius II., 93

Cities, three ways to gnvern
conquered, 39; of Germany,
86

Citizens, who solely by good
fortune become princes ex-

perience diflSculties in main-
taining their position, 53;
easy for a courageous prince
to keep steady the xninds of
his, 88

Colonies, should be established
in new principalities, 18;
more advantageous than
maintaining troops in con-
quered dominions, 19

Colonna, Cardinal, one who had
been injured by Duke Valen-
tino, 63

Colonnesi, the, averse to the
aggrandisement of the Pope,
55; beaten by the Duke
Valentino, 56; kept within
bounds by Julius II., 94

Commodus, Emperor, cruel and
rapacious, 157; inherited
the Empire, 160; conspired
against and killed, 160

Cruelty, a prince ought not to
mind reproach of, 133; a new
prince cannot avoid the im-
putation of, 134

Cyrus, an excellent example of
one who by abUity rose to be
a prince, 46; not inferior to
Moses, 46; could not have
succeeded without use of
force, 49 ; imitated by Scipio,
118; Xenophon's life of, 118;
liberal with the results of
pillage, 129

Darius, kingdom of, 31 ; govern-
ment of, 34 ; princes made by,
in Greece and Ionia, 53

David, offered his services to
Saul, no; but rejects Saul's
weapons, no

Ferdinand of Spain, ravaged
Italy, 103; his aid invoked by
Julius II., 107; his deeds all
great, and some extraordi-
nary, 177; used religion as a
plea to undertake great
schemes, 178

Ferrara, Duke of, attacked
by Venetians, and by Pope
Julius II., II

284

Index

Fever, hectic, in^cations of, in
early and late stages, 21; not
at first discemable, iii

Florentines, the, appointed
Paolo Vitelli captain, loi ;
being without arms, sent
French to take Pisa, 108; per-
mitted Pistoia to be destroyed
to avoid reputation of cruelty,
133; support of the, sought
by the members of the meet-
ing at Magione, 220, 221 ;
determine to restore the exiled
Guelphs to Lucca, 238; seize
Montecatini, 238; defeated by
Castruccio Castracani, 240;
again defeated by Castruccio,
254; send an enormous army
against Castruccio, 257; are
completely defeated on the
banks of the Amo, 261

Fortune, what she can effect in
himian affairs, 203 ; is in some
degree manageable, 204; a
man must accommodate him-
self to changes of, 205; is
mastered by the adventurous,
207

France, ruin of, attributed to
greatness of the Church, 27;
kingdom of, how governed,
32; easy to conquer, 33;
difficult to hold, 33; army of,
of a mixed character, iii;
would have been imconquer-
able if ordnance of Charles
VII. had been carried out,
III; one of the best ordered
and governed kingdoms, 153;
reason for the establishment
of the parliament of, 153

Friendship, obtained by pay-
ment cannot be relied upon,
135

Germany, cities of, 86; fortified,
86; public depots containing
a year's provision maintained,
86; military exercises held in
repute in, 86

Giorgio degli Opizi, opposed to
Castruccio Castracani, 236

Goliath, the Philistine cham-
pion, no

Goths, enlistment of the, the
first disaster to the Roman
Empire, in

Government, Roman method of,
in conquered dominions, 21;
of principalities, two different
kinds, 31; of the Tiork, 32;
of France, 33; extreme diffi-
culty in introducing innova-
tions into, and reasons of, 48;
necessity of using force in in-
troducing changes into, 48;
change of form of, a time of
danger to principalities, 81

Government, self, principalities
that have been used to, un-
willing to submit to princes,
17; only safe course to follow,
in order to subdue cities
accustomed to, 40

Gracchi, the, mistaken in trust-
ing to the people of Rome, 81

Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino,
on recovering his dominion
rased all the fortresses, 172^

Guinigi, Francesco, a leader of
the Ghibellines, 233; receives
Castruccio Castracani into his
house, 234; leaves his son
Pagolo to the care of Cas-
truccio Castracani, 236

Guinigi, Pagolo, son of Fran-
cesco, left to the care of Cas-
truccio Castracani, 236; held
in high estimation, 243; suc-
cessor to Castruccio, 265; is
not as fortunate as Castruccio,
266

Hannibal, held together his
enormous array by his in-
human cruelty and valour,
136

"Happy shrewdness," a quality
necessary to a prince, TJ

Hiero the Syracusan, rose from
a private station to be Prince
of Syracuse, 49; his great
ability, 49; his achievements,
50; found mercenary soldiers
useless, 109; destroyed the

Index

285

mercenaries he had employed,
no

Injuries, Machiavelli's rule for
the infliction of, 73

Italy, before entry of Charles
of France, under dominion of
the Pope, the Venetians, the
King of Naples, the Duke of
Milan, and the Florentines,
92; Julius II. intended to
drive the French from, 94;
ruined by resting her hopes on
mercenaries, 98; ruled for
many years by mercenaries,
102; reason divided into so
many states, 102

Johanna, Queen of Naples,
forced to come to terms with
the King of Aragon, 100

Julius II., Pope, attacks Duke
of Ferrara, 1 1 ; his election,
by aid of Duke Valentino, 60 ;
state of the Church at the
election of, 93; intended to
gain Bologna, ruin the Vene-
tians, and drive the French
from Italy, 94; kept the
Orsini and Colonnesi factions
within bounds, 94; invoked
the aid of Ferdinand of Spain,
107; assisted in reaching the
papacy by a reputation for
UbCTality, 128; made wars
without imposing any extra-
CHxiinary tax on his subjects,
128; impetuous in all his
afiairs, 206

Laws, good, one of the chief
foundations of states, 97

Leo, Pope, foimd the Church
most powerful, 94

Liberality, exercised in a way
that does not bring the r^u-
tation for it is injurious, 127;
how a prince should exercise
the virtue of, 127, 128; some-
times dangerous, 129

Lodovico, Duke, repulses Louis
XII., 16

Lorenzo de Medici, the Magni-

ficent, i; urged to liberate
Italy, 212; the necessity for
depending upon national
forces pointed out to, 214

Louis XI. of France, employed
Switzers, no

Louis XII., his occupation of
Milan, 16; his unwise poKcy
in Italy, 23-6; friendly ap-
proaches made to, 23; as-
sisted Pope Alexander to
occupy the Romagna, 24;
how, lost Lombardy, 26; his
marriage dissolved by Pope
Alexander VI., 56; his good
faith doubted by Duke Valen-
tino, 56; assists the Duke to
quell the tumults in the
Komagna, 57; robbed Italy,
103

Machiavelli, Nicolo, a conver-
sation of, with Cardinal
Rouen, 26; recommends the
measures taken by Cesare
Borgia, Duke Valentino, cis
worthy of imitation, 58;
statement made by Duke
Valentino to, 61 ; his rule to
govern infliction of injuries
and bestowal of benefits, 73;
sent by the Florentines to
offer assistance to Duke
Valentino, 221

Magione, meeting of the Vitelli,
Orsini, and their following at,
219

Marcus, Emperor, lived and
died honoured, 156

Maximilian, Emperor, consulted
with no one, 192; being
pliant, was diverted from his
designs, 192

Maximinus, Emperor, a warlike
man, 161; elected to the
throne by the army, 161;
practised many cruelties, 161;
murdered by his own army,
161

Meanness, a vice which wiU
enable a prince to govern, 129

Mercenaries (soldiers), useless
and dangerous. q8 : rob a

286

Index

prince in time of peace, 98;
Italy ruined by resting her
hopes on, 98; captains dan-
gerous whether capable
or not, 99; oppressed the
Carthaginians, 100; ruled
Italy for many years, 102;
first given renown by Alberigo
da Conic, 103; leaders of,
principle that has guided
them, 103; studied to lessen
danger to themselves, 103;
lukewarmness in campaigns,
104; reasons why use of, is
less dangerous than employ-
ment of auxiliaries, 108
Milan, occupied by Louis XII.,
16; Francesco Sforza rose by
great ability to be Duke of,

54
Miserly, a Tuscan term, 122
Moses, an excellent example of
one who by ability rose to be
a prince, 46; could not have
succeeded without use of
force, 49

Nabis, prince of the Spartans,
sustained the attack of all
Greece and a Roman army,
80; reason of his ability to,
80; resisted every attack, 150

Nobles, sometimes create a
prince to withstand the
people, 77; cannot be satis-
fied by a prince by fair deal-
ing, and without injury to
others, 78; danger to a prince
from, and from the people,
compared, 78, 79; two ways
in which nobles should be con-
sidered, 79

Numantia, course followed by
Romans to hold, 40

Oliverotto da Fermo, brought
up by an unde, Giovanni
Fogliani, 69; fought under
Pagolo Vitelli, 69 ; and under
Vitellozzo, 69; resolves to
seize Fermo, 70; causes the
murder of his uncle and the
chiefs of Fermo, 71; over-

reached by Cesare Borgia, 71 ;
attends the meeting at Ma-
gione, 219; sent to Duke
Valentino, 223 ; with his band
waits near Sinigalia, 226;
comes before Duke Valentino,
228; is strangled, 229

Orsini, Duke di Gravini, attends
the meeting at Magione, 219;
comes before Duke Valentino
at Sinigalia, 227; is strangled,
229

Orsini, Signor Paul, mediates
between the Duke Valentino
and the Orsini, 57

Orsini, the, averse to the ag-
grandisement of the Pope, 55 ;
resistance crushed by Duke
Valentino by help of the
French, 57; beaten at Sini-
galia, 71 ; kept within bounds
by Julius II., 94; employed
by Duke Valentino, 109

Pagolo, Signor, attends the
meeting at Magione, 219;
comes before Duke Valentino
at Sinigalia, 227 ; is strangled,
229

Pagolo Vitelli, a soldier, 69

Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of
Siena, ruled more by those
who had been distrusted than
by others, 170; his servant
Antonio da Venafro, 185;
sends Antonio da Venafro to
the meeting at Magione, 220

People, the, sometimes create a
prince to defend them from
the nobles, 78; should be
kept friendly by a prince, 79,
80; only ask not to be op-
pressed by a prince, 80; a
proverb concerning, 81

Pertinax, created Emperor
against the wishes of the
soldiers, 156; came to a sad
end, 156

Philip of Macedon, conflicts of,
with Romans, 22 ; made cap-
tain of their soldiers by the
Thebans, too; took away
the Thebans' liberty, loo;

Index

287

how, organised and armed his
forces should be studied,
112

Pbilopoemen, commended for
his constant study of the rules
of war, 117; his frequent dis-
cussions with friends on the
art of war, 117

Pitigliano, Count of, fought for
the Venetians, 102

Pontificate, the, kept weak and
powerless by armed state of
factions in Rome, 92; short
life of a pope, a cause of weak-
ness to, 93; temporal power
of the, Uttle esteemed in
Italy, 93 ; found most power-
ful by Pope Leo, 94

Prelates, the ambitions of,
create disorder among the
barons of Rome, 94

Prince, ways to obtain the good
graces of a, i ; two ways by
which a, may rise, 67; how
a, ought to live among his
people, 73; " happy shrewd-
ness," a quality necessary
to a, 77; a, cannot by fair
dealing and without injuring
others satisfy the nobles, 78;
danger to a, from nobles, and
from the people, compared,
78, 79; course to be adopted
by a wise, 82; how a coura-
geous, wiU overcome diffi-
culties with his subjects, 87;
a, should personally perform
the duties of captain in case
of war, 99; auxiliaries use-
less to a, who invokes their
aid, 107; a wise, depends on
the arms of his own nation,
108; a, ought to study only
war, its rules and discipline,
115; should guard against
being despised, 115, 130; a,
ignorant of the art of war not
respected by his soldiers, 116;
how a, should train himself
with a view to wax, 116; a,
should read history, 118;
rules of conduct for a, towards
subjects and friends, 121;

necessary for a, to know how
to do wrong, 112; how a,
should exercise the virtue of
liberality, 127, 128; a, ought
to hold a reputation for mean-
ness of little account, i29,'
liberality dangerous to a, 129;
a kind of Liberality necessary
to a, 129; should guard
against being hated, 130; a,
ought to desire to be consi-
dered clement and not cruel,
133; a, should not mind
reproach of cruelty, 133;
whether better for a, to be
loved or feared, 134; safer
for a, to be feared than loved,
134; a, when relies entirely
on men's promises is ruined,
135 ; a, should inspire fear in
such a way as to avoid hatred,
135 ; must keep his hands off
the property of his subjects,
135; to keep faith praise-
worthy in a, 141; a, should
adopt the nature of the fox
and the lion, 142; necessary
for a, to be a dissembler and
pretender, 143; unnecessary
for a, to have all good quali-
ties, but necessary to appear
to have them, 143; a, must
always appear to be merciful,
faithful, humane, upright,
and religious, 144; what
makes a, most hated, 149; a,
must not appear efieminate
or irresolute, 149; a, who is
highly esteemed not easily
conspired against, 150; a,
who is esteemed should hold
conspiracies of little account,
153; factions can never be of
use to a, 169; how a wise,
may increase his renown, 170;
a, must consider why men
favour him, 171; nothing
makes a, so much esteemed
as great enterprises and set-
ting a fine example, 177;
ought to endeavour to gaia
the reputation of being a
great and remarkable man.

288

Index

178; should show himself the
patron of ability, 181; should
entertain the people with
festivals and spectacles, 182;
importance to a, of the choice
of servants, 185; a never
failing test by which a, may
form an opinion of his ser-
vants, 186; how a, should
keep his servants honest, 186 ;
a, should avoid flatterers, 191;
should be a constant inquirer,
192 ; a, not wise himself will
never take good advice, 193;
a new, narrowly observed,
197; a, who relies entirely
upon fortune is lost when it
changes, 204, 205. See also
Princes
Princes, a wise policy for, to-
wards neighbours, 20; the
faith of, how it should be
kept, 26; who by valour ac-
quire a principality, keep it
with ease, 47; who rise from
private citizenship solely by
good fortune experience diffi-
culty in maintaining their
position, 53; how, ought to
live among their people, 73;
sometimes created by nobles
to withstand the people, 77;
sometimes created by the
people to defend them from
the nobles, 78; course which
should be followed by weak,
85; reason for this course,
86; ecclesiastical, alone have
states and do not defend them,
and subjects and do not rule
them, 91; in time of peace
are robbed by mercenaries or
auxiliaries, 98; ought to
study only war, its rules and
discipline, 115; who have
done great things have held
good faith of little account,
141; should leave afifairs of
reproach to others, and keep
afiairs of grace in their own
hands, 154; a custom with,
to build fortresses, 171; irre-
solute, generally ruined, 180;

the secretaries of, 185. Ses
also Prince
Principalities, how many kinds,
7; by what means acquired,
7; hereditary, 11; how to be
ruled and preserved, 11;
mixed, 15; difficulties which
occur in a new, 15 ; annexed,
how to be secured, 17; colo-
nies to be established in new,
18; are governed in two dif-
ferent ways, 31; three ways
to govern, 39 ; new, acquired
by one's own arms and ability,
45 ; which rise unexpectedly
lack firm foundations, 54;
concerning those who obtain
a, by wickedness, 67; civil,
77; are created either by
people, or nobles, yy; liable
to danger when passing from
civil to absolute government,
81; how the strength of all,
should be measured, 85;
ecclesiastical, are acquired
either by capacity or good
fortune, and can be held
without either, 91; ecclesi-
astical, alone are secure and
happy, 91; the chief founda-
tions of, 97; based on mer-
cenary or auxiliary soldiers
neither firm nor safe, 98;
evils in, few can recognise
them beforehand, in; not
secure without their own
forces. III. See also States

Prophets, armed, have been
conquerors, 48 ; unarmed,
have been destroyed, 48.
See Moses

Proverb, a, that " He who
builds on the people, builds
on mud," 80; only partly
true, 81

Pyrrhus, difficulties experienced
bj', in holding conquered
states, 35

Ramiro d'Orco, appointed
governor in the Romagna, 58;
executed by order of Duke
Valentino, 59

Index

289

Republics, more vitality in,
than in dominions ruled by
princes, 40; leaders of, should
perform the duties of captain
personally in case of war, 99

Roberto da San Severino,
fought for the Venetians, 102

Romans, policy followed by, in
conquered countries, 21 ; fore-
saw troubles and repressed
them, 22 ; frequent rebellions
against, 34; course foUowed
by, to hold Capua, Carthage,
Numantia, 40; stood for
many ages armed and free,
99; employment of Goths
the first disaster to the Em-
pire of the. III

Romulus, an excellent example
of one who by ability rose to
be a prince. 46; could not
have succeeded without use
of force, 49

Rouen, Cardinal, 26 ; a conver-
sation of MadiiaveUi with.
26; his relations with Duke
Valentino, 63

Rule, a genersd, he who is the
caiise of another becoming
powerful is ruined, 27

San Giorgio, Cardinal, one who
had been injured by Duke
Valentino, 63

San Pietro ad Vincula, Cardinal,
one who had been injured by
Duke Valentino, 63

Saul, gives his own weapons to
David, no

Savonarola, Girolamo, cause of
his ruin, 49

Scali, Giorgio, mistaken in
trusting to the people of
Florence, 81

Sdpio, imitated Cyrus, 118;
his army ia Spain rebelled
through his too great for-
bearance, 136; upbraided by
Fabius Maximus, 136

Severus, Emperor, cruel and
rapacious, 157; oppressed the
people, 157; knew how to

counterfeit the fox and the
lion, 158; under a pretext
moved the army on Rome,
158; two difl&culties before
him, decided to attack Niger
and deceive Albinus, 158;
caused the death of Albinus,

159

Sfona, Francesco, Milan a new
principality to, 7; rose by
great ability to be Duke of
Milan, 54; enlisted by Milan-
ese against the Venetians,
100; beaten by Venetians
under Carmignuola, loi;
through being martial be-
came Duke, 115

Sforza, Giacomuzzo (father of
Francesco), engaged by Queen
Johanna of Naples, 100

Sinigalia, surrenders to Duke
Valentino, 224; situation of
the city of, 226

Sixtus, Pope, a courageous, 92

Soldan, the, the State of, like
the Christian pontificate, 162

Soldiery, of the several kinds of,

97, 98

Spartans, the, held Athens and
Thebes, 39

States, which rise unexpectedly
lack firm foundations, 54;
difficulties of laying new
fotmdations in acquired, 55;
course to be followed by a
usurper in seizing a, 72 ; eccle-
siastical, alone not defended
by their prince, 91; eccle-
siastical, alone secure and
happy, 91; the chief foimda-
tions of, 97; based on mer-
cenary or auxiliary soldiers
neither firm nor safe, 98. See
also Principalities

Switzers, completely armed and
free, 99; employsd by Louis
XI., no; a source of peril to
France, no; afraid of in-
fantry, 215

Theseus, an excellent example
of one who by ability rose to
be a prince, 46; could not

290

Index

have succeeded without use
of force, 49
Turk, the, difi&culties of seizing
the kingdom of, 32 ; ease with
which the kingdom of, may
be held if conquered, 32

Uguccione of Arezzo, lord of
Pisa, 237; his son killed in
battle, 240; devotes his ener-
gies to destroying Castruccio
Castracani, 241; flies to Lom-
bardy, 242; dies in poverty,
242

Urbino, rebellion at, 221

Vaila, battle at, disastrous to
the Venetians, 102

Valentino, Duke. See Borgia,
Cesare

Venetians, introduced Louis
XII. into Italy, 23, 56; pro-
tectorate of the, over Faenza
and Rimini, 55; Julius II.
intended to ruin the, 94;
overcome by Francesco
Sforza at Caravaggio, 100;
acted safely when they de-
pended on own armed gentle-
men and plebeians, loi ; under
Carmignuola beat Duke of

Milan, loi; mercenary cap-
tains employed by, 102;
serious consequences of a
battle at Vaila to the, 102;
fostered the Guelph and Ghi-
belline factions, 169; their
alliance with France caused
the ruin of the, 181

Vitelli, Nicolo, demolished two
fortresses in Citta di Castello,
172

Vitelli, Pagolo, appointed cap-
tain by the Florentines, loi

Vitelli, the, beaten by Duke
Valentino at Sinigalia, 71 ;
employed by Duke Valentino,
109

Vitelli, Vitellozzo, attends the
meeting at Magione, 219;
comes before Duke Valentino,
227; is strangled, 229

War, its rules and discipline
should be the only study of
princes, 115; how a prince
should train himself in pre-
paration for, 116; use and
value of a training for, 117;
the rules of, continually
studied by Philopoemen, 117

Xenophon, his life of Cyrus, 118

M»oi At Tmb
TeMPL« Press

CTCHWORTH
IN GREAT BRITAfU

EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY

By ERNEST RHYS

VICTOR HUGO said a Library was "an act of faith,"
and some unknown essayist spoke of one so beautiful,
so perfect, so harmonious in all its parts, that he who
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X

the New Europe which we hope will now preserve its peace unde
the auspices of the League of Nations set up at Geneva,

That is only one small item, however, in a library list whic
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of this huge provision is, as a matter of course, given to th
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the directors and editors contrived to keep in mind that books
like men and women, have their elective affinities. The presen
volume, for instance, will be found to have its companion books
both in the same section and even more significantly in othei
sections. With that idea too, novels like Walter Scott's Ivanhoi
and Fortunes of Nigel, Lytton's Harold, and Dickens's Tale oj
Two Cities have been used as pioneers of history and treated as
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ing to grow more documentary and less literary; and "the
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"You only, 0 Books," said Richard de Bury, ''are liberal and
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the wisdom and the wit which are at the disposal of Everyman
in his own Hbrary may well, at times, seem to him a Httle
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learn how Cleomira dances, when the elegance of her motion is
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and innocence of her thoughts." He may turn to Plato's Phaedrus

__ 3 —

'and read how every soul is divided into three parts (like Caesar's
Gaul). He may turn to the finest cntic of Victonan times,
Matthew Arnold, and find in his essay on Maurice de Guerin
the perfect key to what is there called the "magical power of
poetry." It is Shakespeare, with his

"daffodils
That come before the swallow dares, and take
The winds of March with beauty;"

^it is Wordsworth, with his

"voice . . . heard
In spring-time from the cuckoo-bird.
Breaking the silence of the seas
Among the farthest Hebrides;"

or Keats, with his

". . . . moving waters at their priest-like task
Of cold ablution round Earth's human shores."

WiUiamHazlitt's" Table Talk," among the volumes of Essays,
may help to show the relationship of one author to another,
which is another form of the Friendship of Books. His incom-
parable essay in that volume, "On Going a Journey," forms a
capital prelude to Coleridge's "Biographia Literaria" and to
his and Wordsworth's poems. In the same way one may turn to
the review of Moore's Life of Byron in Macaulay's Essays as a
prelude to the three volumes of Byron's own poems, remember-
ing that the poet whom Europe loved more than England did
was as Macaulay said: "the beginning, the middle and the end
of all his own poetry." This brings us to the provoking reflection
that it is the obvious authors and the books most easy to reprint
which have been the signal successes out of the seven hundred
odd in the series, for Everyman is distinctly proverbial in his
tastes. He likes best of all an old author who has worn well or

— 4 —

a comparatively new author who has gained something like news
paper notoriety. In attempting to lead him on from the gooc
books that are known to those that are less known, the pub-
lishers may have at times been too adventurous. The Chie)
himself (as a mere editor may say) has been much more than
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thrown himself into it with the zeal of a book-lover and indeed
of one who, like Milton, thought that books might be as alive
and productive as dragons' teeth, which, being "sown up and
down the land, might chance to spring up armed men."

V

JC 143 .M3813 1908 SMC

Machiavelli, Niccolo,

1469-1527.
The prince /

AKG-2662 (mcsk)

I

II

■liU